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Executive Summary 
Introduction 
This report summarises the background, design and methods, and key findings from an 
independent evaluation of the Collective Action for Nutrition (CAN) Social Audit programme 
designed and implemented by the Odisha-based non-governmental organisation (NGO) 
Society for Promoting Education and Rural Development (SPREAD) and supported by Azim 
Premji Philanthropic Initiatives (APPI). The evaluation was led by the Institute of 
Development Studies (IDS), UK in partnership with Development Corner Consulting (DCOR), 
India. Findings are intended to provide evidence on the effectiveness of the social audit 
model and feed into future plans for replication and scale-up. 
Background 
The first two sections of the report present the background to the intervention and the 
evaluation design. 
Whilst India has seen steady improvements in health and nutrition services over the past 
decade, as reflected in some improvements in nutrition outcomes (e.g. infant mortality rates, 
child stunting rates), significant quality and coverage issues remain at community level, 
meaning that wide disparities in nutrition outcomes still exist based on inequities of 
socioeconomic status, caste, ethnicity, gender, and geography. 
Social accountability approaches, including social audits, offer a demand-driven alternative to 
improving delivery of state nutrition-related services. India has a long history of innovation in 
social accountability approaches with social audits now institutionalised in a number of 
national policies and programmes including the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural 
Employment Guarantee Act (MGNREGA) and the National Food Security Act (NFSA 2013), 
which is the focus of the CAN programme and this evaluation. The NFSA aims to improve 
food and nutrition security to citizens by bringing together four existing programmes: the 
Targeted Public Distribution System (TPDS); the Midday Meals (MDM) programme; 
Integrated Child Development Services (ICDS), and the Maternity Entitlement Scheme 
(MAMATA). 
The Odisha-based NGO SPREAD works to empower marginalised communities to access 
their rights. Their geographic focus is six districts (Balangir, Nuapada, Kalahandi, Malkangiri, 
Koraput, and Nabarangpur) of the ‘KBK+’ districts of Odisha.1 The three-year CAN 
programme’s overall goal is ‘Reducing malnutrition among children and women by facilitating 
efficient implementation of food and nutrition programmes, ensuring transparency, downward 
accountability, and community participation.’ The programme is running between August 
2016 and July 2019. The main intervention focus is a social audit process designed to 
sensitise communities to their rights and entitlements under the four primary schemes 
covered by the NFSA. Interim outcomes expected include increased knowledge and uptake 
of NFSA services, improved participation in community-level governance activities 
(especially by women), and improved institutional delivery of nutrition services and 
entitlements. The longer-term outcome anticipated is reduced malnutrition amongst target 
communities, particularly for women and children, as a result of increased uptake and 
improved institutional delivery. 
                                               
1
 A number of more marginalised districts which were bounded originally by older boundaries of Koraput, Balangir, and 
Kalahandi. 
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The SPREAD programme design divides the intervention into three main phases: the pre-
social audit, social audit, and post-social audit phase. All three phases involve interaction 
with a wider range of community and state actors, including NFSA rights holders in the 
community, government officials, community leaders, and service providers. During the pre-
social audit phase, the social audit calendar is developed, community volunteers (Samikshya 
Sathis – SSs) are recruited, and social audit teams are set up. In this phase, intensive 
campaigns are also conducted as build-up activities for the social audit. During the intensive 
seven-day social audit process in each intervention Gram Panchayat (GP), a series of 
meetings and activities take place, including initial village meetings, focus group discussions 
(FGDs) with local council members (the Panchayati Raj Institution – PRI), field surveys, data 
collection with NFSA rights holders and verification of registers and documentation, followed 
by data compilation, and report writing.  
The process culminates in the organisation of a public hearing taking the form of a formal 
village council (PRI) meeting (a Gram Sabha – GS) to share findings and grievances raised 
as part of the data collection. During the post-social audit phase, the social audit team are 
expected to follow up on NFSA grievance redressal with the relevant government officials 
being accountable. In the post-audit social ‘follow-up’ stage, the CAN programme also began 
work on nutrition behavioural change via a further participatory learning and action (PLA) 
model, but this part of the intervention is not covered or evaluated here as it fell outside of 
the period and scope of the evaluation. 
Evaluation design 
To assess the impact and operation of this model, the evaluation was tasked with the 
following two overarching objectives: 
1. To determine the short-term impact of the SPREAD model of social audits on 
improving the delivery of nutrition services and entitlements, as well as the uptake of 
these services by target groups; 
 
2.  To understand how the social audit process leads to: 
a. Changes in knowledge, behaviour, and practice at the household level 
b. Community-level changes and outcomes. 
 
The design consists of three interwoven methodological components designed to 
complement each other as part of a mixed methods theory-based design which draws on the 
programme’s theory of change (Figure 1). These include: 
1. A quantitative component, based on a rigorous experimental survey design which 
measures the impact of the social audit on a range of outcomes; 
2. A process evaluation component, which documents critical processes, mechanisms, 
and outputs to assess quality of the implementation of the social audit programme; 
3. A qualitative community-based study, which explores community-level perceptions 
and contextual factors related to the outcomes of the social audit. 
 
The quantitative baseline survey was conducted in December 2017–January 2018, followed 
by an endline survey in April–May 2018. This was shortly followed by the community-based 
qualitative and process fieldwork carried out in July–August 2018. Programme data used for 
the process evaluation were collected and analysed throughout the evaluation. Final mixed 
methods data analysis, synthesis, and triangulation was undertaken between September–
November 2018. 
The quantitative evaluation is based on an experimental design in which the timing of the 
social audits was randomly varied across the local administrative units (GPs), to enable a 
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causal estimation of the impact of the social audits. Specifically, the impact estimates are 
based on exogenous variations in the length of time between the social audit and the endline 
data collection. Treatment assignment was done at the GP level, with GPs randomly 
assigned into an ‘Early’ group (E) and ‘Late’ group (L). In the Early group, the gap between 
the social audit and endline data collection is about three months, whereas in the Late group, 
it is one month. As such, the focus of the design is on the more immediate outcomes of the 
project, rather than longer-term outcomes. 
Quantitative findings draw on two sources of comparisons: (i) the experimental comparison 
between Early and Late GPs (based on differences in or on endline levels of the outcomes), 
and (ii) the before–after comparison in all GPs. Combining both sources of comparisons 
allows us to ascertain if there had been any impact directly as a result of the intervention; as 
well as whether the impact was immediate and short-lived (changes significantly higher in 
‘Late GPs’), or cumulative (changes significantly higher in ‘Early GPs’). This model had 
limitations, however, as firstly, such a short duration between baseline and endline means 
that the evaluation focuses on the short-term impacts to communities participating in the 
social audit, even though we know that such processes of accountability and empowerment 
require a long time to filter through to improvements in service delivery (if at all). Secondly, 
because if desired results improved, in both Early and Late GPs, we would be unable to tell 
whether such improvements were the result of the communities’ participation in the 
programme; or simply wider societal or service delivery changes that were picked up during 
this period of time. 
Despite these limitations, this research design still enables us to rigorously assess the effects 
of social audits, despite the constraint of having all GPs receiving the intervention in phase 1 
of the programming. 
Outcomes were measured through pre- and post-social audit questionnaires administered to 
primary caregivers (PCs) of a child below 24 months, pregnant women, men (typically the 
husbands of caregivers or pregnant women), adolescent girls, Anganwadi workers (AWWs), 
Accredited Social Health Activist (ASHA) workers, and Sarpanchs. Specific outcomes 
measured include knowledge of households of NFSA entitlements; access to and uptake of 
health and nutrition services; the perceived quality and responsiveness of health and 
nutrition services; food security and Infant and Young Child Feeding (IYCF) knowledge and; 
participation in community-level governance and civic attitudes. For the quantitative sample, 
a total of 116 GPs (58 in each treatment arm) were selected. Given 20 observations 
(households) per GP and an intra-cluster correlation coefficient of 10 per cent, 116 GPs 
allowed for detection of an effect size of 0.22 standard deviations with a statistical power of 
80 per cent. The number of households was later increased to 24 per GP, thus raising the 
statistical power to 8 per cent. For GP-level outcomes, for which there is only one 
observation per GP, we are able to detect an effect size of 0.5 standard deviation with a 
statistical power of 80 per cent. 
The process evaluation component drew on a range of primary and secondary qualitative 
and quantitative data sources, including programme documents, and Management 
Information System (MIS) data, community-level in-depth interviews (IDIs), and FGDs with 
community members, SPREAD/SS (volunteer) staff, and others and the evaluation’s 
quantitative data. The qualitative evaluation component methods were based on community-
level IDIs and FGDs with community members, government officials, SPREAD/SS/social 
audit team members and NFSA service providers. Community-level data collection for both 
qualitative and process components was incorporated into the same tools and fieldwork 
process. A total of 11 villages were selected as case studies from across three districts 
(Balangir, Kalahandi, Koraput) based on a stratified random sample from the quantitative 
evaluation sample. A total of 121 IDIs and 80 FGDs were conducted.  
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Figure 1 Theory of change developed for use by the evaluation 
 
Source: Authors’ own. 
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Findings 
Section 3 of the report contains our findings on the CAN programme’s design, 
implementation, and processes. These present a largely positive picture, albeit with some 
challenges faced and areas for further improvement. The programme model was built on 
existing experience and best practice, relied on the use of comprehensive guidelines (such 
as the Social Audit Manual), was modified through an extensive piloting process and suitably 
adapted to the local context to meet the programme’s objectives. In terms of staffing, 
SPREAD recruited over 700 people at all organisational levels (state, block, district, GP) with 
only a few minor delays to recruitment and some staff turnover which didn’t appear to affect 
implementation. 
Extensive staff training and staff development activities were conducted at all levels and 
covered a range of approaches including participatory, group, and practice exercises 
supported by adequate induction materials and resources. Specific detailed training was 
conducted for the Samakhya Sathis (SS – the two volunteers recruited locally in each GP). 
Training was also undertaken with Gaon Kalyan Samiti and PRI members, and involved 
other relevant organisations. This helped develop trust and community/local governance 
relations. The selection of areas to work on based on nutrition vulnerability appear sensible, 
as was the decision to move to blanket coverage of Anganwadi Centres (AWCs) in 
implementation areas. However, given the model’s intensity of personnel and resource 
requirements, a more streamlined, leaner model may be required for further scale-up. 
For MIS, SPREAD relied on a new mobile-based system to collect real-/near-time data on all 
aspects of the social audit process. This included AWC and Fair Price Shop verifications, 
along with checks on midday meals in schools; as well as interviews with 20 per cent of 
ICDS beneficiaries from each Anganwadi centre. This data were compiled and shared with 
the community and relevant stakeholders at the end of the social audit in each GP. Some 
delays and challenges were faced in setting up and implementing the MIS approach but 
overall, it was deemed successful in enabling the team to better streamline data entry, 
cleaning, and analysis, and enable real-time monitoring, decision-making, and sharing with 
the community during public hearings. Some gaps in the effective monitoring of longer-term 
outcomes were identified. 
Overall, many community members reported that their participation in the social audit 
process was a positive experience and was a useful tool to voice concerns, increase access 
to services, and involve communities directly in resolving grievance issues. Most government 
officials and NFSA service providers considered it to be a positive, useful, and well-managed 
process, although some NFSA service providers felt that issues with the TPDS couldn’t be 
solved by an NGO and could only be addressed at a ‘higher level’. 
Over half (59 per cent) of primary caregivers surveyed said that they knew what a social 
audit was and a similar proportion (57 per cent) said that they were aware that a social audit 
had taken place in their GP, though there was substantial variation in awareness levels 
across districts (ranging from 40–80 per cent). Some village-level (Palli Sabha – PS) and 
wider Gram Sabha (the formal administrative unit often incorporating more than one village) 
meeting attendance issues were highlighted. The SPREAD team made efforts to address 
these issues through early and continued positive engagement with communities and 
officials. Difficulties were faced by the social audit team in improving immediate access to 
nutrition entitlements and ensuring that grievances remained focused on nutrition issues as 
opposed to other issues (including housing, roads, etc.). 
In terms of participation rates, around one in five men (18 per cent) and women (23 per cent) 
from the quantitative sample attended the Palli Sabha. For women – but not for men – 
participation in the Gram Sabhas was much lower (10 per cent) than in the Palli Sabhas. The 
main reasons for lack of attendance at the GS were slightly different between men and 
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women: both highlighted that they were busy and lacked time (62 per cent for women and 44 
per cent for men), but men were more likely to be absent from the village at the time of the 
meeting (38 per cent). Qualitative data suggest other possible reasons for non-participation 
included women’s status in the household and because someone else in the household 
participated. 
Section 4 of the report considered the evidence we have gathered on the outcomes mapped 
in the theory of change (Figure 1) relating primarily to awareness and knowledge of services, 
entitlements, and grievance redressal avenues; access to and satisfaction with services; use 
of grievance redressal and broader measures of community participation and empowerment. 
We also considered the broader impacts on food security and IYCF knowledge. 
In terms of knowledge of NFSA services, entitlements, and grievance mechanisms, we see 
some significant changes, varying by service. Knowledge about the ICDS service of Take-
Home Ration (THR) improved amongst caregivers and pregnant women, the latter seeing 
some very high changes (+25/+21 pp early/late). With no significant differences between 
Early and Late GPs we cannot be sure that these changes are cumulative or indeed 
connected to the social audit process. However, in the absence of other supply- or demand-
side activities happening with regard to ICDS during this period, it is hard to rule out their 
connection to the CAN programme. 
Awareness and knowledge of the MAMATA scheme and entitlements did significantly 
improve for the target group of pregnant women between baseline and follow-up. Such 
changes tend to be significantly more marked in Early GPs, indicating a cumulative positive 
impact of social audits. 
Knowledge about the TPDS improved substantially or very substantially amongst all groups 
sampled – caregivers, pregnant women, and men. These included variables measured such 
as overall knowledge of entitlements and knowledge about PDS committees. The changes 
for men were the most marked and were also more pronounced in Early than Late GPs. This 
suggests that these impacts were due to cumulative exposure to the social audit process and 
the community-level activities it set into motion. More detailed views of those who 
participated in the community IDIs and FGDs lend further credence to the view that such 
gains in knowledge were related to attendance at social audit events and processes. 
In terms of access to, uptake of, and satisfaction with NFSA services and entitlements, we 
see a more varied pattern but which includes improvement in some areas across all services. 
For ICDS, we saw an increase in the likelihood that a child was provided with special food 
following growth monitoring, and a small but statistically significant increase in referral to 
rehab centres after monitoring. Neither of these changes differed significantly between Early 
and Late GPs, however. 
For MAMATA, we see significant increases (+22pp) in enrolment amongst pregnant women 
in the Late GPs (increases in Early GPs were not statistically significant) and a significant 
increase (+31 pp) in pregnant women being satisfied by MAMATA. The latter change was 
significantly different between early and late groups, suggesting that the change in 
satisfaction was based cumulatively on length of exposure to the social audit and the 
processes it set in motion. 
For TPDS, we see improvements for all groups sampled, but particularly for men, including 
decreases (-7pp) in men reporting having to pay extra money at the ration shop in Early GPs, 
and a higher likelihood of having been assigned an Aadhar number (+5pp). Both these 
changes are significantly different between early and late groups, suggesting a cumulative 
effect of the social audit process. Other changes where we cannot detect a significant 
difference between Early and Late GPs include, amongst primary caregivers, improvements 
and likelihood to have an Aadhar number, likelihood that ration shops deliver food on a 
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monthly basis, satisfaction with the TPDS, and the quantity of the food ration. Although these 
changes can’t be directly linked to the social audit process, the magnitude of the changes in 
some cases (e.g. 32pp increases in ration shops delivering food monthly in Early GPs and 
46pp in Late GPs) and the absence of other major supply- or demand-side changes 
observed during this period are highly suggestive that these changes are related to the CAN 
programme. This view is supported by the information garnered from some of the individuals 
who participated in the community IDIs and FGDs, who reported increases in access and 
availability of all the services that were the target of the social audit. 
However, it is also the case that other participants in IDIs and FGDs complained that there 
have been no changes since the social audit, or discussed the fact that expected 
improvements in services they thought would result from their village’s participation in the 
CAN programme has not happened. Others still, stressed that they had difficulty accessing 
the services (or actively participating in services) due to their marginalisation in village life, as 
a result of poverty, caste, or tribal status. 
Some of the most surprising results in the outcomes measured relate to use of and 
confidence to use grievance redressal processes, particularly in light of the results on the 
positive effects of social audits, on knowledge of these processes, and on community 
participation. Confidence in an ability to raise issues regarding ICDS, MAMATA, and TPDS 
went down, with the difference between early and late groups statistically significant. We 
have been unable to explain these changes as the data we gathered in community IDIs and 
FGDs suggest that – in some cases at least – people’s confidence about the use of these 
processes had improved. The fact that the decrease in confidence is less marked in Early 
GPs than in Late GPs lends some support to the hypothesis that after having learnt more 
about service entitlements, peoples’ expectations increased beyond a level that they felt 
could be adequately met by simply complaining to the service providers. This hypothesis is 
also somewhat supported by the IDIs and FGDs we undertook with the service providers 
themselves, who reported that complaints had gone up but that they were frustrated that a lot 
of what was being complained about was not within their power to address (as these had 
more to do with systemic supply-side constraints). 
Our findings on community empowerment and voice in local nutrition-related decision-making 
strongly support the view that social audits led to very large positive changes in the civic life-
related attitudes of caregivers and pregnant women. Both groups of women became more 
positive about citizens being engaged in civic life and about states being responsive to 
citizens’ demands. Social audits also strongly enhanced the community participation of 
pregnant women and the political participation of caregivers (both effects are seen in Early 
GPs only, which is evidence of a cumulative impact of social audits in this regard). 
Qualitative data provide a number of further illustrations of people’s growing sense of 
awareness of the forms of redressal and of being able to voice their problems. Qualitative 
data also suggested that people became increasingly motivated to take part in community life 
via their membership of committees as a means to solve future problems. But our qualitative 
research also emphasised how entrenched power structures are in villages, and how the 
realities of daily life may limit the participation of others. 
Again, surprisingly, the changes we see in IYCF/nutrition-related knowledge and practices 
are not positive. In fact, nutrition knowledge scores amongst primary caregivers declined in 
Early GPs – with the only positive result being amongst those in Late GPs and relating to 
‘other nutrition knowledge’. Declines in knowledge are not present in Late GPs, suggesting 
that social audits exert a cumulative effect of knowledge. This could be due to the delivery of 
nutrition knowledge being different in Late and Early GPs (this is an area that deserves 
further exploration by SPREAD and which they report is being actively addressed now in 
follow-up activities), and/or with service providers being diverted away from nutrition 
counselling towards other tasks as a result of the social audits. 
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Our findings on food security and dietary diversity show very significant improvements in 
dietary diversity scores for women and children. However, as nutritional knowledge amongst 
samples had not improved during that time and in some cases had deteriorated (with 
nutrition knowledge actually decreasing in Early GPs), it is hard to link this change to the 
social audits (although neither can we formally rule out the possibility that social audits had 
an immediate impact). Some other plausible explanations are that income changed 
significantly during this period as a result of greater livelihood opportunities, or that these are 
seasonal variations in food availability. Some mothers interviewed as part of the community 
IDIs and FGDs, however, do link the social audit to changes in their children’s diets. Further 
work will be needed to understand changes in this area. 
Similar to above, findings on occurrence, and awareness of village health and nutrition days 
showed significant improvements in both Early and Late GPs. The quantitative data made it 
difficult to attribute this to the social audits, although it is plausible, particularly given the 
limited positive evidence from the qualitative data that the audits exerted an immediate 
effect, given the scale of changes seen. 
Conclusions 
Section 5 of the report summarises earlier sections and provides broader conclusions on the 
suitability of the model for the purposes of the programme. 
In terms of implementation, SPREAD have clearly shown the ability to put in place a large 
and complex operation – including the recruitment and management of several hundred staff 
– and implement the social audit process in a way that was mostly welcomed by those in the 
communities we surveyed or interviewed; most service providers and government officials. 
Operating at this scale and with the political acumen to do so in a way that was well 
integrated into local democratic institutions and government services (the PRIs, the Palli 
Sabhas, the Gram Sabhas, as well as securing the participation of local officials of the 
concerned services) is an immense first hurdle that many organisations might fail at without 
proper thought and experience. This is very positive, albeit a high bar for replicability 
elsewhere, including at larger or less resource-intensive scales. Even bearing in mind these 
positive findings, participation rates were not uniformly high. Whether participation rates (at 
around 23 per cent for the Palli Sabha amongst women and 10 per cent for the Gram Sabha) 
could have been higher depends a little on one’s expectations of poor communities’ capacity 
to spend at least several hours participating in such an exercise. This may be a question of 
design assumptions as much as a question of implementation. 
We observed positive changes in nearly all the areas in which we measured outcomes. In 
some areas, we cannot relate changes directly and rigorously to communities’ participation in 
the CAN programme for reasons of the limitations explained in terms of the methodology. 
However, this includes some large changes in both Early and Late GPs referred to above, for 
which we cannot as yet offer alternative explanations. Changes in dietary diversity for both 
women and children, however, though substantial, similarly did not differ between early and 
late groups and because these changes could plausibly be explained by other factors of 
increased income and food availability, we are more cautious in linking them to the presence 
of the social audit. 
Outcomes that we measured and which showed significant difference between Early and 
Late GPs (results were all higher in Early as compared to Late GPs, suggesting a cumulative 
impact as the result of exposure) included awareness and knowledge of, and satisfaction 
with, the MAMATA scheme amongst pregnant women, knowledge of entitlements and PDS 
committees, decreases in having to pay extra money at a ration shop, and increases in 
Aadhar registration amongst men; enhanced community participation amongst pregnant 
women; and political participation amongst primary caregivers. 
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Finally, there are two areas in which we see outcomes changing in the opposite way to which 
we would have hoped – the confidence of those surveyed to raise issues with service 
providers and in women’s IYCF knowledge scores. Qualitative data provide some support to 
the hypothesis that the former is due to the immediate rise in expectations not being met. We 
also note that the social audit process did not prioritise IYCF knowledge and many of the 
service improvements were concerned with delivery of hard outputs (THR, PDS, etc.) rather 
than improving the ‘softer’ skills and delivery tasks of frontline workers such as AWWs, who 
have responsibility for nutrition counselling. Wider evidence from India and elsewhere shows 
that without a concerted, sustained, high-intensity, and well-supported effort to change IYCF 
knowledge, such changes in knowledge – and certainly practice – will not happen. As this 
was not a core part of the CAN programme, such changes are therefore not so difficult to 
understand. 
In summary and in terms of the original objectives of the evaluation, we do see sufficient 
evidence that the social audit model has the potential to improve delivery and uptake of 
NFSA services. These service improvements and uptake were not uniformly positive for all 
target groups, but in some areas, the changes were significant and directly linked to 
communities’ participation in the social audit processes. The social audit did also lead to 
changes in knowledge, behaviour, and practice at a household level in terms of participation 
in the social audit itself and increased desire to participate in aspects of civic life such as 
committees related to NFSA delivery. Nutrition and IYCF knowledge, however, did not 
change. Given that this was not an objective of the evaluation and would not have been 
possible given our design and methods, we cannot offer a definitive answer to the question 
of whether a social audit design can result in changes in maternal and child nutritional status 
within the context of the delivery of NFSA services in Odisha. However, some of the changes 
we see are of a magnitude rarely witnessed in terms of the Indian services covered by the 
NFSA, or local democracy strengthening, whether in terms of knowledge/awareness, 
participation/empowerment, and service delivery/satisfaction. There is good evidence that 
SPREAD is well placed to continue to implement this model effectively. As the programme is 
continuing into its next phase, we make some further recommendations for its ongoing 
implementation in the final section. 
 
Implications for CAN programme Phase 2 design 
 IYCF knowledge more central; AWW (and others’) roles in nutrition behaviour change 
communication (BCC) more central; 
 Further operational research and attention to differences in social audit (SA) 
participation rates, particularly amongst women and more marginalised groups – and 
to take into account other calls on time (work/household chores, migration); 
 Further work to understand why confidence to raise issues declines immediately after 
SA; 
 Further work to build on positive results in terms of knowledge, access, and 
satisfaction across the services – and willingness to participate in community 
life/committees. 
 
Longer-term implementation, scalability questions/research 
 Different intensities of length of exposure/rate of exposure (how many times/year) 
 Different organisational structures – less resource intensive? 
 Increased level of policy engagement with state-level actors through strategic 
partnerships /networks to address service bottlenecks at district and state-level. 
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1 Introduction and background 
1.1 Context of report 
Azim Premji Philanthropic Initiatives (APPI) has identified fighting malnutrition in India as one 
of their strategic focal areas of work. In 2015, they signed a Memorandum of Understanding 
(MOU) with the Government of Odisha to work collaboratively to reduce malnutrition in the 
state, with a particular focus on stunting reduction amongst women, adolescent girls, and 
children under five years. In order to achieve this goal, APPI has been working closely with a 
number of existing public service delivery platforms over the past three years including the 
Integrated Child Delivery Services (ICDS) as well as various networks of civil society 
organisations, private sector stakeholders, and community actors. Sixteen key areas of 
intervention focus were identified which included governance accountability. 
As part of this strategic effort, in August 2016, APPI entered into a new partnership with the 
Odisha-based NGO Society for Promoting Rural Education and Development (SPREAD) to 
design and roll out a three-year community accountability social audit programme entitled 
‘Collective Action for Nutrition’ (CAN). In December 2017, APPI commissioned the Institute of 
Development Studies (IDS) to act as the lead technical partner in the design and 
implementation of an evaluation of the CAN programme to assess its effectiveness. 
This final report summarises the background, evaluation design and methods, main findings, 
and recommendations from the evaluation, incorporating primary and secondary qualitative 
and quantitative data collection. The main target users of the report are APPI, SPREAD, and 
the Government of Odisha, as well as others wanting to learn from the social accountability 
model. It is hoped that findings will feed into ongoing plans and preparations for the next 
phase of the social audit programme due to commence in December 2018. 
1.2 Undernutrition in Odisha 
Over the past decade, India’s coverage of basic health and nutrition services has steadily 
improved, partly as a result of universalisation of the government’s Integrated Child 
Development Services (ICDS), which provides health, nutrition, and education services to 
young children. Despite substantial investments in roll-out, however, significant coverage and 
quality issues remain at community-level (Avula et al. 2015; Das Gupta et al. 2005). Less 
than 55 per cent of mothers and children receive any essential health and nutrition inputs 
(Avula et al. 2015), 38.4 per cent of children under five are stunted and under 10 per cent of 
children aged 6–23 months receive an adequate diet (Ministry of Health and Family Welfare 
(2016). 
Odisha has an estimated poverty rate of 32.6 per cent which masks the social and spatial 
variation of poverty and inequity across the state (Thomas et al. 2015). For example, rural 
poverty rates in the KBK+ districts are 68 per cent compared to the state rural average of 
46.9 per cent. There have been some notable overall improvements in health and nutrition 
outcomes in recent years; for example, infant mortality rates have declined from 65 per cent 
in 2005/6 to 40 per cent in 2015/16, and rates of stunting in children under five years (height 
for age) have fallen from 45 per cent to 34.1 per cent in this same period (less than the 
national average of 38.4 per cent). However, the incidence of child wasting (weight for 
height) has increased from 19.6 per cent to 20.4 per cent; 34.4 per cent of children under five 
are underweight; and rates of women with anaemia have risen from 51 per cent to 61.1 per 
cent (Ministry of Health and Family Welfare 2016). In addition to this, major inequalities of 
nutrition outcomes still exist based on socioeconomic status, caste, ethnicity, gender, and 
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geography. Therefore, fighting malnutrition, particularly for children and women, remains a 
major concern and priority. 
1.3 Social accountability and social audits 
Much of the global focus on addressing the high burden of malnutrition has been on 
strengthening supply-side institutions and policies (Waldman, Reed and Hrynick 2017; 
Gillespie and Margetts 2013). However, recent accountability literature suggests that this 
approach is too technocratic and ‘top down’, treating individuals as passive users rather than 
active citizens that engage with state services in multiple ways (Fox 2015). ‘Social 
accountability’ approaches offer an alternative model that emphasises demand-side citizen 
participation in state processes to help shape service improvements. A plethora of initiatives 
have emerged under this umbrella, including social audits, community scorecards, and 
citizen report cards (Gaventa and McGee 2013). Whilst approaches vary, most share an 
interest in the power of information and assume that by publicly exposing weaknesses in 
services, government actors will be forced to respond and improve service delivery 
(Houtzager and Joshi 2008). Several recent reviews focusing on social accountability (e.g. 
Fox 2015; McGee and Gaventa 2011; Joshi 2013) point to the growing but mixed evidence of 
their impact, which they attribute in part to a lack of clear theories of change or lack of 
rigorous study design. A few studies have reported significant impacts, including for example, 
in service delivery in India (Ravindra 2004) and Uganda (Björkman and Svennson 2009). 
Nonetheless, there is a need for more theory-based research and evidence to understand 
the particular impact pathways and contextual assumptions that might explain the reasons 
for success and failure of this type of approach. Findings from this evaluation will be used to 
contribute to this evidence gap. 
India has been at the forefront of innovation in social accountability initiatives across many 
sectors (Pande 2007) and the use of social audits to expose and address state corruption in 
particular has gained widespread recognition (Fox 2015; Maiorano 2014). In their Social 
Audit Manual of the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act 
(MGNREGA), India’s Ministry of Rural Development define a social audit as ‘verification of 
implementation of a programme/scheme and its result by the community with active 
involvement of the primary stake holders’ (GoI 2005). Emerging from informal citizen-led 
action alongside the Right to Food Movement, social audits have since been formally 
institutionalised in national policies and programmes. This includes India’s National Food 
Security Act (NFSA) (GoI 2013) (the focus of the SPREAD CAN programme and this 
evaluation) which aims to ensure ‘food and nutritional security by ensuring access to 
adequate quantity of quality food at affordable prices’ (GoI 2013). The Act covers community 
nutrition schemes, school feeding, maternity entitlements, and food distribution (discussed 
more in Section 1.4). Other legal frameworks in India that refer to social audits include the 
Supreme Court’s Direction (2002); Right to Information Act (2005); and Right to Public 
Services Act (passed in 2012 in Odisha). 
There have been few independent studies of social audits within the context of the NFSA to 
date. Existing evidence on the institutionalisation of social audits in India has focused on the 
Government of Andhra Pradesh’s decision to mandate social audits as part of the National 
Rural Employment Guarantee Act. An evaluation of this approach reported significant 
positive impacts on employment and exposure of corruption compared to other states (Afridi 
and Iversen 2014), but questions have been raised about the model’s sustainability given the 
capacity and resources required (Aiyar and Samji 2009). Other questions on the nature of 
citizen–state interactions (Fox 2015; Joshi 2013) highlight differences between 
confrontational social audit approaches which are designed to expose government failures 
and pressurise public officials into acting, versus more collaborative community scorecard 
processes. The Government of Odisha has shown a strong interest in the use of social audits 
as a tool to improve service delivery and have recently set up the Odisha Society for Social 
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Audit Accountability and Transparency (OSSAAT) under the Panchayati Raj Department and 
housed in the State Institute of Rural Development, Bhubaneswar. The first official Governing 
Body meeting was held in June 2018. The main objective of OSSAAT, said Principal 
Secretary Sri Singh, ‘is to create enabling environment for the Gram Sabha and Palli Sabha 
to conduct impartial and effective social audits for the development schemes and 
programmes in its territory.’ 
Whether or not their existing governance structures can effectively and sustainably manage 
the sensitive processes social audits entail is a key consideration alongside continued 
delivery of NFSA services. 
1.4 National Food Security Act (NFSA) 
The NFSA, passed in 2013, aims to provide food and nutrition security to citizens by 
ensuring access to adequate quality and quantity of food at affordable prices through 
bringing together four core existing programmes under one Act: 
 The Targeted Public Distribution System (TPDS) – a food and essential items 
distribution scheme which targets food-insecure households; 
 The Midday Meals (MDM) programme – a school-based feeding programme 
targeting children ages 6–14 years; 
 Integrated Child Development Services (ICDS) – a supplementary feeding 
programme targeting children between six months and six years, and pregnant and 
lactating women; 
 Maternity entitlements – the Odisha state programme is referred to as MAMATA. 
 
The Act has a strong focus on nutrition support to women and children and has also 
mandated social audits as a process through which citizens can collectively monitor 
implementation of these food and nutrition entitlements to ensure adequate access to these 
entitlements. 
1.4.1 Targeted Public Distribution System (TPDS) 
The Targeted Public Distribution System (TPDS) is the largest social protection programme 
in India, in terms of both government expenditures and number of beneficiary households. 
The NFSA entitles 50 per cent of the urban population and 75 per cent of the rural population 
to receive food benefits under the TPDS. 
The previously universal Public Distribution System (PDS) was converted into a targeted 
system in 1997. Following this shift, beneficiaries were identified and divided into two 
categories, as either below the poverty line (BPL) or above the poverty line (APL). People in 
each category were entitled to a set of food grains at differing quantities and prices. In 2000, 
an additional classification of Antyodaya Anna Yojna (AAY, poorest of the poor) was 
introduced to provide the abject poor with dedicated food grain allocations at highly 
subsidised prices. In 2013, the scope and mandate of the TPDS expanded significantly 
through its incorporation into the National Food Security Act (NFSA). Before 2013, most 
households had one of the three types of ration cards previously described (BPL, APL, AAY). 
Now there are only two categories, namely Priority Household (PHH) and Antyodaya Anna 
Yojna (AAY). 
The distribution of subsidised cereals through the TPDS is a major instrument for ensuring 
the availability of affordable food grain to the public, especially the poor. The quantity and 
price of food grain available to households depends on the type of ration card assigned to 
them. Persons belonging to PHH are entitled to receive 5kg of food grains (rice, wheat, and 
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coarse grains) per person per month at subsidised prices of Rs.3/2/1 per kilogramme. AAY 
households are entitled to 35kg per month at a rate of Rs.1 per kilogramme. 
The TPDS provides subsidised food grain through a large network of government-licensed 
fair price shops (FPSs). The government purchases food grain from farmers based on a 
predetermined price floor, at a minimum support price (MSP). Then it provides highly 
subsidised food grain to low-income and vulnerable households. State governments are 
responsible for identifying beneficiaries and selecting fair price shops. The district food office 
provides beneficiary households with a ration card that serves as identification for accessing 
the TPDS. Once a household receives its ration card, its members can visit their FPS (all 
households are assigned to a specific FPS) to buy their food grain every month. Information 
on eligibility and purchases made from the TPDS are recorded on the card. 
Recent technological changes have been introduced in order to improve delivery of the 
TPDS. Beneficiaries are enrolled biometrically by the Unique Identification Authority of India, 
which assigns each resident a unique Aadhaar identification number. The use of Aadhaar for 
the distribution of TPDS rations has been controversial and critics have pointed out the large 
number of access and technological failures and identification errors, amongst broader 
issues to do with security and privacy. Both exclusion and inclusion errors were recorded, i.e. 
people who should be included in the TPDS as eligible cardholders but who are excluded in 
reality, and people who are not eligible to be covered by the TPDS but who are included by 
mistake or through inefficiency in implementation. 
1.4.2 Midday Meal (MDM) 
The Midday Meal programme was first established in 1995 with a view to improve school 
enrolment, retention, and attendance, and simultaneously improve nutritional levels among 
children. Under this school-based feeding programme, children attending government-run 
schools, aged up to 14 years, are entitled to one free hot cooked nutritious meal per day at 
school (excluding holidays), served according to prescribed age-appropriate nutritional 
standards. The scheme is either provided via a decentralised model where meals are cooked 
on-site by local cooks, helpers, or self-help groups (this is the most common model, 
particularly for rural areas) or a centralised model where meals are prepared in external 
kitchens through public–private partnerships and delivered to schools (more common in 
urban areas with high density of schools). In case of non-supply of entitled meals, the rights 
holders are eligible to receive a food security allowance. 
1.4.3 Integrated Child Development Services (ICDS) 
The ICDS scheme provides a package of six services to children below six years of age, 
pregnant women, and nursing mothers. These are supplementary nutrition, immunisation, 
health check-up, growth monitoring and referral services, non-formal pre-school education, 
and nutrition and health education. 
The ICDS scheme provides specific guidance on the weighing and growth monitoring of 
children, and counselling for mothers/caregivers by AWWs. Each child in the age group of 0–
3 years must be weighed at least once every month and assessed against the World Health 
Organization (WHO) New Growth Standards register. If the growth trajectory is deemed to be 
normal, the AWW advises the mother/caregiver to maintain the feeding and hygiene 
practices that she has been following. If the growth trajectory is below expected parameters, 
mothers/caregivers are advised on age-appropriate feeding, food preparation, and hygiene 
practices. Severely malnourished children are referred for further medical check-ups. 
Supplementary nutrition includes Take-Home Ration (THR) and Hot Cooked Meal. THR or 
chhatua (a wheat-based preparation) and two eggs per week are given to pregnant and 
24 
lactating mothers, and children from six months to three years. A hot cooked meal is 
provided daily to children between three and six years of age who attend the centre. Those 
children between three and six years who are found to be severely malnourished are also 
given THR, as well as the hot cooked meal. THR packets are colour-coded (yellow/sky-
blue/red2), to ensure that the nutritional supplements are consumed by the intended 
beneficiary rather than by other family members. 
1.4.4 MAMATA 
The MAMATA conditional cash transfer scheme was launched by the state of Odisha to 
alleviate maternal and infant undernutrition. It provides monetary support to pregnant and 
lactating women for the first two live births, to enable them to seek improved nutrition and 
promote health-seeking behaviour. 
The intermediate objectives identified by the Odisha government are as follows: 
 To provide partial wage compensation for pregnant and nursing mothers so that they 
are able to rest adequately during their pregnancy and after delivery; 
 To increase utilisation of maternal and child health services, especially antenatal care 
(ANC), postnatal care, and immunisation; 
 To improve mother and child care practices, especially exclusive breastfeeding and 
complementary feeding of infants. 
The specific target group for this scheme are pregnant and lactating women of 19 years of 
age and above, except those who already avail of the maternity benefit (i.e. who are 
themselves employees or wives of employees of state government/central government). The 
payable amount is transferred directly to the account of the rights holder. This was originally 
allocated in four instalments. From April 2017 onwards, the money is transferred in two 
instalments, dependent on their meeting the desired conditions, as specified below. 
Allocation rules prior to April 2017 set the total monetary support at Rs.5000/- to be allocated 
as follows: 
 First instalment: at the end of the second trimester of pregnancy, Rs.1,500/- 
 Second instalment: after completion of three months after delivery, Rs.1,500 
 Third instalment: after the infant completes six months of age, Rs.1,000/- 
 Fourth instalment: after the infant completes nine months of age, Rs.1,000/- 
Allocation rules after April 2017 set the total monetary support at Rs.5000/- to be allocated as 
follows: 
 First instalment: at the end of six months of pregnancy, Rs.3000/ 
 Second instalment: after the infant completes nine months of age, Rs.2000/- 
Conditionalities for the first instalments include the registration of pregnancy within six 
months, the receipt of at least one antenatal check-up, iron folic acid (IFA) tablets, one 
tetanus (TT) vaccination, and at least one counselling session. Conditionalities for the 
second instalment include the registration of childbirth, child vaccination requirements, 
weighing of the child at least two times after birth, and at least two IYCF counselling 
sessions. 
                                               
2
 THR packets are yellow for pregnant and lactating mothers, sky-blue for children aged six months to three years, and red for 
severely malnourished children. 
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1.5 SPREAD CAN programme 
1.5.1 Programme background, aims, and overall approach 
Founded in 1989, SPREAD is an Odisha-based NGO that works to empower marginalised 
communities to access their rights in a number of areas including land, food, and education. 
The organisation works primarily in the Koraput district of Odisha and neighbouring KBK 
districts which have a high proportion of tribal populations and people living below the 
poverty line relative to the rest of Odisha. 
As well as addressing the immediate needs of the communities they work with (such as 
provision of medical emergencies, health checks, educational supplies, etc.), SPREAD also 
facilitate participatory development processes that build the capacities of community-based 
organisations (e.g. self-help groups, village development committees) to develop long-term 
sustainable development with the community. This often starts with identifying the immediate 
needs of families and progresses to wider issues faced at the village, GP, and block level. 
The goal of the three-year ‘Collective Action for Nutrition’(CAN) programme (August 2016–
July 2019) supported by APPI is ‘Reducing malnutrition among children and women by 
facilitating efficient implementation of food and nutrition programmes, ensuring transparency, 
downward accountability, and community participation’. 
SPREAD describes the following key intervention areas as the focus of their programme 
(SPREAD 2017a, b, c, d, e): 
 Build knowledge of community on the National Food Security Act (NFSA) to improve 
accessibility; 
 Promote participation of community and community-based organisations (CBOs) in 
decision-making on access and entitlements to food and nutrition programmes; 
 Effective implementation of NFSA and health services (including village health and 
nutrition days, nutrition rehabilitation centres, village health and sanitation committees 
(VHSCs), etc.); 
 Build capacities and strengthen community-based institutions; 
 Working towards Panchayati Raj Institutions (PRIs) as nutrition champions; 
 Institutionalisation of the social audit process and grievance redressal mechanisms. 
The main intervention focus is a social audit process designed to sensitise communities to 
their rights and entitlements under the four primary schemes covered by the government’s 
National Food Security Act (NFSA) 2013 (see Section 1.4). By raising awareness of rights 
and grievances through a transparent participatory process of engagement involving local 
community members, village leaders, government officials, and others involved in the 
delivery of NFSA services, culminating in a public hearing to share testimonies and findings 
from the process, it is hoped that NFSA services will improve. 
Box 1.1 SPREAD definition of the social audit process 
 
Social Audit is a process of Deepening Democracy. It is a process, where the rights holders obtain 
information on all such schemes, programmes, systems impacting their lives; validate their 
truthfulness and work towards bringing a positive and reformative change. It is a participatory 
process which empowers citizens. Social Audit adds value to the whole idea of decentralisation and 
establishes the Community’s capacity for Planning, Monitoring, and Course Correction. 
 
Source: SPREAD Social Audit Manual (2017b). 
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The overall expected outcome for the programme is reduced malnutrition among the target 
communities (specifically children under five years) through improved delivery of nutrition 
services and entitlements and increased downward accountability of the ICDS through the 
social audit model. However, given the nature of the intervention and relatively short time 
frame of the APPI grant, both organisations acknowledged that they may not see immediate 
changes in nutritional outcomes for children. Other interim outcomes expected include: 
Household-specific project outcomes: 
 Increased knowledge of households (especially eligible women) on NFSA 
entitlements (especially TPDS), and on the MAMATA scheme; 
 Improved uptake of nutritional entitlements from ICDS for target groups (pregnant and 
lactating women; women of children under the age of three years; and adolescent 
girls); 
 Improved uptake of antenatal and postnatal services, and knowledge of IYCF 
practices by eligible women (with a specific focus on pregnant and lactating women; 
and mothers of children under the age of five years); 
 Behavioural change in adolescent girls (with respect to IFA supplementation); 
 Increased immunisation coverage of children under the age of three years; 
 Improved participation of households (and especially women) in community-level 
governance activities (with specific reference to Gram Sabhas, Palli Sabhas, and 
social audits); 
 Improvement in intra-household decision-making for women on issues related to food 
security and nutrition. 
Community-specific project outcomes: 
 Emergence of empowered communities with more accountable ICDS centres; 
 Improved institutional delivery of nutrition services and entitlements in Gram 
Panchayats; 
 Increased community-level demand for improved nutrition services and entitlements; 
and improved community participation in decision-making related to food and nutrition 
programmes; 
 Establishment of (mal)nutrition as a critical agenda for the Gram Sabha and making 
‘malnutrition-free villages’ a goal for PRIs (Panchayati Raj institutions). 
 
1.5.2 Overall design 
There are nine objectives of the social audit, as outlined in the August 2018 version of the 
SPREAD Social Audit Manual (p10–11): 
1. Promote transparency and accountability in the implementation of a programme. 
2. Inform and educate and mobilise community and rights holders about their rights and 
entitlements of the programme or scheme during the course of social audit. 
3. Provide a collective platform, which is inclusive and participatory, to different 
stakeholders to express their needs and grievances. 
4. Improve capacity of the local stakeholders participating the during social audit 
process. 
5. Democratise decision-making by providing a platform for implementing authorities to 
be accountable to rights holders. 
6. Strengthen the scheme by deterring corruption and irregularities and improve the 
delivery of the programme. 
7. Influencing policies with grass-roots realities and evidences. 
8. Identifying systemic gaps. 
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9. Establishing and exploring linkages with PRIs and community-based organisations. 
 
According to the Social Audit Manual, a social audit is split into three phases: 1. the pre-
social audit (seven days’ duration), 2. the social audit (seven days’ duration), and 3. the post-
social audit (undefined duration – a continuing process). The whole process is split into 
eleven steps: 
Box 1.2 The 11 steps of the social audit 
 
Step 1 Meet the official and Panchayat functionaries as an entry meeting 
Step 2 Collect the official documents required for field verification, review the registers and 
documents 
Step 3 Verification physically of the storage centres in schools, Anganwadi Centres, and FPS, door-
to-door verification 
Step 4 Conducting village meeting and FGDs with rights holders 
Step 5 Filling the verification formats, seeing information gaps 
Step 6 Consolidation of records that are required for social audit 
Step 7 Ensuring government official participation in the Gram Sabha on the specified date as well as 
participation of all rights holders 
Step 8 Report preparation 
Step 9 Presenting the social audit report with evidence in the Gram Sabha 
Step 10 Noting the minutes carefully 
Step 11 Follow-up of the social audit Gram Sabha with action taken report from the concerned 
department 
Pre-social audit phase design 
The first part of the process is to develop a calendar that includes details of important dates 
within the areas the social audit will be carried out. This is so that the audit can be conducted 
at an appropriate time for these other events, or ideally in conjunction with an existing 
planned Gram Sabha meeting. Next, volunteers who will conduct the social audit are 
identified and recruited, giving priority to local people who are from marginalised groups. 
Thirdly, the Social Audit Committee should be set up, and formed at least seven days in 
advance. The committee should comprise 10–15 people including PRI members, SHG 
members, Gaon Kalyan Samitis (GKS) members, disabled people, and respected people 
from the GP. The social audit team should also interact with the Community Committees 
formed for the NFSA programmes. 
Social audit phase design 
The social audit itself is expected to take seven days in total as outlined in the calendar 
presented in Table 1.1. 
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Table 1.1 Model calendar for social audit process 
Days Activity Discussion with Points of discussion 
Day 1 Village meeting, Focus Group 
Discussion (FGD) and meeting 
with PRI members 
Community and PRI 
members 
Village profile, schemes and 
services, exclusion and 
inclusion errors, hunger and 
malnutrition, roles and 
responsibilities of PRI members 
Day 2 Field survey and data collection Beneficiaries, AWW, 
ASHA, teachers, 
jogan sahayak, 
members of SMC, 
JC, MC, PDS 
advisory committee 
Demographic profile of the 
village, infrastructure of AWC, 
school, number of beneficiaries, 
register verification, cross-check 
of secondary data with primary 
data 
Day 3 Field survey and data collection Beneficiaries, AWW, 
ASHA, teachers, 
jogan sahayak, 
members of SMC, 
JC, MC, PDS 
advisory committee 
Demographic profile of the 
village, infrastructure of AWC, 
school, number of beneficiaries, 
register verification, cross-check 
of secondary data with primary 
data 
Day 4 Field survey and data collection Beneficiaries, AWW, 
ASHA, teachers, 
jogan sahayak, 
members of SMC, 
JC, MC, PDS 
advisory committee 
Demographic profile of the 
village, infrastructure of AWC, 
school, number of beneficiaries, 
register verification, cross-check 
of secondary data with primary 
data 
Day 5 Meeting with service providers AWW, ASHA, 
teachers, jogan 
sahayak, members 
of SMC, JC, MC, 
PDS advisory 
committee 
Based on the data collection 
from the field, the findings will 
be shared with service providers 
Day 6 Data compilation and report 
writing 
Team members  
Day 7 Public hearing and presentations   
Note: jogan sahayak = supply assistant; SMC = School Management Committee; JC = 
Jaanch Committee. Source: Authors’ own based on SPREAD Social Audit Manual. 
The Social Audit Manual lists the principles that should be adhered to during the 
implementation of social audits (p10): 
 Social auditors responsible for facilitating social audit need to have access to the 
complete information prior to social audit, to assimilate and verify the information 
provided to them by the administration. 
 A social audit Gram Sabha and public hearing should mandatorily have officials and 
PRI members to be present, and answer the queries raised there. 
 Outcomes of a social audit must have legal sanction and the state governments 
should enact specific rules for this. 
 Social audit must be conducted in every Gram Panchayat once in every six months. 
 Social audit Gram Sabha must be presided by an authority other than from the 
implementing agency. 
 During the social audit process make sure that a person, related directly, or indirectly 
to any of the stakeholders of the schemes or services, should not be a part of it, as 
there is chances of getting false/biased information. 
 The quorum of a Gram Sabha as defined in the Odisha Panchayati Raj Act will apply 
to the social audit Gram Sabha too. 
29 
 The social audit Gram Sabha and social audit public hearing should be open for all 
the members of the public to participate. This includes people from the press, civil 
society organisations and members, SHG members, etc. 
 The social audit team should present all recorded information to the Gram Sabha 
orally. 
 Social audit must include the exercise of the officials (independent observers) taking 
and announcing a decision on each deviation presented which is also recorded in the 
social audit public forum resolution. 
 A social audit is a joint exercise of the government and citizens. It is the responsibility 
of the Gram Sabha to conduct a social audit with the help of the social audit 
facilitators. But acting on the grievances identified during a social audit within a fixed 
time period is the sole responsibility of the state government. 
 Civil society organisations should be an important part of the social audit. They 
should participate in the social audit Gram Sabha and social audit public hearings. 
 
Post-social audit phase design 
After the social audit has finished, the social audit team is expected to complete a number of 
tasks, including writing up and sharing the report from the public hearing (in the local 
language), ensuring the grievance redressal process is followed for every issue raised about 
the NFSA, and following up grievances, within a specific time frame. The team is expected to 
hold the relevant officials accountable to resolve grievances. 
1.5.3 SPREAD CAN implementation plan 
According to the SPREAD implementation plan (see SPREAD 2016a, Implementation PLAN 
Final 4.8.16) a total of 240 social audits were planned to take place under the CAN 
programme. This included 24 pilots within the first year of the project, and the remaining 216 
social audits in a corresponding number of GPs (within 24 blocks, 6 districts, and including 
2,923 villages) were planned for year 2. The whole programme was planned to take three 
years, starting August 2016 and ending July 2019. 
Year 1 August 2016–July 2017 The 24 pilot social audits were planned to take place 
between February 2017 and July 2017. 
Year 2 August 2017–July 2018 The remaining 216 social audits were planned to take place 
during the second year of the programme, 108 between August 2017 and January 2018, and 
the final 108 between February 2018 and July 2018. 
Year 3 August 2018–July 2019 Further social audits carried out in the same locations by 
the SS volunteers that were trained by SPREAD. 
1.6 Baseline characteristics of target groups 
In this section, we summarise the demographic characteristics of households and particular 
target groups included in the baseline quantitative sample of 116 GPs. The survey is 
representative of households in the SPREAD programme area but the SPREAD programme 
area itself is not necessarily representative of the population living in the KBK districts. In 
fact, SPREAD targets the most food-insecure regions within the KBK area for its CAN 
programme so that we should expect some systematic differences between the 
characteristics of study participants and those of the general population. Table 1.2 
summarises the mean of some key socioeconomic and food security indicators by districts 
based on our household survey and contrasts them with the district-level means provided by 
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the POSHAN programme, which collates data from the NFHS4. The following subsection will 
refer to this table when describing survey respondents. 
1.6.1 Household characteristics 
Religion and caste: 97.7 per cent of respondents belong to Hindu households (defined as 
the religion of the head), 2.2 per cent to Christian households and 0.1 per cent to Muslim 
households. This religion breakdown very closely mirrors the figures from the census in 
Odisha in 2011 for each single district in the sample. 51 per cent of respondents are 
Scheduled Tribes (STs), 25 per cent belong to Other Backward Castes (OBCs), 22 per cent 
are Scheduled Castes (SCs), and just 3 per cent are in the ‘general’ category. This caste 
composition is quite different from that of the census for most districts. Our survey tends to 
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Table 1.2 Baseline characteristics in selected districts – existing data and evaluation data  
Source: Authors’ own and POSHAN (2018).  
Characteristic/district Balangir (%) Kalahandi (%) Koraput (%) Malkangiri (%) Nabarangpur (%) Nuapada (%) 
Source  POSH
AN 
(NFHS
4) 
SPREAD 
evaluation 
survey 
POSHAN 
(NFHS4) 
SPREAD 
evaluation 
survey 
POSHAN 
(NFHS4) 
SPREAD 
evaluation 
survey 
POSHAN 
(NFHS4) 
SPREAD 
evaluatio
n survey 
POSHAN 
(NFHS4) 
SPREAD 
evaluation 
survey 
POSHAN 
(NFHS4) 
SPREAD 
evaluation 
survey 
Exclusive breastfeeding 53.4 82.5 67.4 81.4 70.2 79.4 66.2 80.3 71.7 68.4 49.2 80.4 
Adequate diet 7.3 32.5 4.5 11.2 3.4 10.3 16.8 21.9 11.5 17.7 2.6 18.8 
Mother and Child 
Protection Card 
100 96 96.7 88 98.2 89 95.4 92 92 86 99.1 85 
Women who are literate 61.9 61 46.1 38 39.7 27 34.8 32 41.8 23 49.9 40 
Women with ≥10 years 
of education 
21.6 21 18.7 11 14.5 7 11.8 6 10.7 3 19.9 10 
HH has an improved 
water source 
94 96 93.6 93 84.7 90 89.3 93 98.4 99 95 94 
HH has an improved 
sanitation facility 
14.1 21 14.9 19 18.2 11 16.7 12 16.1 9 20.2 27 
Open defecation 83.6 79 87.5 80 81.3 87 89.3 87 89 90 84.6 73 
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over-sample the SC (except in Malkangiri where it is the opposite) and ST categories of the 
population. This is to be excepted as the social audits are implemented in the most remote 
parts of each district, where the SC/ST share of the population is the highest. 
Access to drinking water: 77 per cent of households obtain their drinking water from tube 
wells, 11 per cent from a public tap/sandpipe, 2.5 per cent from an unprotected well. 2.2 per 
cent of respondents receive their water directly through a pipe to their house/yard. Overall, 
94 per cent of respondents get their drinking water from an improved source, a figure in line 
with POSHAN’s NFHS4 statistics. 
Access to toilet facilities: 84 per cent of respondents do not have any access to a toilet and 
defecate in the open. This is in line with information provided by POSHAN (2018) for the 
sample districts (see Table 2.1). The remaining 15 per cent of respondents use some 
variations of pit latrines (almost 10 per cent of respondents use a flush-to-pit latrine, 3.2 per 
cent have access to a pit latrine with slab and 2.2 per cent use a flush to sceptic tank). The 
rate of open defecation ranges from 73 per cent in Nuapada to 90 per cent in Nabarangpur. 
Household assets: The average respondent reports that their household owns 2.7 assets 
out of a list of 9 assets. There is a wide geographic disparity in the assets index as its mean 
in the sample ranges from two in Koraput to four in Balangir District. 82 per cent of 
respondents have access to electricity and 12 per cent have access to solar electricity. The 
most commonly owned assets are: mobile telephone (66 per cent), electric fan (38 per cent), 
television (33 per cent), and wardrobe (26 per cent). Generators, air conditioners, 
laptops/computers, and DVD players are all owned by less (and sometimes considerably 
less) than 5 per cent of respondents. 
Cooking facilities: Just over half of respondents have a separate room for cooking. 93 per 
cent of respondents use wood as cooking fuel and 6 per cent use LPG/natural gas. Close to 
three-quarters (72 per cent) of respondents have an earth floor and the remaining quarter 
have a cement floor. 
Construction of home dwelling: Materials for the roof and external walls are relatively 
varied in the sample. Almost 50 per cent have tiles, 29 per cent have asbestos, 11 per cent 
have thatch/palm leaf, and 8 per cent have cement for the roof. External walls are made of 
dirt for 46 per cent of respondents, of cement for 26 per cent of respondents, of bricks for 20 
per cent of respondents, of bamboo, or stone with mud for 5.5 per cent of respondents, and 
of stone for 2.2 per cent of respondents. 
Food security: to measure food security, we implemented the Food Insecurity Experience 
Scale (FIES) proposed by Ballard et al. (2013) for the FAO. The scale is made up of eight 
questions with dichotomous yes/no responses. We have used a 12-month reference period 
and we applied the scale at the level of the respondent (individual scale). The questions are 
not meant to be analysed separately. The mean FIES score is 3.02 (out of a maximum of 8). 
The FIES does not vary much across districts as it ranges from 2.7 in Kalahandi to 3.1 in 
Koraput and Malkangiri. However, Nabarangpur stands out as the most food-insecure district 
as the mean FIES there is 3.6. The extent of food insecurity is higher for the SC and ST 
population (3.2) than for OBCs (2.6). 
1.6.2 Primary caregivers 
The baseline survey included answers from 1,884 primary caregivers. The number of 
interviewed caregivers per GP ranged from 11 to 23, with a mean of 16.6. 
Age, gender, and household size: Primary caregivers are 25 years old on average (three-
quarters of caregivers are below 29, and the oldest respondent is 60), and are 
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overwhelmingly female (only 1.3 per cent of primary caregivers are male). 80 per cent of 
primary caregivers are the spouse of the household head, 16 per cent are the 
daughter/daughter-in-law of the household head, and less than 3 per cent (2.6 per cent) are 
household heads themselves. 98 per cent of primary caregivers have just one child below 24 
months. Households have 3.8 members on average, with 25 per cent of them having more 
than five members. 
Literacy rates: 37 per cent of the caregivers are literate, which is far below the Odisha-wide 
literacy rate for women which is 64 per cent. Rates of female literacy are noticeably lower in 
the SPREAD sample than in the whole district for Kalahandi (38 per cent against 46 per 
cent), Koraput (27 per cent against 40 per cent), Nabarangpur (23 per cent against 42 per 
cent) and Nuapada (40 per cent against 50 per cent). Overall, these figures suggest that the 
SPREAD programme targets the most disadvantaged districts, and within these districts, that 
it targets the most disadvantaged areas. 
Employment: 84 per cent of PC respondents are housewives, 8 per cent are self-employed, 
5 per cent are employees, and just under 3 per cent work without pay (as an apprentice or in 
a family business). 86 per cent of PC respondents who reported a work activity did so in 
agriculture (57 per cent in their own farm and 35 per cent as an agricultural labourer). 
Women’s dietary diversity: we also implemented the Women’s Dietary Diversity Score 
(WDDS) proposed by Arimond et al. (2010). The WDDS is simply the sum of all the food 
groups consumed by the respondent on the day prior to the survey (if this was a typical day; 
otherwise, we used the last typical day). The WDDS is based on 21 food groups, using the 
most disaggregated food groups’ indicators (the base version of WDDS uses nine food 
groups). The mean score of WDDS is 6.7 (out of a maximum of 21). The mean WDDS is 
around 7.2 in Nabarangpur, 7.3 in Nuapada, and 7.6 in Balangir. Districts with lower values 
of WDDS are Koraput (5.9), Kalahandi (6.2), and Malkangiri (6.3). The mean WDDS is lower 
among SC/ST populations (around 6.5) than among OBCs (7.2). 
Nutrition knowledge: we implemented a small questionnaire to test nutrition knowledge as 
in Hoddinott et al. (2016). This entails four questions on breastfeeding, three questions on 
supplementary feeding, and seven questions on health and nutrition. Respondents on 
average correctly answered 8.8 questions out of 14. In detail, they correctly answered 2.2 
questions on breastfeeding (out of 4), 1.9 questions on supplementary feeding (out of 3), and 
4.7 questions on health and nutrition (out of 7). 
Committee membership: we asked about the existence of 14 possible groups or 
committees at the local level. Overall, respondents know about the existence of 4.3 
groups/committees, with the mean ranging from 3.8 in Nuapada to 4.6 in Nabarangpur. 
Caregivers are members of 0.6 groups/committees on average, while 34 per cent of 
caregivers belong to at least one group/committee. 
1.6.3 Pregnant women 
The baseline survey included answers from 510 pregnant women (who were not also primary 
caregivers). The number of interviewed caregivers per GP ranged from 1 to 11, with a mean 
of 5.6. 
Age, gender, and household size: Pregnant women are 24.5 years old on average (three-
quarters of pregnant women are below 27, and the oldest respondent is 42). 77 per cent of 
pregnant women are the spouse of the household head, 20 per cent are the 
daughter/daughter-in-law of the household head and less than 2 per cent (1.8 per cent) are 
household heads themselves. 
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Food security: The mean FIES score among pregnant women is 2.6 (out of a maximum of 
8), which is noticeably lower than among primary caregivers (3.2). Similarly, the mean 
WDDS score is 7 for pregnant women against 6.7 for primary caregivers. Both results 
indicate a lower extent of food insecurity among pregnant women than among primary 
caregivers. 
Nutrition knowledge: respondents on average correctly answered 8.2 questions out of 14. 
In detail, they correctly answered 1.9 questions on breastfeeding (out of 4), 1.8 questions on 
supplementary feeding (out of 3), and 4.5 questions on health and nutrition (out of 7). 
Knowledge of nutrition practices is therefore slightly lower among pregnant women than 
among primary caregivers. 
Other than that, there is very little difference in terms of socioeconomic characteristics 
between pregnant women and primary caregivers. 
1.6.4 Children below two years of age 
Exclusive breastfeeding: We find that 78 per cent of children below six months of age are 
exclusively breastfed, which is noticeably more than figures reported by POSHAN. The gaps 
are especially wide for Balangir (83 per cent of exclusive breastfeeding in the SPREAD 
sample against 53 per cent for the entire district), Nuapada (80 per cent against 49 per cent), 
Malkangiri (80 per cent against 66 per cent), and Kalahandi (81 per cent against 67 per 
cent). In Nabarangpur, the rate of exclusive breastfeeding is slightly lower in the SPREAD 
sample (68 per cent) than in the whole district (72 per cent). 
Adequate diet: the proportion of children eating four food groups is also noticeably higher in 
the SPREAD sample than in the district sample obtained in NFHS4, as evidenced by Table 
1.2. The gaps are especially marked for Balangir (33 per cent against 7 per cent), Nuapada 
(19 per cent against 3 per cent), Kalahandi (11 per cent against 5 per cent) and Koraput (10 
per cent against 3 per cent). 
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2 Evaluation design and methods 
2.1 Evaluation aims and objectives 
The original Terms of Reference APPI shared with IDS in June 2017 describes the following 
two main objectives for the evaluation: 
1. Determine the impact of the SPREAD model of social audits on improving the delivery 
of nutrition services and entitlements as well as the uptake of these services by target 
groups; 
2. Understand how the social audit process leads to: 
a. Changes in knowledge, behaviour, and practice at the household level 
b. Community-level changes and outcomes. 
A number of different evaluation design options were presented and discussed with the APPI 
and SPREAD teams over the course of a few months in late 2017 which took into account 
the SPREAD programme timings and anticipated outcomes, as well as evaluation budget 
and methodological limitations. The final design chosen (described more in the sections 
below) determined the extent to which the evaluation team are able to address and make 
evidence-based conclusions on the above original objectives. In particular, the final design 
did not incorporate any survey-based methods for measuring nutritional outcomes/ 
anthropometry such as stunting and wasting. We discussed whether or not this would be an 
appropriate evaluation objective but decided against, given the limited time and 
implementation period of both project and the evaluation. Therefore, we are unable to make 
a comprehensive assessment of the extent to which uptake of NFSA services as a result of 
the SPREAD programme has led to improved nutritional outcomes based on primary data 
collection. We do, however, draw on other evidence gathered from further back along the 
Programme Impact Pathway which might suggest possible changes in these longer-term 
outcomes. 
2.2 Programme Impact Pathway for mixed methods approach 
The evaluation design combines both quantitative and qualitative methodologies within a 
strong mixed methods theory-based design. The three main methodological components 
(summarised below in Box 2.1) were designed to complement and build on each other at 
every stage of the evaluation process including planning, tool design, data analysis, and 
synthesis. Evaluation questions, protocols, and the data collection instruments component 
drew heavily on the social audit model’s hypothesised theory of change as well as evidence 
from recent literature published on other similar downward accountability programme models 
in India and globally. 
 
Box 2.1 The three evaluation components 
 
Component A: Quantitative survey component: this used an experimental baseline and endline 
household survey design to rigorously assess the effects of the social audit on immediate and longer-
term outcomes relating to health and nutrition entitlements and NFSA government services, as well 
as community empowerment and participation. 
 
Component B: Process evaluation component: this documented critical implementation 
processes, mechanisms, and outputs to assess the coverage and quality of the social audit 
intervention compared with its design. This component draws on analysis of programme 
documentation and internal MIS data, qualitative interviews and focus groups with programme 
stakeholders and others, and quantitative data collected via the quantitative endline survey. 
36 
Inception 
phase 
(finalise 
design and 
programme 
roll-out) 
Quantita
tive  
baseline 
househol
d survey 
with 116  
GPs 
Quantitati
ve  
endline
survey 
with 116 
GPs
Communit
y-level  
qualitative 
and 
process 
data 
collection 
in 11 
villages
Final
mixed 
methods 
analysis 
and 
report 
Process evaluation secondary data collection
Sept -
Dec 17
Dec 
17—
Jan 18
April—
May 
18
July—
Aug 18
Sept—
Nov 18
 
Component C: Qualitative evaluation component: this explores the community-level perceptions 
and contextual factors which might explain intended/unintended and positive/negative outcomes 
resulting from the programme (as captured via the quantitative component). These include levels of 
community empowerment and participation as well as wider interactions between societal, 
community, and intra-household structures which might influence behaviour change. This component 
draws primarily on findings from in-depth interviews and focus group discussions with different sub-
groups of target communities and government stakeholders. 
Source: Authors’ own. 
Figure 2.1 summarises the key stages of the evaluation which combined sequential and 
concurrent data collection components followed by a final phase of mixed methods analysis. 
See also the mixed methods table in Annex 2 which maps the steps along the impact 
pathway with the evaluation methods of data collection and sources of analysis. 
Figure 2.1 Key stages of evaluation mixed methods process 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Authors’ own. 
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Figure 2.2 Programme Impact Pathway
 
Source: Authors’ own. 
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The Programme Impact Pathway (PIP) diagram is the final product of an iterative production 
process. The starting point was the plan described in the original Social Audit Manual (prior to the 
publication of the August 2018 version). This first version was then discussed and altered directly 
with SPREAD team members during workshops and meetings with IDS researchers to better reflect 
the reality of what they were planning and carrying out in the field. That version was reduced to the 
most basic components and shared during focus group discussions with social audit team 
members, in the fieldwork stage of this evaluation. Focus groups were asked if they thought the 
diagram was an accurate representation of the process, what obstructions they faced, and what 
worked well during the implementation phase. Information gained from these focus groups, along 
with further discussions and interviews with SPREAD, was integrated to produce this most recent 
version. 
The PIP is designed to build on the SPREAD model’s theory of change to provide a comprehensive 
overview of the different stages of the social audit process and how these relate to longer-term 
programme outcomes. It has acted as a key reference point in the design of quantitative, qualitative, 
and process-related fieldwork tools, for discussions with the SPREAD team and the evaluation 
team’s analysis focused on implementation-level findings (as presented in Section 3 of this report) 
and outcomes (as presented in Section 4). 
2.3 Quantitative component design and approach 
2.3.1 Quantitative evaluation design 
The objective of the quantitative evaluation component is to measure the impact of the social audits 
on a range of outcomes of interest, and to assess if this impact is statistically different from zero. 
The quantitative evaluation is based on an experimental design in which the timing of the social 
audits is randomly varied across Gram Panchayats (GPs). Randomly assigning the timing of 
social audits generates exogenous differences in the length of time between endline data collection 
and social audit among otherwise similar GPs which enables us to estimate the impact of the social 
audit. 
This differs from the classic ‘phased-in’ experimental design in which communities in the control 
group would not receive social audits in phase 1, enabling a comparison with treatment 
communities. This design was not deemed feasible in the SPREAD social audits evaluation as all 
216 GPs were required to receive the social audits in phase 1. 
Treatment assignment was done at the Gram Panchayat level. The unit of intervention of the social 
audit is the ICDS centre, but SPREAD aims to cover all ICDS centres within treated GPs, so that we 
could not assign the intervention at this level. 
We randomly assigned Gram Panchayats into an ‘Early’ group (E) and a ‘Late’ group (L). GPs in the 
E group had their social audits occur between 4 January and 8 February 2018, whereas GPs in the 
L group had their social audits occur between 13 March and 6 April 2018. The baseline data 
collection was undertaken in December 2017–January 2018, just before the social audits were 
scheduled to be implemented, whereas the endline data collection took place in April–May 2018, 
within two weeks since the GPs in the L group had their social audits organised. 
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Figure 2.3 Flowchart of the quantitative evaluation 
 
 
Source: Authors’ own. 
Figure 2.3 represents the flowchart of the evaluation. It is worth emphasising that although the dates 
for baseline data collection and early social audits overlap (as well as for late social audits and 
endline data collection), the baseline data was always collected prior to the social audit in any given 
GP. Likewise, the endline data was always collected after the social audit in any given GP. 
We opted for creating two experimental groups. Based on existing evidence, we believed that the 
strongest design was to implement all the social audits in the treatment GPs within a short period of 
time at the beginning of the implementation window and, similarly, to implement all the social audits 
in the control group within a short period of time as late as possible. This maximises the difference 
in exposure between treatment and control group and minimises internal heterogeneity within each 
group, thus increasing statistical power. 
There was an average of 107 days between the social audit and the endline data collection among 
GPs of the Early group and an average of 36 days between the social and the data collection 
among GPs of the Late group. The data collection was organised in such a way as to minimise 
variation within each of these groups. Figure 2.4 shows the distribution of the number of days 
between social audit and endline data collection in both Early and Late GPs. It is apparent that 
within-group variations have been kept small, especially for the Early GPs. 
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Figure 2.4 Number of days between social audit and endline data collection among Early and Late GPs 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
The evaluation design proposes to exploit relatively small differences in exposure to the social 
audits to measure impact. As a result, we expect these small differences in exposure to exert an 
effect on short-term outcomes, but not necessarily on longer-term outcomes. The focus of the 
evaluation design is therefore on the more immediate outcomes of the projects. 
Interpretation of the findings 
The quantitative evaluation draws on two sources of comparisons: (i) the experimental comparison 
between Early and Late GPs (based on differences or on endline levels of the outcomes) which will 
be used to assess impact, and (ii) the before–after comparison in all GPs, which will be used to 
contextualise the impact estimates. 
The rationale for relying on the Early–Late comparison is based on the assumption that full effects 
of the social audits will need a period of time to manifest themselves after the social audits take 
place. In other words, we expect the bulk of the impact to derive from post-audit activities and not 
from the 6–7 days in which the social audit itself takes place. This means that we expect to see 
more effects of the social audits among the E group than the L group. It is possible, however, that 
the effects of social audits would in fact only be immediate and disappear quickly. If that were the 
case, then the impact of social audits would be larger in the L group than in the E group. 
Solely reporting on the differences between Early and Late GPs would not give any indication as to 
the trajectory of outcomes since baseline. Imagine that we find no statistical difference in terms of 
the evolution of across Early and Late GPs for a given outcome. This could be because: a) the 
outcome did not change at all between baseline and endline, b) the outcome improved similarly in 
both groups between baseline and endline, or c) the outcome deteriorated similarly in both groups 
between baseline and endline. For the sake of the interpretation of the impact estimates, it is thus 
key to display the before–after comparison. 
Combining the before–after and the Early–Late comparisons, we can classify the impact of social 
audits (SAs) into the following five categories: 
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 SAs have an immediate and constant effect: levels of outcomes change over time, but 
there is no difference between E and L GPs. 
 
 SAs have a cumulative effect: levels of outcomes change over time, but the changes are 
more pronounced in the Early GPs. 
 
 SAs have a transient effect: levels of outcomes only change over time for a short while. The 
changes will be concentrated in the L GPs. 
 
 SAs have a non-linear effect: levels of outcomes first increase (or decrease) after the audit 
before decreasing (or increasing) past their baseline values as time passes. 
 
 SAs have no effect: no discernible changes in the levels of outcomes for either E or L GPs. 
 
Another useful feature of the evaluation design is that the ‘before and after’ comparisons of outcomes 
of interest would be meaningful in its own right. Given that the timespan is so short between the 
baseline and endline data, substantial changes in the outcomes of interest are suggestive of an effect 
of social audits, although only the experimental comparison between E and L groups will have a 
causal interpretation. 
 
Impact is measured through pre- and post- social audits questionnaires administered to primary 
caregivers of a child below 24 months, pregnant women, men (typically the husbands of caregivers 
or pregnant women), adolescent girls, Angawandi workers (AWWs), ASHA workers, and council 
leaders (Sarpanches). 
Outcomes that have been measured through the quantitative approach include: 
 Knowledge of households of NFSA entitlements; 
 Access to and uptake of health and nutrition services; 
 Perceived quality and responsiveness of health and nutrition services; 
 Food security and IYCF knowledge; 
 Participation in community-level governance; 
 Civic attitudes. 
 
Sample size and sampling design 
We first randomly selected the 116 GPs to take part in the evaluation out of the 216 GPs in which 
SPREAD operate and which did not receive the pilot social audit programme. We then randomly 
assigned these GPs into Early or Late groups using implicit stratification. Specifically, we ordered 
observations by district and by block prior to the randomisation to minimise sampling variability 
across the two treatment arms. 
We then randomly chose one village with probability proportional to size (PPS) in each GP to 
include in the survey. In a number of cases, the selected villages were small, and the field team was 
not able to find the required number of eligible households to interview. In this case, the team was 
instructed to add the closest village to the sampling frame, and to conduct a household listing in the 
additional village. If the target number of 25 was still not achieved, the team would add a third 
village and so on. The map of sample villages is in Annex 2. 
In the selected villages, the field team conducted a household listing of A: households with a 
primary caregiver of a child below two years of age, and B: households with a pregnant woman. The 
team then randomly selected households from these lists for the interviews. The team also selected 
one AWW and one ASHA worker per GP for interview (based on the presence of health workers in 
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the village during survey time). The team also aimed to interview the Sarpanch in each of the 116 
GPs. 
We set the total number of GPs for the evaluation at 116 (58 in each of the Early and Late groups). 
Given 20 observations per GP and an intra-cluster correlation coefficient3 of 10 per cent, 116 GPs 
allows us to detect an effect size of 0.22 standard deviations with a statistical power of 80 per cent. 
We eventually increased the number of households to 24 per GP, thus raising the statistical power 
of the quantitative evaluation to 82 per cent. For GP-level outcomes, for which we will only have one 
observation per GP, we were able to detect an effect size of 0.5 standard deviation with a statistical 
power of 80 per cent. 
The target groups for the quantitative evaluation are women with a child below 24 months 
(caregivers) and pregnant women (who may or may not already have a child). Caregivers were 
given the highest priority in the selection of respondents, and pregnant women were added to the 
survey if the field team could not find 24 eligible caregivers at the time of survey. The mean number 
of caregivers in each GP was just below 17 (and the mean number of pregnant women in each GP 
was about 7). 
As most outcomes are the same for caregivers and pregnant women (excluding the fact that the 
latter are not asked about child-related questions), we could pool both groups in the estimations. 
However, we decided to run the estimations on both sub-samples separately to ascertain potential 
heterogeneity of the social audits’ impact. Estimations associated with caregivers are powered to 
detect an effect size of 0.20 SD. Estimations associated with pregnant women are powered to 
detect an effect size of 0.25 SD. 
Table 2.1 presents the breakdown of the sample size by target group and by district. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
3
 In a cluster randomised trial, the intra-cluster correlation coefficient (ICC) measures the degree of similarity of observations within each 
cluster (i.e. GP). The higher this coefficient, the less each additional household interview brings in new information (as households tend to 
be the same) and so the lower the effective sample size. With an ICC of 15 per cent instead of 10 per cent, the statistical power of the 
valuation would fall to 70 per cent (i.e. we would face a 30 per cent risk of wrongly declaring the intervention to have no impact when it does 
have one). 
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Table 2.1 Number of interviews per target group and district 
District Balangir Kalahandi Koraput Malkangiri Nabarangpur Nuapada All 
Target 
group 
       
Primary 
caregivers 
380 415 386 221 340 143 1885 
Pregnant 
women 
120 109 94 68 81 38 510 
Men 382 350 377 195 260 81 1645 
Adolescent 
girls 
37 55 36 30 44 8 210 
AWW 23 24 24 14 21 9 115 
ASHA 
workers 
24 25 24 14 18 9 114 
Sarpanches 23 25 23 14 19 9 113 
Source: Authors’ own. 
2.3.2 Estimations of treatment effect 
We estimate the effect of the social audit through the following model: 
∆𝑌𝑖𝑗 = 𝛼 + β ∙ 𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑙𝑦 𝑆𝐴
𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗 
where α denotes the change in the outcome of interest Y between baseline and endline, β is the 
difference-in-difference parameter associated with the effect of being assigned to the early social 
audit group, and 𝜀𝑖𝑗 is the error term. 
The estimations account for the clustering of observations within GPs in the computation of 
standard errors. 
For a number of outcomes, the baseline variable does not exist (or was measured differently than at 
endline) so that the double-difference framework above cannot be used. Instead, we will use a 
single-difference framework in which the endline value of the outcome is explained by the treatment 
status and an error term. 
The model of equation (1) is based on a panel framework where the same individuals are present at 
baseline and endline. Unfortunately, we faced a very high – and unexpected – level of attrition at 
endline. More than one-third (38 per cent) of primary caregivers interviewed at baseline could not be 
re-interviewed at endline, mostly because people were momentarily unavailable due to work. We 
systematically replaced attrited households by new households drawn from the updated listing of 
eligible households. This opens the possibility to conduct estimations based on a repeated cross-
section framework. However, we preferred keeping the panel estimations as our preferred 
specification as the new households were quite different from the original ones in terms of the 
endline value of key outcomes of interest, and because the panel specification allows us to measure 
change in a more robust fashion (as change is based on answers from the same respondents). 
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Attrition poses two challenges for the panel estimations of treatment effect. First, when the 
determinants of attrition are systematically related to the intervention, then the internal validity of the 
estimates is threatened. Second, if the characteristics of remaining participants differ from those lost 
at follow-up, the nature of the sample changes and the generalisability of results to the initial 
population of interest cannot be guaranteed (external validity problem). Table 2.2 shows the 
baseline characteristics of primary caregivers across Early and Late groups for the initial sample, 
the sample lost to follow-up, and the sample of remaining participants. It suggests that neither 
problems manifest themselves. The characteristics of participants lost to follow-up are mostly the 
same to those who remain in the sample. The only meaningful difference concerns participation in 
the labour market as active women tended to drop from the sample at a higher rate. Importantly, the 
differences between women of the Early and Late groups were no greater among remaining 
participants than they were at baseline, suggesting no problem of internal validity. 
Table 2.2 Attrition rates for quantitative sample 
 
All participants 
Loss to follow-up  Remaining participants 
          
Group Early   Late  Early   Late   Early   Late  
 Mean (SD)  Mean (SD) Mean (SD)  Mean (SD)  Mean (SD)  Mean (SD) 
Household 
size 4.73 (1.50)  4.93 (1.52) 4.73 (1.58)  4.86 (1.65)  4.73 (1.45)  4.97 (1.44) 
SC 0.22 (0.41)  0.22 (0.41) 0.22 (0.41)  0.20 (0.40)  0.22 (0.41)  0.23 (0.42) 
ST 0.53 (0.50)  0.47 (0.50) 0.53 (0.50)  0.46 (0.50)  0.53 (0.50)  0.48 (0.50) 
OBC 0.22 (0.42)  0.28 (0.45) 0.22 (0.41)  0.31 (0.46)  0.23 (0.42)  0.26 (0.44) 
General 
caste 0.03 (0.17)  0.03 (0.17) 0.03 (0.18)  0.03 (0.17)  0.03 (0.17)  0.03 (0.18) 
Spouse of 
household 
head 0.78 (0.41)  0.82 (0.38) 0.75 (0.44)  0.82 (0.39)  0.81 (0.39)  0.82 (0.38) 
Illiterate 0.44 (0.50)  0.40 (0.49) 0.40 (0.49)  0.41 (0.49)  0.47 (0.50)  0.40 (0.49) 
Literate 0.34 (0.48)  0.40 (0.49) 0.37 (0.48)  0.38 (0.49)  0.32 (0.47)  0.40 (0.49) 
Can read 
but not 
write 0.22 (0.41)  0.20 (0.40) 0.23 (0.42)  0.21 (0.41)  0.21 (0.41)  0.19 (0.40) 
Illness 0.16 (0.37)  0.14 (0.34) 0.16 (0.37)  0.15 (0.36)  0.16 (0.36)  0.13 (0.34) 
Housewife 0.81 (0.39)  0.85 (0.35) 0.78 (0.41)  0.81 (0.39)  0.84 (0.37)  0.88 (0.33) 
Active in 
labour 
market 0.18 (0.39)  0.14 (0.35) 0.21 (0.41)  0.19 (0.39)  0.16 (0.37)  0.12 (0.32) 
Improved 
water 
source 0.95 (0.22)  0.93 (0.26) 0.94 (0.23)  0.93 (0.26)  0.96 (0.21)  0.93 (0.26) 
Improved 
sanitation 
source 0.14 (0.35)  0.17 (0.38) 0.13 (0.34)  0.16 (0.37)  0.14 (0.35)  0.18 (0.38) 
Separate 
kitchen 0.50 (0.50)  0.50 (0.50) 0.51 (0.50)  0.51 (0.50)  0.49 (0.50)  0.50 (0.50) 
Assets 
index 2.69 (1.79)  2.71 (1.91) 2.73 (1.86)  2.67 (1.84)  2.66 (1.74)  2.74 (1.94) 
FIES 3.09 (2.60)  2.96 (2.56) 2.99 (2.57)  3.10 (2.52)  3.15 (2.62)  2.88 (2.59) 
WDDS 6.67 (2.12)  6.78 (2.02) 6.67 (2.02)  6.85 (1.99)  6.68 (2.19)  6.74 (2.04) 
Source: Authors’ own. 
2.3.3 Quantitative data collection process 
 
For both the baseline and endline data collection, DCOR engaged a survey team consisting of 104 
people. For the endline survey, DCOR could only bring back around 80 per cent of the field 
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supervisors and 40 per cent of the field investigators who were involved in the baseline survey. 
Many of the field investigators were already engaged in other studies conducted by other agencies 
but DCOR ensured that the core team (team leader, survey coordinators, and IT expert), which was 
involved in the baseline, was available for the endline survey. 
During the classroom training of the survey team, all the questions in the tools were clearly 
explained to the survey team including the additional questions included for the endline survey. The 
survey team members were also provided tablets to do mock-practice during the classroom training, 
which helped them to become well versed with the Open Data Kit (ODK) tools loaded in the tablet. 
For both baseline and endline data collection, two days of field practice were organised in which 
Computer Assisted Personal Interviewing (CAPI) application of all the tools were tested to check the 
functionality, logical linkage, and skip patterns, and also to suggest changes in the tools. 
A household listing was carried out before both the baseline and endline survey. For the household 
survey, this allowed us to assess the number of eligible households for interviews in each sampled 
village. In case the number of eligible households was below the target, we included the closest 
neighbouring village into the sample and carried out a household listing and the required number of 
interviews there to reach the initial target. Overall, the field team added 72 villages/hamlets to the 
116 sampled villages. 
For the endline survey, the household listing was necessary to replace mothers of children below 24 
months, pregnant women, or adolescent girls interviewed at the baseline who were not eligible 
under the same category or who were absent when the endline survey was conducted. 
During the baseline, the field team identified 4,196 eligible households, out of which 2,394 were 
interviewed (1,884 households with a primary caregiver and 510 with a pregnant woman). The field 
team also interviewed 1,645 male respondents, 210 adolescent girls, 115 AWWs, 114 ASHA 
workers, and 113 Sarpanches. 
During the endline survey, the household listing was carried out in all the 188 villages/hamlets (116 
sample villages and 72 additional villages/hamlets where the baseline survey was carried out to 
obtain the required sample size) from the 116 sample Gram Panchayats. But due to the non-
availability of the required eligible sample households, another four neighbouring villages/hamlets 
from the same sample Gram Panchayats were covered in the household listing during the endline. 
In total, the household listing in the endline survey was carried out in 192 villages/hamlets from 116 
sampled Gram Panchayats. The household listing exercise enumerated a total of 19,221 
households, of which 3,500 households (i.e. 18 per cent) had eligible respondents for the interview 
(2,695 households had primary caregivers only, 787 households had pregnant woman only, and 18 
households had both the respondents). 
After the training of the survey team was complete, endline data collection started on 28 April 2018 
and continued until 23 May 2018. A total of 2,379 households were interviewed, of which 1,984 
were primary caregivers (mothers of a child below 24 months) and 385 were pregnant woman. As 
with the baseline, the sample households where both primary caregivers and pregnant women were 
found, the interview of the primary caregiver was conducted. The spouse of the primary caregiver or 
pregnant woman could be interviewed in 1,738 households (i.e. 73 per cent) out of the 2,379 
households covered in the survey. Similarly, the survey team could interview 167 (i.e. 7 per cent) 
adolescent girls in 2,379 households covered in the endline survey. In addition to these 
respondents, the survey team could interview 115 AWWs, 115 ASHAs, 115 Sarpanchs, and 114 
village leaders in the 116 sample villages covered in the survey. 
In all the interviews conducted at the endline, a photograph of the respective Gram Sabha was 
shown to all the respondents to help them to recall the social audit conducted in their Gram 
Panchayat. Prior to the start of the survey in every sample village, the interviewers were provided 
with the photograph of the respective Gram Sabha to show to the respondent at the time of 
interview. 
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2.4 Process component design and approach 
The process component of the evaluation was designed to gather and document information 
relating to programme design and inputs, implementation mechanisms, and immediate outputs to 
determine whether the programme was successfully implemented according to its intended design 
and any associated challenges faced. It was also used to help shed light on why the social audit 
model may have achieved or failed to achieve its desired outcomes due to issues earlier on in the 
Programme Impact Pathway. Findings from this component are covered in Section 3 of this report. 
Primary objectives 
1. Assessment of quality of implementation: 
a. Identify and map out the critical processes and mechanisms involved in the 
implementation of the social audit model; 
b. Assess to what extent these processes were implemented as planned and resulted in 
achievement of planned outputs; 
c. Examine possible reasons for success and/or failure in implementation (e.g. logistical, 
budget, personnel, PRI/community/individual resistance, etc.) and how these might have 
affected the achievement of outputs. 
 
2. Community participation in audit process: 
a. Explore the project’s approach to inclusivity (e.g. village listing exercises, selection 
process for community leaders, etc., proportion of village/GP members participating in 
audit events, gender considerations, geographical distribution of contributing 
individuals/households); 
b. Examine transparency of process and information sharing: documentation and 
distribution of information captured from meetings, decisions, etc., fora used for 
sensitisation and dissemination, etc., awareness of audit process amongst wider 
community); 
c. Assess governance mechanisms built into programme: leadership and decision-making 
around pre-audit, audit, and post-audit phases, role of PRIs, AWWs and others in 
decision-making at different stages of process. 
Methods 
The process evaluation applied a range of approaches to gather qualitative and quantitative data to 
address the above questions, including: 
 Programme document review (M&E framework, implementation work plans and tools, 
presentations, progress reports, promotional material, budgets, contracts, etc.); 
 In-depth interviews and focus group discussions with community members, SPREAD 
programme stakeholders, and others which included participatory process mapping 
(combined with the community-level qualitative tools and data collection); 
 Data obtained from endline quantitative household survey at output level; 
 Analysis of SPREAD monitoring data including MIS data from the social audit process. 
2.5 Qualitative component design and approach 
The qualitative component sought to explore and unpack some of the important explanatory social 
contextual factors existing at community-level which may have influenced the uptake and impacts of 
the social audits (as captured through the quantitative evaluation component). 
Primary research questions 
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1. How does the social audit affect or facilitate community empowerment and participation in 
government service delivery and decision-making? 
2. How does the social audit impact differently on different sub-groups of the target population 
(including ST, SC, and OBC groups, adolescent girls, children <2 years, the elderly, etc.?) 
3. What are the interactions between societal, community, and household-level structures and 
how might these influence participation in the social audit process and nutrition-related 
behaviour change? 
4. What are the local contextual factors that might enhance or hinder the uptake of the social 
audit model as part of the government’s mandate under the NSFA? 
Methods 
The qualitative component applied a multi-site case study approach to gather detailed descriptive 
community-level data from a sample of 11 villages where the social audits had been implemented. 
The primary tools for data collection were semi-structured In-Depth Interviews (IDIs) and Focus 
Group Discussions (FGDs) with a range of different target groups including male and female 
community members, government officials, social audit team members, and NFSA service 
providers. 
2.6 Sampling strategy and process for community-level qualitative and 
process data collection and analysis 
APPI and IDS partnered with DCOR to conduct the community-level data collection for the 
qualitative and process components. DCOR were already familiar with the local context and 
communities, had experience of working with APPI on other similar nutrition surveys as well as 
having led on the quantitative survey data collection process for the evaluation, so could apply their 
learning and experience from this process to the qualitative and process fieldwork. 
IDS were responsible for the development of the research tools and initial data collection plan in 
May–June 2018, with input from the APPI, SPREAD, and DCOR teams as needed to ensure they 
met APPI’s expectations, were contextually appropriate, and feasible to implement. The tools were 
also cross-checked against the quantitative baseline survey tools and baseline data/report to ensure 
that they complemented the approach and findings from the quantitative component. The six main 
research tools developed were: 
1. Community member IDI guide 
2. Community member FGD guide 
3. Social audit team/SPREAD/Samikshya Sathi IDI guide 
4. Social audit team/SPREAD/Samikshya Sathi FGD guide 
5. NFSA service provider IDI guide 
6. Government officials IDI guide. 
 
These are available for public inspection and sharing by contacting the authors. The sampling 
strategy for the selection of villages for data collection incorporated the following steps: 
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Sampling at district level 
A total of three out of the six KBK+ districts (50 per cent) that SPREAD had selected for 
implementation of the programme were sampled according to different levels of vulnerability based 
on a vulnerability index4 constructed from the quantitative baseline data. 
Figure 2.5 Mean of vulnerability index across six target districts 
 
 
Source: Authors’ own. 
By construction, the index was normalised to 1. Kalahandi District was found to be a typical district, 
with Balangir and Nuapada as the least vulnerable districts and Koraput, Malkangiri, and 
Nabarangpur as the most vulnerable districts. A random sampling procedure run by IDS selected 
Kalahandi, Balangir, and Koraput as the three chosen districts from across these three levels of 
vulnerability. 
Sampling at village level 
Three villages were sampled from each of the three selected districts where social audits had taken 
place. These were selected as a sub-sample of the quantitative survey sample in order to be able to 
triangulate, draw on, and expand on the quantitative data. A stratified random sample of nine 
villages was taken based on distance from the district capital, whereby one village per district was 
selected from across the three distance categories (close to capital, medium distance to capital, far 
from capital).5 The final list of villages comprised:6 
 
Balangir District 
                                               
4
 The index of vulnerability at district level (p1) was constructed based on (i) proportion of SC, (ii) proportion of ST, (iii) proportion of 
primary caregivers who are illiterate, (iv) assets ownership index, (v) index of nutrition knowledge, (vi) index of knowledge of MAMATA 
entitlements, (vii) household food insecurity index, (viii) primary caregivers’ dietary diversity index and (ix) density of groups/committee. 
The higher the index, the lower the vulnerability. 
5
 ‘Close’ villages are about 30km from the district capital, ‘medium’ villages 62km, and ‘far’ villages 83km. 
6
 Village names have been removed to ensure they remain anonymous. 
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1. 1 ‘Close’ village (Late) in Sihini GP 
2. 1 ‘Medium’ village (Early) in Luhasinga GP 
3. 1 ‘Far’ village (Late) in Haldi GP 
 
Kalahandi District 
1. 1‘Close’ village (Late) in Duarsuni GP 
2. 1‘Medium village (Early) in Baradanga GP 
3. 1‘Far’ village (Late) in Thuamul GP 
 
Koraput District 
1. 1‘Close’ village (Late) in Raniguda GP 
2. 1’Medium’ village (Late) in Bagderi GP 
3. 1‘Far village’ (Early) in Ballel GP 
 
The original design proposed selecting two additional villages that hadn’t been exposed to the social 
audit process to act as a comparison, but it was later decided that it would be more useful to select 
a few ‘positive deviance’ villages where the social audits had been taken up extremely well by the 
community, and participation and engagement rates had been high, as this would provide insights 
into what characteristics may have led to their success. The two ‘positive deviance’ villages were 
selected from two of the three districts according to the highest social audit participation rates based 
on the quantitative baseline data. These villages were: 
1.  1 Late village in Boipariguda GP, Koraput District 
2.  1 Late village in Golamunda GP, Kalahandi District 
The total of eleven villages sampled were not intended to be statistically representative of the wider 
population but rather provide rich contextual insights that could complement and enhance the 
quantitative survey data. 
Piloting of tools and research team training 
Internal training of the field research coordinator, supervisors, and researchers was conducted by 
DCOR for six days from 20–25 June 2018, which included three days of classroom training and 
mock practices for two days so that the team could get used to using the tools and pick up on any 
issues or challenges faced. The IDS team then joined the DCOR team for three days from 26–28 
June for further orientation and discussion of the tools and pilot testing of the tools. Suggestions and 
inputs were provided by the DCOR research team to adapt the tools to the local context. 
Representatives from the SPREAD team also provided valuable inputs to the study team about the 
social audit intervention being implemented. 
Pilot testing of the topic guides was done over the next two days from 27–28 June. One of the non-
sampled intervention villages, Kumbhari in Saintala Block was visited for the pilot testing. The IDS 
and DCOR teams jointly conducted this pilot-testing exercise with field support from the SPREAD 
team, which included FGDs with different categories of community members, and IDIs with NFSA 
providers and community members. De-briefing on the findings of the pilot testing was conducted 
after completion of each day of fieldwork. The research team shared their experience of pilot testing 
with the IDS team who recorded any suggested changes and incorporated them into the final 
versions of tools that were finalised shortly afterwards. 
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During the pilot testing, it became clear that the DCOR research team would benefit from additional 
field practice before starting data collection. Therefore, a week-long field practice was done after the 
piloting was conducted which helped them become more familiar with the tools. 
Data collection 
After the topic guides were finalised, data collection was started on 9 July 2018 and continued until 
23 May 2018. In all three districts, data collection was carried out simultaneously. The team 
consisted of 17 people (a team leader, field research coordinator, three field research supervisors, 
and 12 field researchers). Five team members (1 field supervisor and four field researchers) were 
engaged in data collection in each of the three districts. The four field researchers engaged in each 
district were into two sub-teams to conduct the FGDs or IDIs paired (one researcher conducted the 
interview and the other researcher acted as the note-taker). In total, six pairs of field researchers 
were engaged across the three districts for conducting the FGDs and IDIs planned for the study. 
Table 2.3 IDIs conducted per district and target group 
 
District Koraput Bolangir Kalahandi Total 
A. Community member 
Community member 36 20 26 82 
Sub-total 36 20 26 82 
B. NFSA service providers 
AWW 2 2 1 5 
School teacher 1 1 1 3 
Jogana Sahayaka 1 1 1 3 
Sub-total 4 4 3 11 
C. Government officials 
ABEO   1   1 
ICDS/lady supervisor 1 1 1 3 
Sarpanch 1 2 2 5 
CRCC 1   1 2 
Ward member 1   1 2 
Sub-total 4 4 5 13 
D. Social audit team 
Samikshya Sathi 3 3 3 9 
Block coordinator 1 1 1 3 
District coordinator 1 1 1 3 
Sub-total 5 5 5 15 
Total IDIs 49 33 39 121 
Source: Authors’ own. 
A total of 121 IDIs were conducted in the three districts. Of these, 82 IDIs were conducted with the 
community members, 11 with the NFSA service providers, 13 with the government officials and the 
remaining 15 were conducted with the social audit team members. 
The number of FGDs conducted is presented below in Table 2.4. 
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Table 2.4 FGDs conducted by district and target group  
District Koraput Bolangir Kalahandi Total 
A. FGD with community member 
SC Younger women 2 2 4 8 
ST Younger women 5 3 4 12 
OBC Younger women   1   1 
SC Older women 3 3 4 10 
ST Older women 4 2 4 10 
OBC Older women   1   1 
ST Men 5 3 4 12 
SC Men 1 3 4 8 
OBC Men 1     1 
Village leader 4 3 4 11 
Sub-total 25 21 28 74 
B. FGD with implementation team 
SPREAD district and block 
coordinator 
1 1 1 3 
SPREAD Samikshya Sathis 1 1 1 3 
Sub-total 2 2 2 6 
Total FGDs 27 23 30 80 
Source: Authors’ own. 
The DCOR study team conducted a total of 80 FGDs across all three districts together, of which 74 
FGDs were conducted with the community members and 6 FGDs were conducted with the 
implementation team. The 80 FGDs were attended by a total of 624 persons (200 in Koraput, 184 in 
Bolangir, and 240 in Kalahandi districts). On average, each FGD included around eight individuals. 
Data handling and analysis 
Audio recording of the FGDs and IDI 
After informed consent7 was given, IDIs and FGDs were digitally recorded using a portable digital 
recorder. Audio recordings were downloaded after coming back from the field on a daily basis. The 
recorded files were renamed using an anonymised coding system developed in an encrypted Excel 
sheet. 
English translation of the FGDs and IDIs 
Recorded files were then transcribed as verbatim in English by a team of 30 translators. The quality 
of the English transcriptions was assured by matching audio recordings with the transcriptions by 
the DCOR quality assurance team. The translation team were provided training on the social audit 
intervention and research tools before conducting the translation. After the transcriptions were 
completed, all the transcription data files were given new names and codes to ensure data and 
informant confidentiality. 
                                               
7
 The purpose and objectives, risks, benefits, and confidentiality of the information collected in the study were clearly explained to the 
participants prior to taking informed consent. 
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Data coding and analysis 
The translated FGDs and IDIs were coded using qualitative data analysis software (NVivo 12) 
through a two-stage primary and secondary coding process. First, the IDS team developed a 
primary-level coding scheme for each research tool/target group based on the main research 
questions, tools, and key themes to be explored, based on their initial review of the transcripts. This 
was shared with DCOR who conducted the primary-level coding exercise. During the coding 
process, DCOR raised queries and provided feedback to IDS on the coding and some of the 
themes which led to some sections being revised and new nodes added or changed. 
Once DCOR completed the primary-level coding in NVivo, the IDS team developed a secondary 
coding scheme which built on the primary-level coding. The IDS team used this to carry out a higher 
level of qualitative data analysis of key emerging themes, patterns, and crosscutting issues 
important for assessing and exploring the programme’s implementation processes and outcomes, in 
accordance with the Programme Impact Pathway and evaluation objectives. These themes were 
also triangulated with the quantitative and SPREAD MIS data. 
2.7 Ethical considerations 
Ethical approval was granted by the Institutional Ethics Committee (IEC) in Odisha. The IEC 
meeting took place in Bhubaneswar and was chaired by Justice Hruday Ballav Das. The applicant 
organisations included IDS, APPI, and DCOR Consulting. Relevant documentation had been 
submitted to the board prior to the meeting. Following a discussion of ethical implications of the 
evaluation design by the ethics panel with IDS, DCOR, and SPREAD representatives, the IEC 
granted ethical clearance on 11 December 2017. IDS’ Institutional Ethics Committee also approved 
the study design in November 2017. 
Data collection did not involve any collection of biological samples or use of biometric testing or 
anthropometric measurements so the overall risk of possible harm or discomfort caused to 
participants was considered low. Specific measures taken to minimise risk and to ensure the safety 
of the participants included the following: 
 Informed consent was obtained from each individual prior to interview and respondents were 
told that participation was completely voluntary and that they could stop at any time. 
 So as to minimise taking up people’s time, data collection tools were tested and piloted so as 
to ensure that they did not include unnecessary details and did not exceed 1–1.5 hours. 
 In order to minimise participant burden, particularly given that the same communities were 
sampled for both quantitative and qualitative data collection, participants received a small gift 
as compensation for their time. 
 Care was taken to protect data privacy and confidentiality. All files containing interviews and 
focus groups that were digitally recorded were stored with password protection and 
according to an anonymised code system. All the transcription and translation files were de-
identified and kept anonymous for data coding and analysis. The back-up of all the files was 
kept on a separate hard disk in order to avoid data loss. 
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3 Findings at implementation level (design, inputs, 
outputs) 
Section 3 presents the evaluation’s main findings related to the design and implementation of the 
SPREAD CAN programme, including the appropriateness of the overall design, staff recruitment, 
and training, selection of areas and target groups, programme management and monitoring, 
implementation roll-out, and knowledge and participation of the communities in the social audit 
process. Evidence is drawn from a range of primary and secondary data sources including SPREAD 
programme documentation, meetings, and MIS data, community-level IDIs, and FDGs with different 
stakeholder groups, as well as other external literature. 
3.1 Design 
In this section, we review the appropriateness of the design for the intended outcomes, including 
evidence that it draws on ‘best practice’, any wider evidence on effectiveness or implementation 
considerations; and evidence of any effort that went into improving the intended design, including 
through field tests and pilots. 
Overall, programme documentation, discussions with the SPREAD and APPI teams and the 
evaluation team’s prior knowledge of the field of social accountability practice suggest that a 
substantial amount of effort went into the design of the social audit process. The strongest piece of 
evidence for this is the production of the Social Audit Manual itself and the associated training 
attached to it. The Social Audit Manual was produced following a pilot of the social audit 
methodology in 24 locations in six ‘KBK +’ districts. This followed a review of earlier social audit 
guides and consultation with organisations who had been involved in auditing the government’s 
MNREGA programme. 
The SPREAD Social Audit Manual is comprehensive and covers a number of important areas which 
are helpful in ensuring that SPREAD team members are sufficiently oriented to the history and 
objectives of both the NFSA and related programmes, and the social audit approach itself. This is 
an important observation because, as we will go on to describe below, raising awareness of the 
NFSA context and the objective of the social audits within this was an important part of the 
intervention. 
As well as providing essential background on the NFSA and each of the services covered, the 
manual also lays out clear steps and considerations for every step of the audit process. This 
includes: overall objectives, principles, and procedures; specific activities in the pre-, during, and 
post-social audit stage; social audit team; Samikshya Sathi (SS) and social audit recruitment and 
criteria; documents to be consulted for each scheme covered; information and communication 
activities, field verification; laying the ground for and conducting the public meeting; and follow-up, 
including grievance redressal, and onward referral to state officials. 
Social audits have a long history in India and are a popular form of social accountability and 
advocacy. They have been used in multiple contexts related to NFSA programmes, primarily 
relating to the Public Distribution System (PDS), but also in programmes such as the ICDS. 
Although widespread, there is limited rigorous quantitative evidence on their effectiveness in terms 
of food security and nutrition outcomes, reflecting a wider and global gap in the literature in terms of 
social accountability and nutrition. 
The substantial experience of using social audits in the Indian context combined with the 
requirement that state governments carry out some form of social audit as per their NFSA 
responsibilities suggests that the design was appropriate in this case – albeit one requiring further 
development and evaluation in the context of nutrition (something to which this evaluation report 
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contributes). The further development of the training manual, the way in which the SPREAD team 
was able to draw on practice and guidelines from broader allied sectors including NREGA and the 
right to food campaign (RTF), and the attempt to pilot and further alter the design are all exemplary 
in terms of thought going into the design, once a decision had been made to pursue a social audit 
model. 
3.2 Staff/volunteer recruitment, training, and characteristics 
This section reports on evidence we have gathered on the process followed to recruit and train staff 
and volunteers associated with the CAN programme – including core and district-level staff and 
Samikhya Sathis. Evidence is largely drawn from a review of SPREAD programme documentation 
including training manuals and reports, and discussions with SPREAD staff. 
Recruitment 
Recruitment needs for the programme were extensive, as the design required recruitment of a 
substantial number of people at all organisational levels: 
 10 state-level staff 
 48 block coordinators 
 6 district coordinators 
 240 Gram Panchayat coordinators 
 480 Samikshya Sathis. 
 
This task appears to have been carried out successfully – some delays in timing are reported in 
programme documents, but not so much to delay implementation. There is evidence of a suitable 
and formal recruitment process having been in place according to programme documents. Positions 
were advertised via the development portal devnetjobs, or locally in the case of Gram Panchayat 
coordinators and SSs. A decentralised process of recruitment (presumably under the management 
of district coordinators) to select local personnel was reported as working well. There is evidence of 
a clear interview process (scored written test and interview) and clear criteria for recruitment via job 
descriptions. Attention was also paid to diversity, though there were some reported early challenges 
in finding female candidates for state and district-level positions. Out of the total 185 sanctioned 
positions for phase 1, 176 were reported to be in place by February 2017. Of this, 26 per cent were 
female and 74 per cent male. In terms of caste composition, 39 per cent of project staff were 
‘Scheduled Tribe’ (ST), 15 per cent Scheduled Caste (SC), 28 per cent ‘Other Backward Caste’ 
(OBC), 2 per cent ‘Socially and Economically Backward Communities’ (SEBC), and 17 per cent 
from the general communities. Efforts were made to appoint local persons for the GP and block 
coordinators. 
SSs were recruited separately – some via the GPC recruitment process, others recruited directly by 
a process led by the district coordinator (DC). Here, local contextual knowledge, and aptitude to 
mobilise people and facilitate meetings were prioritised as desired knowledge and skills. 
Training 
The programme carried out extensive training and staff development activities at all levels. There is 
evidence that this extended beyond basic induction, to further training, and refresher training at later 
stages in the programme. There is also evidence that training employed a suitably wide array of 
pedagogical approaches, including participatory, group, and practical exercises. 
Basic induction materials were reported as prepared in Odisha on the NFSA, ICDS, and 
malnutrition. Further resources were provided as primers by the RTF campaign (on social audit, 
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know your rights, ICDS, MDM, NFSA, Right to Information (RTI), Right to Education (RTE), Forest 
Rights Act (FRA)). A two-day induction workshop was held for district and block coordinators. 
Noteworthy is the attention to basic understanding of the objectives and motivations of the project, 
rather than a focus on isolated tasks. Further training on GKS and PRIs was undertaken in all six 
districts to ensure understanding of the three-tier Panchayat Raj system and the roles and 
responsibilities of different PRI members. The GKS training focused on the overall context of the 
National Health Mission (NHM) and the role of the GKS in relation to health and nutrition, including 
in the preparation of village health and nutrition plans. Other relevant organisations were involved in 
the training process (District Programme Manager (DPM)-NHM, District GKS Coordinator, etc.), 
which SPREAD reported helped develop relationships in this area. Training also extended to senior 
management (state team and DC), who underwent a ‘Management Development Programme’ 
facilitated by an external expert, focusing on individual, team, and organisational functioning. Similar 
exercises took place for each of the district teams in October–November 2017. Refresher training 
took place in December 2017. 
Training documents reviewed by this evaluation include a ‘Report of the Social Audit Training Year 
One (August 2016 to July 2017)’; ‘Report of the Samikshya Sathi Induction Training’ and ‘Collect 
Training, Testing of Forms, and Field Piloting 30th June to 4th July 2017’. 
The document on Social Audit Training describes how training of the entire 224 staff members took 
place in two waves of six days in Koroput in May 2017. SPREAD’s senior staff and district 
coordinators formed a resource team for the training and took responsibility for communication and 
participation, while a separate administrative team took care of logistics. Emphasis is placed in the 
report and in the training plan on ensuring participation; ensuring learning through regular group 
recaps; and ice-breaking and social events. Training took place in Odisha. Pedagogical methods 
appearing in the agenda are an appropriate mix of didactic teaching combined with role-play, 
practical demonstrations, group discussion, quizzes, group presentations, and in-field practice. 
Some evaluative reflection is included in the report itself, including comments by participants that 
would improve future training. It is also reported that the training team met every evening to adapt 
the training according to the evolving needs of the participants. 
Training of the initial (pilot) 54 Samikshya Sathis took place separately at two locations: 
Bhawanipatana and Koraput in March 2016. A similar mix of pedagogical methods were employed 
over the three days of each training session. Encouraging signs of broader pedagogical methods 
employed by the course which are documented in the report are the sharing of the expectations of 
the training by the participants; participatory games used to encourage understanding of community 
mobilisation; and reports of feedback from trainee SSs being taken into account during the training 
itself. A further training for the 426 intervention SSs took place in December 2017 according to a 
similar methodology. 
3.3 Targeting and selection of regions and participants 
This section focuses on the evidence available on the SPREAD team’s rationale and process for 
selecting the geographic and participant focus of the CAN programme. Evidence is drawn from 
review of SPREAD programme documentation, discussions with the SPREAD team and some 
external literature. 
3.3.1 Selection of target areas (state, block, GP, village level) 
State-level selection 
At state level, the CAN programme’s geographic focus is on the state of Odisha. This reflects 
APPI’s strategic focus on supporting and influencing the Government of Odisha’s efforts to 
mainstream social audits within the state as a tool to improve nutrition outcomes which remain poor 
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relative to most other states in India. By trialling the programme at scale within the state, if proven to 
be successful, it is hoped that this will influence the Government of Odisha, as well as other states, 
to adopt this type of model in ensuring community accountability for delivery of nutrition-related 
services. SPREAD has been working in Odisha State since 1989 and Odisha remains the 
geographic focus of their programme operations and existing networks. 
Figure 3.1 Areas covered by SPREAD CAN programme 
 
Source: SPREAD (2017a). 
District-level selection 
For its first three years of implementation (2016–19) the CAN programme is focusing on six of the 
thirty districts in Odisha located in the south and western areas of the state, namely: Koraput, 
Malkangiri, Nabarangpur, Kalahandi, Nuapada, and Balangir (see Figure 3.1). These six districts, 
along with two others (Rayagada and Sonepur) form the ‘KBK+’ (Kalahandi-Balangir-Koraput+ ) 
districts, which are collectively recognised by the following characteristics (see Thomas et al. 2015): 
 High proportion of Scheduled Tribe and Scheduled Caste populations (56 per cent 
compared to 35 per cent in the rest of the state); 
 High rates of poverty, with average rural poverty rates close to 68 per cent compared to the 
state average of 46.9 per cent (in Nabarangpur District it is as high as 80.6 per cent); 
 Poor health and nutrition indicators and severe food insecurity compared to non-KBK+ 
districts; 
 Geographically marginalised, with poor road connectivity and dense hill terrain which inhibits 
access to public services including health. 
These characteristics made them an ideal target area for the CAN social audit programme and 
formed the basis for them purposively selecting six of the KBK+ districts. The latest NFHS4 
government data available on nutrition vulnerability was used to inform this selection. 
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Block and GP-level selection 
At sub-district level, SPREAD selected a total of 24 administrative blocks based on a target to reach 
40 per cent of the total blocks per district. Within each block, approximately 50 per cent of the GPs 
were selected for inclusion in the programme, which was subsequently standardised to 10 GPs per 
block. This resulted in a total of 240 GPs being selected. Of the total 240 GPs, 24 GPs (1 per block) 
were selected for inclusion in the pilot implementation phase carried out between May and June 
2017, with the remaining 216 GPs included as part of the scaled up implementation between 
January and May 2018. As was the case with the selection of districts, blocks were purposively 
selected based on existing secondary data from NFHS4. GP-level selection was influenced by 
discussions with Child Development Project Officers (CDPOs) and District Officers (DOs) 
responsible for nutrition, based on their assessment of need and which GPs were lagging behind 
nutritionally. 
SPREAD and APPI agreed to the above programme coverage for the following reasons (SPREAD 
2016a): 
 It covered most of the KBK+ districts and would provide enough evidence to mainstream the 
social audit tool within the state government (one of the programme’s primary overarching 
objectives); 
 A 40 per cent block coverage was considered substantial enough to influence and ensure 
that the district collectors would take forward decisions for improvement of ICDS in their 
district; 
 It would enable adequate assessment of SPREAD’s capacity to scale up implementation of 
social audits and their presence in Odisha State. 
As this sampling approach appeared to work well, there are no plans to change the approach for the 
next cycle of audits. The GP was considered the main unit of intervention for implementation of 
social audits and for delivery of improved nutrition services and entitlements. The SPREAD Social 
Audit Manual (2018) highlights that the selection of the appropriate programme target area is critical 
and the Panchayat is the ideal unit for conducting social audits. 
Village-level selection 
The original sampling design was to select 50 per cent of the Anganwadi Centres within each GP to 
conduct social audits. Following the pilot, this was increased to 100 per cent based on feedback 
from PRIs and discussions with communities who felt it was important to capture the full picture of 
the performance of every AWC in each GP; otherwise, there was a risk that some poorly performing 
ones might be missed out. It was also felt to be more effective for gaining community and political 
support at GP and higher levels. The introduction of the MIS system for the full-scale 
implementation phase meant that this process could be done quicker so the expanded sampling 
approach did not affect overall timings for the process. 
3.3.2 Targeting of participant groups 
A number of different factors influenced the targeting and inclusion of particular groups and sub-
groups in the social audit process, which included: 
Individuals entitled to NFSA services 
Given that the CAN programme focuses specifically on improving demand and uptake of the four 
government schemes covered under the NFSA (2013) – namely ICDS, TPDS, MAMATA, and 
Midday Meals – individuals eligible for these schemes were considered the main target for inclusion 
in the social audit (SA) process. SPREAD specifically focused on individuals eligible for ICDS as it 
58 
was thought to cover the vast majority of target beneficiaries (pregnant and lactating women, and 
children under six years). 
The SPREAD SA manual highlights that, before initiating the village-level field verification process, 
the social audit teams need to decide whether to apply a census approach (whereby all rights 
holders under each of the NFSA schemes are approached for household-level interview and focus 
groups), or a sample approach (whereby the team agrees on a target percentage of eligible 
individuals to target). SPREAD estimated that all NFSA schemes combined would cover more than 
90 per cent of households across the KBK+ districts. 
For the CAN programme audits conducted in 2017/2018, SPREAD chose to adopt a sample 
approach, targeting 20 per cent of rights holders for ICDS for field verification as this would reach 
the vast majority of NFSA-eligible households, with the exception of the Midday Meals scheme 
which was covered separately via FGDs with children in schools. Selection for field verification 
household surveys was done through a lottery-based system of randomly selecting individuals from 
a list of rights holders based on secondary data available from the AWC. SPREAD estimate that on 
this basis they were able to reach their target of 20 per cent of ICDS, PDS, and MAMATA 
beneficiaries. For a few AWCs, SPREAD reported some issues with accessing rights holders’ 
details from AWWs but this was minimised through prior and consistent engagement and capacity 
building with communities prior to the start of the social audit process. For focus group discussions, 
the main focus was on sampling individuals whose household members were entitled to ICDS 
services. There is a risk that, by relying on secondary data from AWCs to select households for field 
verification, they may have potentially missed sampling newly eligible households, or else those 
who were particularly marginalised in terms of awareness of, and access to, AWC facilities. 
Government officials and community leaders 
Many of SPREAD’s internal programme documents and published reports highlight the critical 
importance of gaining support and involvement from village leaders, state officials at different levels 
of administration, ASHAs and AWWs, and existing committee structures such as Mothers’ 
Committees throughout the social audit process (including pre-, during and post-audit phases). This 
ensured that responsibility and ownership of the process was taken on by the communities 
themselves, with the support and involvement of the SPREAD social audit team. The social audit 
teams therefore made a consistent strategic effort to identify and involve the appropriate individuals 
from across these different groups, particularly PRI members. This was primarily achieved through 
close engagement with the Sarpanches of the respective GPs who themselves coordinated the 
introduction and involvement of other PRI members and state officials involved in implementation of 
the NFSA (e.g. the Block Development Officer (BDOs), CDPO, Market Inspector (MI), and Block 
Education Officer). 
As part of this effort, SPREAD’s programme design incorporated a series of structured training 
sessions for PRI and GKS members prior to the initiation of the actual audit process to raise 
awareness on areas including the Nutrition Manifesto, NFSA, roles and responsibilities of the PRIs, 
and social audit, with a view to helping to motivate the PRIs to take a lead role in the social audit 
process. The programme also incorporated block-level sharing meetings after the social audit 
meetings involving PRI members, BDOs, CDPOs, Mis, and other block-level officials to present and 
follow up on actions highlighted during the GS hearing (SPREAD 2018c). This ensured the active 
participation of government officials in the post-audit phase of addressing concerns and grievances 
raised during the audit. 
Marginalised or disadvantaged groups 
Central to SPREAD’s downward accountability model and social audit approach was a specific 
effort to improve NFSA service delivery for particularly marginalised and disadvantaged groups 
across the six KBK+ target districts. This includes SC, ST, and other backward caste members, 
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women, and individuals with disabilities. Whilst the overall population in these districts is considered 
poorer and more vulnerable relative to populations in other districts, these groups were considered 
particularly vulnerable and susceptible to poor access to NFSA services and entitlements, and 
would therefore be more likely to directly benefit from inclusion in the social audit process. 
At GP and village level, this meant that the SPREAD social audit teams were trained and instructed 
to take special care to identify and mobilise rights holders from SC, ST, and other backward 
communities and disabled households to ensure their active participation in focus group 
discussions, the Palli Sabha village meeting, and Gram Sabha public hearing. 
3.4 Programme management and monitoring 
This section focuses on assessing SPREAD’s overall approach to managing and monitoring the 
CAN social audit programme, including personnel structures, and monitoring tools and systems set 
up. Evidence is largely drawn from review of SPREAD programme documentation and MIS data. 
Findings on how the various steps of the social audit processes were implemented by SPREAD are 
included in Section 3.5. 
3.4.1 SPREAD management approach and structures 
SPREAD’s approach to managing the CAN programme was able to draw on ten years of learning 
and experience accumulated from their work facilitating community mobilisation and monitoring of 
food entitlements, and implementing other social audit approaches within the same regional 
contexts. 
Piloting their SA approach with 24 GPs in 2017 meant that earlier lessons and experience (which 
were systematically documented in individual social audit reports) and challenges faced during 
implementation were able to help shape the design and management structures for scaled up 
implementation across the remaining 216 GPs in 2018. The development and use of a detailed 
Social Audit Manual and SS training manual acted as important management tools for providing 
detailed and standardised guidance for SPREAD staff on the background /context/aims as well as 
steps involved and sensitivities required to undertake the social audit process (for more details on 
staff recruitment and training see Section 3.2). 
SPREAD designed a complex multi-tier management structure in order to oversee and implement 
the programme (see Figure 3.2). This included a number of core State team members (including 
State Programme Manager, Community Governance Coordinator, Social Audit Expert, Accounts 
Officer, and M&E Coordinator) based in the main Koraput office, six District Coordinators, 48 Block 
Coordinators (BCs), 240 GP Coordinators, and 480 Samikshya Sathis. Whilst not considered formal 
SPREAD employees, the Samikshya Sathi volunteers recruited from the 240 individual GP 
communities were considered a central pillar to the functioning of the whole programme and were 
closely supervised by the Gram Panchayat Coordinators (GPCs). The SSs were appointed and 
trained to facilitate the social audit process and acted as a critical connection between the SPREAD 
team and community members (more details on recruitment and training of SSs is included in 
Section 3.2). 
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Figure 3.2 SPREAD management structure 
Source: SPREAD (2018a). 
This multi-layered management model combined staff working at GP/village level alongside more 
strategic political engagement with government officials and service providers at higher levels of 
administration (state, district, block). Evidence from programme documentation and interviews with 
SPREAD staff suggest that this model helped increase state involvement in, and responsiveness to, 
the programme. More details on participation rates in the social audit process are included in 
Section 3.6. 
Whilst proven to be an effective management model, there remains a question around its intensity 
in terms of personnel and resource requirements, particularly when considering wider scale-up of 
the programme and replication elsewhere. Indeed, the core SPREAD team indicated during 
discussions with the evaluation team in February 2018 that, in the longer term, they were looking at 
options for a leaner management model. It will be important for SPREAD to consider this as part of 
their planning for the next phase of social audits due to commence in December 2018. 
Some staff turnover issues were reported during the course of the programme, particularly at block 
and SS level, although this doesn’t appear to have had any major impacts on the delivery of the SA 
programme and vacant positions (at least at block level) were filled up immediately. 
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By using the SSs recruited from within their local community (rather than SPREAD employees) to 
act as the main facilitators of the social audit process, through collaboration with the Sarpanch and 
local officials, it is perhaps unsurprising that qualitative interviews with community members 
revealed a widespread low level of awareness of NGO SPREAD as the main implementing agency 
responsible for overseeing the audits. Many community members either said they didn’t know who 
managed the social audits or else named the Sarpanch or other Panchayat officers as the lead 
responsible. 
Whilst a lack of community awareness of who led the process could be seen as a sign of poor 
communications about the programme and process, this also stems from a deliberate intention on 
behalf of SPREAD to integrate the social audit process into existing community structures with a 
limited profile, particularly given the longer-term plan for communities to manage social audit 
processes themselves without external support. 
An external advisory committee was set up by SPREAD to provide strategic guidance on the overall 
direction and management of the programme. This structure was formally in place by December 
2016 and the first official meeting was held in July 2017 (originally planned for March 2017 but 
delayed to due to member availability issues and other processes). The committee included 
individuals with expertise in food, nutrition, governance, water, sanitation, and journalism. Feedback 
and advice was sought from the committee on resource material and ongoing activities and 
challenges faced, who were able to provide constructive suggestions for improvements (for 
example, on strengthening relationships with PRIs and framing the advocacy agenda for social audit 
and nutrition). Specific ToRs with some members were agreed to fulfil specific activities for example 
one member agreed to facilitate a training workshop to the project team on nutrition (SPREAD 
2018c). 
3.4.2 Monitoring frameworks and tools 
SPREAD’s internal programme documentation includes two key documents central to the planning 
and monitoring of programme activities, outputs, and outcomes: 1) a grant monitoring plan 
(SPREAD 2016b) and 2) an implementation plan (SPREAD 2016a). 
The monitoring plan, prepared before the start of the project in August 2016, summarises the 
project’s main anticipated outputs and outcomes alongside their associated indicators, means of 
verification/data sources, frequency of data collection, and risks/assumptions. The monitoring plan 
has not been reviewed or updated within the course of the project. The plan provides a useful 
overview of the areas to be monitored and sources of verification (e.g. annual reports). The plan 
doesn’t include details on the specific monitoring tools and data collection approaches intended to 
capture the information needed to meaningfully assess ongoing progress at output level or assess 
longer-term programme outcomes anticipated, such as community empowerment/ownership, 
women’s empowerment, food consumption, and other nutrition outcome indicators. Discussions with 
SPREAD confirmed that they consider the MIS social audit templates (discussed more below) as 
their primary monitoring tool for measuring achievement of outputs (e.g. number of GS meetings 
held, participation rates, etc.). Community-based monitoring during the post-social audit phase (also 
discussed more below) was used as the primary tool for assessing some outcomes (such as 
community empowerment) but not others (such as improved NFSA service delivery, increased 
uptake, etc.). For some of these longer-term outcomes, SPREAD will be looking to the independent 
evaluation results to determine the extent to which these have been achieved. For the next round of 
social audits, SPREAD will be able to compare their MIS findings e.g. on service access from the 
previous round in order to determine changes in these outcomes over this period. 
The implementation plan developed at the start of the programme in 2016 maps out key steps 
involved in the four phases of the programme’s implementation between August 2016 and August 
2019. Monitoring of progress against this plan was recorded via monthly progress reports and via 
the six-monthly Programme Reports submitted to APPI (with the latest being August 2018). These 
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reports also document key opportunities, achievements, what worked well, challenges, 
modifications to the initial plan, utilisation of resources, partnerships, spend patterns, future plans, 
and significant change stories experienced by participants in the process. 
A process documentation of the social audit was conducted during the fourth phase by an external 
consultant commissioned by SPREAD who produced a summary that was shared with government 
officials as part of post-audit follow-up. Efforts were also made to discuss and document the 
experience of the blocks teams while organising the social audits. 
MIS approach, process, and tools 
APPI appointed an external Copstech platform agency, SocialCops, to work closely with APPI and 
SPREAD in the development and roll-out of a mobile phone-based Management Information 
System (MIS) approach for collecting and analysing data as part of the social audits. Detailed 
survey templates were developed according to the different sources of field verification. This 
included the main sites for NFSA services such as the AWC, Fair Price Shop and School, PDS, 
ICDS, and MAMATA beneficiary households. Templates were also developed to monitor 
participation in the social audit processes including Palli Sabha and Gram Sabha meetings, PRI 
training, and post-audit PLA and VHND monitoring. The survey templates were programmed into a 
software tool (‘Collect’) that could be accessed by the social audit team via an android-based 
application. Once data was uploaded to the central online database (‘dashboard’) it could be viewed 
and analysed by the SPREAD team. 
Given the central importance the social audit model places on documenting information about 
individuals’ entitlements to specific services to use as an accountability tool to hold service providers 
to account to bring about improvements, having a reliable and efficient tool and process to collect 
and quickly analyse this data was critical to the success of the SPREAD programme. Programme 
documents including the Social Audit Manual and programme progress reports highlight the 
importance of this use of technology for increasing efficiency, enabling quick data compilation, and 
quick analysis compared to traditional paper-based methods. 
From the programme perspective, it has saved time for data collection by SS and GPC and 
also the cumbersome and time-consuming process of data entry, cleaning, and compilation 
has been minimised and avoided to great extent. Digitising the social audit process can be a 
model for future social audits across the country.  
(SPREAD 2018c) 
 
Staff training, form testing, and field piloting of the Collect MIS tool across four of the pilot GPs were 
facilitated by SocialCorps in June–July 2017 (see SPREAD 2017e). This included training on the 
various steps involved in MIS data collection in the field and on the management of data via the 
dashboard. 
Aside from its core function to store and analyse data about NFSA services and the social audit 
process, the MIS also acted as an important management tool for SPREAD BCs and GPCs to be 
able to monitor the social audit team’s precise locations, progress in conducting verification 
processes, and quality of data and documentation (e.g. photos of AWC registers) collected. 
The MIS was in place and used for data collection across all the 216 social audits conducted in 
2018. The SPREAD team was also able to use the dashboard to display data during block-level 
sharing meetings as part of the post-social audit follow-up phase and also planned to use them in 
district and state-level meetings with officials. 
Some of the challenges posed by the introduction of this mobile-based MIS approach included the 
following: 
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 Some delays were experienced in selecting the appropriate IT agency which meant the 
development and testing took place later than SPREAD had originally planned, although this 
didn’t affect their ability to roll out the system in time for the cycle of 216 audits started in 
January 2018. 
 
 Some auditors were initially apprehensive as this was the first time they had used mobile 
phones and the internet. With ongoing guidance and support from SocialCops and other 
SPREAD staff, plus hands-on experience in piloting the mobile application, their confidence 
and competence improved, although there remains a question around data reliability and 
input error rates if staff were so unaccustomed to use of this technology. A WhatsApp 
support group was formed with SocialCops to discuss and resolve MIS-related difficulties. 
 
 Areas with poor internet connectivity were found to cause problems with uploading data in 
real time. To overcome this issue, auditors were instructed to ensure they saved responses 
in offline mode and move to an area with better internet connectivity every three days. 
 
 Cleaning of data, especially cleaning of data of the names of Anganwadis took longer than 
expected. MIS data sets reviewed by the evaluation team showed many incidents of block 
and GP names being recorded with multiple spelling variations which may have affected the 
accuracy of data analysis via the dashboard. 
 
 The initial dashboard set up in 2017 didn’t fully meet expectations and required 
improvements to its functionality. 
SPREAD also used their MIS system to monitor community-level follow-up during the post-social 
audit follow-up phase. This included ten cycles of participatory learning and action (PLA) meetings 
developed and conducted with the support of the organisation Ekjut as a tool for community 
monitoring of governance and transparency. The main target group for these meetings were women 
and adolescents. These meetings were designed to cover NFSA schemes and behavioural aspects. 
VHND participation rates were also captured as part of the MIS. MIS findings on participation rates 
for these post-audit follow-up activities will help feed into the design of the next round of social 
audits starting in December 2018. 
3.5 Social audit implementation 
This section first examines the CAN programme’s overall success in meeting its implementation 
targets in terms of timings for the calendar of social audits planned and final geographic coverage 
achieved. Evidence for this is taken from SPREAD programme documentation. We then go on to 
examine some of the key implementation findings related to each of the three main phases of the 
audit process (pre-audit, social audit, and post-audit). Evidence for these findings are drawn largely 
from community-level IDI and FGDs with different target groups and to a lesser extent from 
SPREAD programme documentation and MIS data. 
SPREAD successfully carried out 240 social audits across 240 GPs as per their original design and 
plan (described in Section 1). The 24 pilots were completed during May, June, and July of 2017. 
The remaining 216 were not carried out strictly according to the planned timetable, with the majority 
taking place during the final six months of year 2 (58 between August 2017 and January 2018, and 
158 between February 2018 and July 2018). However, they did meet their overall deadline of 216 
before August 2018. (SPREAD 2018c). The timings of the audits shifted slightly to accommodate 
the evaluation research plan of IDS, in particular to fit the design of the quantitative component 
which required the GPs randomly sampled for ‘early’ and ‘late’ phases of the programme cycle to be 
implemented accordingly by SPREAD. 
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The final count of villages covered by the Social Audit programme was higher than planned, with 
3116 villages included (193 more than planned). 
Pre-social audit findings 
During discussions with SPREAD and in interviews and focus groups with the social audit teams, it 
became clear that to interpret the timeframe as set out in the manual as a rigid one was not realistic 
or the intention of the programme team. The social audit teams started the ‘pre-social audit phase’ 
months before the beginning of the social audit, as they realised it was necessary to build 
relationships with key people, in particular PRIs, over a longer period in order to gain the trust of 
communities and raise awareness about the process. Forming the Social Audit Committee in 
accordance with the recommendations in the Social Audit Manual also proved problematic in the 
reality of the field. The Social Audit Committee inevitably became the same group of people as the 
social audit team. This is a flaw in the process that has been recognised by SPREAD, and is 
something they are aiming to improve in the next round of social audits. 
The majority of the social audit teams reported that gaining the initial trust of the community, 
healthcare providers, and government officials was challenging.8 This created issues when trying to 
persuade them to engage in the social audit process. This was due to a number of factors, 
including, firstly a history of other NGOs working in these communities, who were reported to have 
made promises of change that resulted in nothing. Secondly, the community had no previous 
contact with SPREAD, (‘no one knew us’), which was exacerbated by some members of the social 
audit team being relatively young and female, who therefore struggled to communicate effectively 
with community members who were older, more senior, or men. A lack of understanding about the 
process also meant that community members had very low initial expectations of its effectiveness, 
and this also created fear and resistance from health-care providers and schools that the process 
was confrontational and was about finding problems with them. 
Prior to the social audit week, several community members did report being contacted or visited by 
SPREAD to inform them of the upcoming meetings and verifications. Many people reported that 
their first contact with the social audit team was during the social audit itself. This finding supports 
the original Social Audit Manual plan for proceedings. 
According to the Social Audit Manual, government officials should be included in the planning 
process for the social audit. A few of the government officials interviewed reported that the SPREAD 
team did not contact them prior to the social audit starting. However, a couple did report being 
contacted by SPREAD, and that they were subsequently involved in the social audit process from 
the outset. 
Several NFSA service providers reported being contacted during the pre-social audit phase. They 
reported that they were given information about the social audit, that it would take seven days, and 
that they would be carrying out research that would verify information regarding NFSA services. 
One madam and sir had come, they said they will reside in the Panchayat and conduct 
investigations of the Anganwadi Centres, conduct meetings, etc. They stayed here for 7–8 
days. 
 
(Male, OBC, 32, Kalahandi, TPDS distributor) 
However, an equal number of NFSA service providers reported that they had not been contacted 
and that the commencement of the social audit was a surprise to them. 
                                               
8
 Five out of six FGDs and four out of fifteen IDIs. 
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They arrived suddenly and revealed that ‘We are from the SPREAD team and will inspect 
about the midday meal’? 
 
(Male, OBC, Bolangir, teacher – MDM provider) 
 
Social audit findings 
The social audits were generally carried out as planned within the seven-day period. However, the 
activities that were divided into day 1, and then days 2–4, were reported to be carried out 
simultaneously throughout days 1–4. 
Logistical and practical issues created several problems with keeping to the seven-day schedule, 
however. Social audit teams experienced problems with their tablets, with accessing the internet 
and electricity, and with transportation between and within communities.9 Team members reported a 
particularly heavy workload during Gram Sabha times, and timing issues created by external 
factors, such as fitting around schedules of government officials, left them carrying out more than 
one Gram Sabha on the same day.10 Further time pressures were created by seasonal migration of 
target community members and school and Anganwadi centre closures during the social audit 
week, making the strict seven-day schedule problematic.11 Long days and an extremely heavy 
workload during the social audit period were also reported to be a problem; compiling the reports 
from the data, as well as having daily team meetings in the evening, were reported as problematic. 
Some social audit team members suggested extending the seven-day period to reflect the need to 
be flexible within communities, perhaps to nine or ten days. 
Reflecting the challenge of establishing trust within the communities during the pre-social audit 
phase, social audit teams also experienced resistance from some health-care providers, 
government officials, and schools during the social audit phase. This created difficulties in collecting 
the necessary data.12 In some communities, health-care providers (and their families) were reported 
to have been deliberately intimidating during Gram Sabha meetings in order to prevent people from 
reporting grievances,13 or creating deliberate disturbances during the meeting.14 A lack of 
attendance of community members, health-care providers and government officials at village 
meetings and Gram Sabhas was also reported in some cases.15 SPREAD have tried to overcome 
this challenge through early positive engagement and continued communication, as well as 
providing further training and support for social audit team members and communities. 
Social audit teams reported feeling disheartened when the social audit process did not meet the 
expectations of the communities. This was caused by two distinct issues. Firstly, when social audit 
team members were unable to enhance access to nutrition schemes for community members who 
were entitled.16 Secondly, in areas where there has not been a functional grievance redressal 
system prior to the social audit, the process has been appropriated in order for people to voice 
concerns over issues such as housing, drinking water, roads, etc.17 This has created issues for the 
social audit teams, as they try to ensure that the discussion focuses on nutrition. 
                                               
9
 Five FGDs, three IDIs. 
10
 Four FGDs. 
11
 Two FGDs, one IDI. 
12
 Reported in official reporting documents for Feb 2017, August 2017, and Feb 2018, four out of six FGDs. 
13
 Five FGDs. 
14
 Four FGDs, three IDIs. 
15
 Reported in official reporting documents for Aug 2017 and Feb 2018, four FGDs, two IDIs. 
16
 Reported in official reporting documents for Feb 2018 and August 2018, five out of six FGDs. 
17
 Reported in official reporting document for Feb 2018 and August 2018. 
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A consistent theme that emerged during interviews and focus groups with community members, 
social audit team members, and NFSA providers was around a lack of trust in the process due to 
previous inaction, or the problem being at such a high level that they did not know how to resolve it. 
One community focus group participant explained that she did not engage with the social audit 
process ‘because [no matter] how much you complain, the government will never listen to it’ (female 
community FGD participant). 
Despite the challenges identified, many people within the communities reported that the social audit 
process was a positive experience. 
Interviewer: Was the experience of the Gram Sabha meeting good? 
Response: Yes it was good…they asked all people about their problem. 
 
(Male, ST, 28, Bolangir) 
 
Response: It was a good experience. I felt good. 
Interviewer: Why did it felt good? 
Response: There was an awareness among the people. People who were unaware of it 
came to know about it. 
 
(Male, OBC, 45, Kalahandi) 
Aspects of the process that were found to be particularly pleasing to the community were the ability 
for everyone to voice concerns (even if this option was not used), the possibility that access to 
schemes would increase, the feeling of being included in something, and in particular, when the 
process was successful in resolving grievances. 
Yes the meeting happened so that they can solve our problems. They did that meeting, so 
that the things will change and anything good will happen in [future]. 
 
(Female, SC, Koraput) 
 
The point of going to every house and creating awareness to the people made me happy, 
from that we came to know that a meeting is going to be held so that we could go and join. 
 
(Male FGD participant (average age of FGD, 53), Balangir) 
Criticism of the social audit process from community members centred around the same issues 
raised by social audit team members. A few people were upset when Gram Sabha meetings were 
disrupted by other community members, when they did not feel listened to, when the process did 
not meet their expectations regarding increased access to NFSA services, when senior officials 
failed to attend, or when they did not understand what was happening. 
The majority of government officials interviewed for this evaluation found the social audit process to 
be a positive one. Most appreciated the mechanisms of public accountability for NFSA service 
providers and PRI members, that allowed them to understand the gaps in services and 
requirements for improvement. Further, many reported that they valued the awareness-raising 
aspects of the process, and the inclusiveness of all community members. 
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Very few challenges were identified by government officials. One person reported that the Gram 
Sabha meeting did not provide necessary refreshment, and was too long for mothers with small 
children to attend. Another reported disappointment at not being able to resolve all the problems 
raised. The final complaint was that there was not enough time for everyone to speak in the Gram 
Sabha. 
The majority of NFSA service providers interviewed considered the social audit process to be 
useful, positive, and well managed. This group includes those who were not contacted prior to the 
start of the social audit, suggesting that even though they were not warned of the upcoming events, 
they have still witnessed the merits of the process. 
 
Almost all the work was done neatly and properly. They checked all our records and 
documents of Anganwadi and MS records as well and took a photo of everything. 
 
(Female, OBC, 50, Balangir, AWW Provider) 
A few of the NFSA service providers reported that the grievance redressal processes that were 
started by the social audit were useful and positive and that the process itself was conducted well. 
There were two criticisms of the process from NFSA providers. Firstly, that, in their opinion, it is not 
possible for an NGO to solve the problems within the TPDS programme because the issues are at 
‘the upper level’. Secondly, that during a Gram Sabha, there were some unruly participants. There 
was no direct criticism of the way that the process was conducted, or of the SPREAD team itself. 
One suggested improvement for future social audits was a need to include more people, but also to 
ensure that the required changes had been made to NFSA services in order to ensure people’s trust 
in the process. 
Post-social audit findings 
The social audit teams stated that they have gone beyond the expectations of the audit manual 
during the post-audit stage. They have remained in contact with communities, and encouraged the 
reinvigoration of NFSA-related community committees, as well as providing training in the form of 
ten PLA meetings with community-level institutions. 
MIS data reported the following from PLA meeting participation rates until 24 November 2018: 
Table 3.1 SPREAD MIS data on PLA meeting participation 
Total meetings conducted  9,666 
Total participants 224,184 
Average participation per meeting 23 
Total female participants 208,983 (93% of total participants) 
Adolescent girls participants 27,034 
Pregnant women participants 21,341 
Lactating women participants 30,003 
Mother of child aged 6 months to 6 years participants 
 64,452 
Source: Authors’ own based on data provided by SPREAD MIS. 
Awareness-raising events have also been organised at village level, increasing knowledge about (i) 
good breastfeeding practice, (ii) handwashing and (iii) nutrition. The social audit team also visits the 
homes of the most vulnerable households, to ask about the status of their services and utilisation. 
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VHND tracking has been developed and results have been shared with officials. SPREAD also 
reported organising a state-level meeting to share the findings of the 216 social audits (SPREAD 
2018c). 
The social audit teams that were included in this evaluation did not report experiencing difficulties 
with writing up and sharing reports from the public hearing. Some problems were reported regarding 
monitoring and following up on grievances that were raised, where GPs did not have a pre-existing 
functioning grievance redressal process. 
The social audit team are not expected to maintain direct contact with the individuals who 
participated in the social audit process. However, they have stated that they hope to deliver 
awareness-raising events and training within social audit communities. Amongst the community 
members who are members of committees, the majority reported that there has been no contact 
with the social audit team, and that there has been no change in their committees. However, when 
discussing change within committees the majority of respondents stated that they had always been 
functioning well, and so there was no need to improve. One person did report positive contact, when 
there was a further visit to check AWW improvements. 
There was a mixed experience amongst government officials around communication with the social 
audit team after the submission of the report from the Gram Sabha. A few providers reported 
repeated positive contact, during which they were asked further about grievance redressal 
procedures. 
 
They had met me and had also contacted me through telephone and had asked about the 
wellbeing of village…and whether anyone is having any problem and you put a board in the 
village displaying about the number of people to have availed benefits by the different 
schemes. 
 
(Female, ST, 40, Koraput, Sarpanch) 
 
Several, however, reported that once the team had submitted the report, they did not hear from 
them again. 
No, they came to submit the report and took signature. After that they haven’t contacted me 
yet or haven’t done any follow-up actions. 
 
(Female, ST, 44, Kalahandi, MAMATA Area Headquarter Supervisor) 
 
It was generally agreed, however, that the submission of the Gram Sabha report was carried out in 
a timely manner. 
NFSA service providers also reported a mixed experience regarding contact from the social audit or 
SPREAD team after the social audit had ended. Half of respondents reported continued support and 
contact, whereas the other half had no contact at all. 
They came and attended the Inspection committee meeting and the Mothers’ committee 
meeting and gave valuable suggestions. 
 
(Female, OBC, 50, Balangir, AWW Provider) 
 
Interviewer: Did they help you anyway to solve the problems regarding the complaints or did 
they give any information? Whatever complaints were lodged in the Gram Sabha… 
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Response: No. Nothing. 
  
(Female, Brahmin, 45, Balangir, AWW Provider) 
Gender challenges 
SPREAD expressed a desire to ensure that the social audit programme was inclusive of women, 
and would encourage their involvement with all aspects of the process. However, several obstacles 
were encountered in operationalising this wish. 
In February 2017, they reported that recruiting suitable female candidates for district and block 
coordinator roles was challenging. Female participants were reported to be less active during 
training events, as male block coordinators dominated discussions. This was recognised by 
SPREAD who planned to ensure that special attention is given to those who participate less in the 
training. In February 2018, it was reported that female Sarpanchs are dominated by their husbands 
when it comes to decision-making and that attending the CAN Gram Sabha was, for many of them, 
their first large gathering as Sarpanch. It was recognised that these women required extra support 
from the social audit team. Separate training has been organised for female PRIs in order to 
enhance the participation of women in activities at Panchayat level and to also increase their 
knowledge around poverty and malnutrition (SPREAD 2018b). Social audit team members reported 
finding it difficult to persuade women and girls to participate in meetings, but thanks to SPREAD 
training, they now find it easier to engage with women and girls in communities. Further, female 
social audit team members experienced difficulties engaging with men in the community. SPREAD 
have also organised training to combat this issue. 
3.6 Community knowledge of and participation in the social audit 
process 
This section focuses on findings related to community knowledge of and participation in the CAN 
programme social audit process, drawing on evidence from SPREAD programme documentation (in 
particular the Social Audit Manual and training manual), data from the quantitative evaluation 
component, as well as community-level IDIs and FGDs with different target groups. 
Ensuring that community members have knowledge of the social audit process, and subsequently 
participate in that process is explicitly part of the social audit teams’ responsibilities. The Social 
Audit Manual goes so far as to say that active participation in the process is ‘mandatory’ for 
ensuring the success of a social audit (p30). This is in order to build ownership of the process within 
the community, enhance effectiveness, and ensure transparency (p30). 
Both the Social Audit Manual and the Social Audit Training Manual emphasise the requirement of 
the social audit team to communicate effectively with communities regarding the social audit 
process, but also, crucially, to ensure that the community engage with and participate in all aspects 
of the process. Further, the necessity to include marginalised groups (such as ST, SC, OBC, 
women, and disabled people) is stressed. However, despite this emphasis on marginalised people 
within the manuals and training sessions, and other anecdotal evidence that the team took this 
issue seriously, there are no specific systematic reporting requirements or reporting templates, and 
so it is not possible to see evidence of whether what happened in the communities reflected the 
training within the SPREAD documentation. 
3.6.1 Knowledge of the social audit process 
Despite the emphasis on including the community within the social audit process, detailed 
instructions regarding how to raise awareness and knowledge about the process are lacking within 
the SPREAD social audit manuals, particularly the training manual. Rather, there is a strong 
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emphasis on increasing the knowledge of the community about their rights and NFSA entitlements. 
Parts of the social audit process itself do require a certain amount of awareness from within the 
community, particularly regarding the purpose of the Gram Sabha, and at least some understanding 
of grievance redressal processes. 
The Social Audit Manual ascribes responsibility for ensuring that communities are aware of the 
process to the social audit team (p30). It suggests that when preparing the ground for the 
forthcoming social audit, the social audit team should organise a public awareness meeting at 
village level, in order to ensure that the community understand the aim and benefits of the social 
audit. This information can also be shared during door-to-door visits and in small videos filmed 
during previous social audits (SPREAD 2018d: 13, 34). Once a social audit has been completed, 
one of the follow-up actions that should be undertaken by the social audit team is to train and 
support community members and service providers to undertake further social audits (ibid.: 15). 
The manual contains detailed information regarding the training process for social audit team 
members. However, it has very few instructions regarding awareness raising for the social audit 
process rather than the NFSA entitlements and rights. It does emphasise the need to mobilise 
people, but does not give explicit instructions about how and when to do this (again, there are 
instructions regarding awareness-raising activities for NFSA entitlements). However, SPREAD felt 
that the process of conducting the village meetings, as well as door-to-door verification visits, should 
provide opportunities for awareness raising about the social audit process itself – with the NFSA 
awareness raising taking precedence. 
The SPREAD team indicated in discussions with the evaluation team that the 480 community-based 
SSs who facilitated the social audits had gained valuable knowledge about the social audit process 
through extensive training, capacity building, and hands-on experience. Given that SSs were 
recruited from within their home communities, it was anticipated that knowledge about the process 
would be retained and shared with other community members for this and future rounds of social 
audits. 
Quantitative findings on knowledge of the social audit process 
According to the evaluation’s quantitative survey data, when asked whether they knew what a social 
audit is, 59 per cent of caregivers and 56 per cent of men responded yes. 57 per cent of caregivers 
and 56 per cent of men stated that they were aware that a social audit took place in their GP. 
Regional disparities were sizeable, with the proportion of female respondents aware of social audits 
ranging from a high of 80 per cent in Nabarangpur to a low of 40 per cent in Koraput, and male 
respondents ranged between 48 per cent in Malkangiri and 66 per cent in Nabarangpur.18 Of those 
who knew what the social audit was, 56 per cent of caregivers knew that a social audit covered 
ICDS, 55 per cent knew that it covers TPDS, and 29 per cent knew that it included MAMATA. Just 
over half of men (who were aware of the audit) knew that SAs covered PDS (51 per cent) and just 
below half knew that SAs covered ICDS (47 per cent). About a quarter of men knew that MAMATA 
was part of the process (24 per cent). Overall, 36 per cent of men and 31 per cent of caregivers 
could not cite a single scheme covered by the SA process. 
 
Overall, between a fifth and a quarter of caregivers (23 per cent), and 18 per cent of men attended a 
village meeting (Palli Sabha) as part of the social audit. However, only 14 per cent of the attendees 
reported that they were told that the social audit process is ongoing and there is a Gram Sabha 
meeting. 
 
A lack of knowledge about the process was given as a reason for caregivers not attending the Palli 
Sabha (14 per cent of respondents) and the Gram Sabha (10 per cent of respondents). 
                                               
18
 A chi-squared test rejects that the mean awareness levels are the same across districts. 
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Comparatively, 13 per cent of men did not know about the Gram Sabha and 11 per cent did not 
know about the Palli Sabha meeting. The main modes through which caregivers had knowledge 
about the social audit were through relatives/friends/neighbours (38 per cent and through a visit 
from the SA team (37 per cent). The main modes through which men knew about social audits were 
‘from relatives/friends/neighbours’ (41 per cent), because someone from the SA team came to their 
house (30 per cent), because they were invited to a village meeting in their (or a neighbouring) 
village (23 per cent) and through a ward member (15 per cent). 
 
There was some confusion as to who is in charge of the social audit process as 55 per cent of 
caregivers did not know who was responsible, 13 per cent thought it was conducted by the local 
elected officials, and 4 per cent by government people from outside the village. Only 28 per cent of 
caregiver respondents correctly answered that an NGO was in charge of the audits. 40 per cent of 
men did not know who was responsible, 16 per cent thought it was conducted by the local elected 
officials, and 6 per cent by government people from outside the village. Only 38 per cent of male 
respondents correctly answered that an NGO was in charge of the audits. 
Broader community findings on knowledge of the social audit process (IDIs and FGDs) 
The majority of people included in community interviews and focus groups knew about the social 
audit in some way. However, knowing it is happening is not the same as having an understanding of 
the process. Of the people who participated in the social audit, the majority were able to discuss the 
process in more depth during interviews and focus groups, including discussing the management, 
organisation, and purpose of the process. Just under half the interview participants thought the 
management process was good, and several stated firmly that they understood the process. Many 
people who did not participate in the social audit still considered that it was managed well, and 
explained that other people had reported this to them. 
Interviewer: OK, do you think it was organised well? 
Response: Yes, it was well organised. 
Interviewer: How well was it organised? You didn’t go, how do you know it was well 
organised? 
Response: People said so. 
 
(Male, ST, 61, Kalahandi) 
 
Of those people who participated in the social audit in some way (attending the Gram Sabha, village 
meeting, or being included in the field verification processes), several said that they would have 
participated further but they did not know about the rest of the process. Amongst the 44 people 
interviewed who did not participate in the social audit in any way, the majority stated that this was 
because they did not know about it. 
Awareness-raising events that took place (as reported by the majority of NFSA providers 
interviewed, as well as many community members), concentrated on discussion of entitlements and 
services, and inviting people to participate in the social audit, rather than information about the 
social audit process itself. Very few people were able to accurately explain who decided the place 
and time of the Gram Sabha. 
One government official reported that as a result of participating in the social audit he was able to 
learn how useful a social audit can be for society. 
Through this, the public was able to directly get involved and communicate with the 
government authorities. 
72 
 
(Male, Brahmin, 42, Balangir, Sarpanch) 
As outlined above (pre-social audit section), half of the NFSA service providers interviewed were 
contacted prior to the process in order to inform them about what was going to happen. Several 
people reported an increased understanding of the process that occurred during the social audit 
itself. 
3.6.2 Community participation in the social audit process 
Without community participation, the social audit process would not function. Carrying out the 
village meeting, door-to-door visits, public events (such as plays), and displaying posters throughout 
the community act as methods through which participation is encouraged. 
According to SPREAD’s internal monitoring data, a total of 64,789 people participated in the 216 
social audits, and so an average of 300 people participated in each audit. A total of 8,577 people 
attended because their role within the community required it in some way (from ward member to 
NFSA service provider, to district and block officials, this number also includes social audit team 
members). This meant that a total of 56,212 community members participated, making an average 
of 260 community members per social audit. A total of 14,152 testimonies and 20,568 grievances 
were collected. The total population of the GPs where Gram Sabhas took place is just over 1.1 
million people; of those 670,645 are eligible to vote (and therefore over the age of 18). This means 
that an average of 5 per cent of the total population and just over 8 per cent of the adult population 
participated. 
Marginalised groups 
Including marginalised groups is imperative, and there are specific instructions issued by SPREAD 
around this issue. It is stated that the Social Audit is specifically designed to empower and facilitate 
certain marginalised groups (SC, ST, Particularly Vulnerable Tribal Groups (PVTGs), OBCs, 
women, disabled, and others) to access information (SPREAD 2018d: 22). 
The Social Audit Manual requires that the recruitment of Samikshya Sathis (SS) volunteers come 
from within the community where the social audit will be undertaken, and that ‘priority should be 
given to women and mostly from SC, ST and Backward Classes’ (ibid.: 29). When carrying out field 
verification exercises, including focus group discussions with rights holders, ‘special care should be 
taken to include rights holders from SC, ST and other backward communities and disabled 
households’ (ibid.: 35). When organising the village meeting, it is suggested that the participation of 
women, SC, and ST should be ‘in good number’ (ibid.: 44); however, there are no specific 
instructions regarding how to ensure that this occurs. 
The Social Audit Training Manual requires that during the training of the social audit team they are 
educated about the issues of multidimensional poverty in India. It is emphasised that those from SC 
or ST households, as well as those households that include someone who is disabled, illiterate, 
landless, and with no adult male present, are classed as deprived by the Indian government. The 
training goes on to explain that by classifying groups of people as poor, the government is then able 
to target specific interventions towards them, including the NFSA entitlements. Social audit team 
members are trained on each NFSA programme, and the specific entitlements of marginalised 
people. Social audit team members are encouraged to focus their efforts on those who are entitled 
to access NFSA schemes, which automatically includes marginalised groups. When organising the 
Gram Sabha social audit, team members are encouraged to place special emphasis on remote and 
unreached hamlets and households, particularly the weak and marginalised – in order to ensure 
that their concerns can be reported and heard. 
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Quantitative findings on community participation 
According to the evaluation’s quantitative findings, overall, 18 per cent of men attended a village 
meeting (Palli Sabha) as part of the social audit, a smaller proportion than women (23 per cent). 10 
per cent of women and 17 per cent of men sampled attended the Gram Sabha meeting. 11 per cent 
of men reported that they attended both meetings, compared to 6 per cent of caregivers.19 
 
Of those who attended the meetings, 40 per cent of women and 59 per cent of men raised a 
concern. 69 per cent of women and 72 per cent of men reported that their concerns were raised by 
others. Local elected officials were reported to be present at the meeting by 70 per cent of women 
and 72 per cent of men; people reported being allowed to speak to them directly in 90 per cent of 
cases for women and 98 per cent of cases for men. Of the men who attended the Gram Sabha, 91 
per cent reported that they were asked to share grievances/issues with the PDS, pension card, etc. 
and 81 per cent that they were asked about Angawandi centres and/or the MAMATA scheme in the 
meeting. 
 
Just one-third of caregiver respondents (33 per cent) reported that the social audit team visited their 
house. This proportion ranges from between 23 per cent (in Kalahandi and Koraput) and 35 per 
cent in Nuapada, while Nabarangpur was a clear outlier with 52 per cent of respondents having 
been visited. The purpose of the home visit was to ask questions about the schemes in 59 per cent 
of the cases, and to invite people to a village meeting in 37 per cent of the cases. Men were 
markedly less likely to report that the social audit team visited the house, with just 22 per cent 
reporting a visit – though this is likely to reflect the programme’s focus on women for the verification 
process for most services. 
 
By far the biggest reason for women not to attend the Gram Sabha was that they were busy at the 
time (62 per cent). Other reasons were absence from the village (13 per cent), the respondent lived 
too far from the location of the Gram Sabha (12 per cent), lack of information on the meeting (10 per 
cent), and family members speaking against the respondent to attend (8 per cent). The two biggest 
reasons for men not to attend the Gram Sabha were lack of time (44 per cent) and absence from 
the village at the time of the meeting (38 per cent). 
 
We estimated the likelihood for primary caregivers to attend the Palli Sabha and Gram Sabha, 
based on characteristics of the household and the women themselves (see Table 3.2 below). Few 
variables predict participation. Surprisingly, caste affiliation, the assets index, and food insecurity 
are unrelated to the odds of attending either meeting. Illiterate women and women who can read but 
not write tend to participate less than literate women, but the difference is not statistically significant. 
Factors explaining participation are sanitation and status of the women in the household. Women 
who have access to improved water sources are two and a half times more likely to attend the Palli 
Sabha and almost three times more likely to attend the Gram Sabha than other women. Moreover, 
women who are the wives of the household head – as opposed to their daughter – are about one-
third less likely to participate in either meeting. Finally, women who are active in the labour force are 
50 per cent more likely to attend Palli Sabhas than other women (although the difference is only 
significant at 10 per cent and is not significant at all for Gram Sabhas). 
 
                                               
19
 It is not possible to directly compare participation figures from the MIS and from the quantitative evaluation survey. The MIS indicates 
that about 8 per cent of the adult population participated. The quantitative survey shows that 10 per cent of adult women and 17 per cent 
of adult men participated. The difference may be attributable – in part at least – to the fact that the target groups for the quantitative 
surveys were those most concerned by the social audit (i.e. caregivers and pregnant women and their husbands). 
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Table 3.2 Determinants of women’s participation in Palli and Gram Sabha – logistic regression 
estimates  
 Participated in 
Palli Sabha 
Participated in 
Gram Sabha 
SC 0.77 0.62 
(0.37) (0.39) 
ST 1.59 1.34 
(0.71) (0.79) 
OBC 0.88 0.53 
(0.42) (0.33) 
Household size 1.02 1.01 
(0.058) (0.068) 
Respondent is the spouse of HH head 0.67
* 0.65* 
(0.14) (0.17) 
Respondent is illiterate 0.93 0.79 
(0.24) (0.21) 
Respondent can read but not write 0.82 0.60 
(0.24) (0.21) 
Respondent was ill in last 12 months 1.31 0.68 
(0.36) (0.23) 
Respondent is in the labour force 1.53
* 1.55 
(0.39) (0.44) 
Access to improved water source 2.49
** 2.93* 
(1.06) (1.59) 
Access to improved sanitation 1.07 1.12 
(0.27) (0.36) 
House has a separate kitchen 1.07 0.89 
(0.21) (0.17) 
HH assets index 1.09 1.13 
(0.070) (0.094) 
Food Insecurity Experience Scale 1.03 1.07 
(0.036) (0.043) 
Woman Dietary Diversity Score 0.96 0.94 
(0.050) (0.046) 
Observations 
 
1150 1150 
Notes: Exponentiated coefficients; standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Source: Authors’ 
own. 
 
Impact of participation on perceptions of social audit success 
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Table 3.3 Perceptions on impact of social audit 
 Caregivers Men 
Proportion of respondents 
who agree with the following 
statements: 
Did not 
participate in 
Palli Sabha or 
Gram Sabha 
Participated in 
Palli Sabha or 
Gram Sabha 
Did not 
participate in 
Palli Sabha or 
Gram Sabha 
Participated in 
Palli Sabha or 
Gram Sabha 
Village community is more 
confident about raising their 
concerns/issues in a public 
forum? 
38.1 70.5 49.6 79.6 
There has been a change in 
behaviour of people such as 
AWW, helper, headmaster, 
ration shop owner after the 
social audit process? 
24.4 51.9 30.6 43.2 
There was a change in how 
the monitoring committees 
function after the social audit 
process? 
12.3 34.4 19.8 28.4 
Source: Authors’ own. 
The next chapter considers outcomes that relate to the social audit process. By mapping 
participation in the Palli Sabha and Gram Sabha to perceptions about the impact of the social audit, 
we can see the extent of satisfaction with the process and the changes it has brought about more 
generally. 
For all variables, there is a sharp difference between women who attended the Palli Sabha and/or 
the Gram Sabha and men who attended neither. The former are systematically more positive about 
the impact of social audits. It may be due to these women being more aware of the change brought 
by SA thanks to their involvement but it could also reflect a selection bias whereby women who 
have the time and who decided to attend the meetings are more likely to be well integrated into the 
community and to report positive changes. Women were most positive about the effect of SA on 
boosting the confidence of the community to raise concerns/issues and community members being 
more aware of their rights and entitlements. Typically, two-thirds of women who participated in the 
process and one-third of the women who did not participate agreed that SA had a positive impact on 
these outcomes. A quarter of women who were not involved report that the behaviour of 
AWW/ASHA workers changed. This proportion doubles for women who attend the meetings. 
Women were most sceptical about the effect of SA on the behaviour of local elected officials (with 
37 per cent of women who were involved agreeing that the behaviour of officials changed). 
Men were most positive about the effect of SA on boosting the confidence of the community to raise 
concerns/issues and community members being more aware of their rights and entitlements. 
Typically, about three-quarters of men who participated in the process and almost half of men who 
did not participate agreed that SAs had a positive impact on these outcomes. 31 per cent of men 
who were not involved report that the behaviour of AWW/ASHA workers changed. This proportion 
reaches 43 per cent for men who attended the meetings. Men were most sceptical about the effect 
of SA on how monitoring committees function (with 28 per cent of men who were involved agreeing 
that there was a change). 
Broader community findings (IDIs and FGDs) on community participation 
Of the 82 community members interviewed as part of the qualitative/process data collection 
process, just under half participated in the social audit in some way (38 people – 16 men and 22 
women). Participation includes attending a meeting, being visited by the social audit team in their 
home, or being involved in other field verification exercises. People did not choose whether or not 
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they were visited at home and so were not self-selecting into the process. Of those people who 
attended the Gram Sabha, a few of them spoke, and the majority of those who did speak felt 
listened to. Those people who attended wanted to speak, but did not feel able, chose not to for a 
variety of reasons, including others voicing similar issues which were resolved satisfactorily, feeling 
that there was no point in speaking because it would make no difference, and one person stated 
there was not enough time in the meeting to speak as they had to leave early. 
Of those who did not participate in the social audit, nearly half stated that they were unable to 
participate due to work commitments, many stated that they had no information about the social 
audit, did not participate because someone else from their household participated instead or 
because they were not present in the village at the time. Of those who did not participate because 
someone else from their household participated instead, it is possible that it was not their choice to 
remain at home – but they were prevented from going due to their status in the household. All were 
women, and the majority were under 30 years old, with children. 
All government officials interviewed participated in the social audit process in some way, the 
majority were present at the Gram Sabha meeting. Others met with the social audit team during the 
process, and participated in awareness-raising events. All of the NFSA service providers 
interviewed participated in the social audit process. Most witnessed assessments and verification 
activities, and attended the Gram Sabha. According to SPREAD reports, there were NFSA service 
providers present at all Gram Sabha meetings. 
Community members reported that some Gram Sabhas did not have the required government 
officials present to make the meeting worthwhile. According to SPREAD reports, despite the 
attendance of 341 block-level officials and 416 district-level officials in total, there were 35 Gram 
Sabhas with no block-level official in attendance, 32 Gram Sabhas with no district-level official in 
attendance, and 8 Gram Sabhas where no officials from any level attended. If government officials 
do not participate in social audits, it has a detrimental effect on the validity of the process, 
particularly from the viewpoint of community members, discouraging them from participating 
themselves. 
3.7 Summary 
In summary, findings in this section on the SPREAD programme’s design, implementation, and 
processes present a largely positive picture, albeit with some challenges faced and areas for further 
improvement. The programme model was built on existing experience and best practice, relied on 
the use of comprehensive guidelines (such as the Social Audit Manual), was modified through an 
extensive piloting process and suitably adapted to the local context to meet the programme’s 
objectives. In terms of staffing, SPREAD recruited over 700 people at all organisational levels 
(state, block, district, GP) with only a few minor delays to recruitment and some staff turnover, which 
didn’t appear to affect implementation. Extensive staff training and staff development activities were 
conducted at all levels and covered a range of approaches including participatory, group, and 
practice exercises supported by adequate induction materials and resources. Specific detailed 
training was conducted for the SSs. Training was also undertaken with GKS and PRI members and 
involved other relevant organisations which helped develop trust and relations. 
Purposive selection of the specific areas (districts, blocks, and GPs) for inclusion in the programme 
was based on an assessment of nutrition vulnerability and need (rather than via a randomised 
selection process). This was informed by both government data (NFHS-4) and consultation with 
government officials. A target sample percentage of geographic coverage was agreed and 
implemented at block level (40 per cent), GP level (50 per cent), and village level (50 per cent of 
AWCs during the pilot phase, later increased to 100 per cent). This was felt to provide adequate 
coverage to be able to influence district and state-level changes to address grievances raised from 
the audit process, and to provide a model for scaled up implementation of social audits which the 
government or others could replicate. Specific groups targeted for the programme included 
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individuals eligible for the four NFSA services; government officials/community leaders; and 
marginalised groups. SPREAD put in place a complex management structure which enabled 
activities to take place concurrently at multiple levels (GP/village, district, block, and state) and 
provided an effective structure for staff supervision, training, and support. This was further 
supported by establishment of an external advisory committee who provided expert input and 
strategic guidance on the management of the programme. Given the model’s intensity of personnel 
and resource requirements, a more streamlined, leaner model may be required for further scale-up. 
In terms of monitoring systems, SPREAD have relied predominantly on a new mobile-based MIS-
based system to verify community entitlements as part of the social audit process, as well as to 
manage and monitor timings and progress for implementation of programme activities undertaken at 
community-level (including the PS and GS meetings, PLA meetings, and VHNDs). Some delays and 
challenges were faced in setting up and implementing the MIS approach but overall, it was deemed 
successful in enabling the team to better streamline data entry, cleaning, and analysis, and enable 
real-time monitoring and decision-making. Some gaps in the effective monitoring of longer-term 
outcomes were identified. Implementation of the social audits as per the plan was deemed 
successful, with a total of 240 audits undertaken across the 240 selected GPs including 24 during 
the pilot phase in mid-2017 and the remaining 216 in late 2017/18. 3,116 villages were included 
which exceeded their original target by 193 villages. Some delays to the process occurred but they 
were still able to complete the final audits within the original timeframes agreed (by July 2018). 
Regarding the three key phases of the audit process (pre-social audit, social audit, post-social 
audit), there were some challenges faced during the pre-audit phase including gaining trust of the 
community, health-care providers, and government officials, and addressing communities’ doubts 
and scepticism about the effectiveness of the programme in bringing about change. For the seven-
day audit phase, activities weren’t implemented as rigidly as suggested in the Social Audit Manual 
with many activities taking place simultaneously. Logistical and practical issues made it difficult to 
keep the seven-day schedule and the social audit teams had to manage heavy workloads during 
this intensive period, particularly around the Gram Sabha meeting. Some PS and GS meeting 
attendance issues were highlighted, which the SPREAD team made efforts to address through early 
and continued positive engagement with communities and officials. Difficulties were faced by the 
social audit team in improving immediate access to nutrition entitlements and ensuring that 
grievances remained focused on nutrition issues as opposed to other issues (including housing, 
roads, etc.). Overall, however, many community members reported that the process was a positive 
experience and was a useful tool to voice concerns, increase access to services, and involve 
communities directly in resolving grievance issues. Most government officials and NFSA service 
providers considered it to be a positive, useful, and well-managed process, although some NFSA 
service providers felt that issues with TPDS couldn’t be solved by an NGO and could only be 
addressed at a ‘higher level’. Both officials and SPREAD staff felt that Gram Sabhas could be 
disrupted by some unruly participants. In terms of post-audit follow-up, the SPREAD teams 
exceeded expectations, conducting a range of follow-up activities at community-level (e.g. PLA 
meetings, home visits) and organising sharing meetings with government officials at district, block, 
and state level to follow up on grievances and issues raised during the audit phase. 
In terms of community knowledge of and participation in the social audit process, there was a 
deliberate effort to focus more on rights and NFSA entitlements rather than awareness of the social 
audit process itself. However, over half (59 per cent) of primary caregivers surveyed said that they 
knew what a social audit was and a similar proportion (57 per cent) said that they were aware that a 
social audit had taken place in their GP, though there was substantial variation in awareness levels 
across districts (ranging from 40–80 per cent). Quantitative and qualitative findings confirmed that a 
lack of knowledge about the process was the main reason for not attending and there was some 
confusion around who was responsible for leading the process (over half of caregivers – 55 per cent 
– weren’t aware). Qualitative findings showed that for those who did participate in the audit, the 
majority were able to discuss the process including the management and purpose of the process. In 
terms of participation rates, around one in five men (18 per cent) and women (23 per cent) from the 
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quantitative sample attended the PS. For women – but not for men – participation in the Gram 
Sabhas was much lower (10 per cent) than in Palli Sabha. The main reasons for lack of attendance 
at the GS were slightly different between men and women: both highlighted that they were busy and 
lacked time (62 per cent for women – and 44 per cent for men) but men were more likely to be 
absent from the village at the time of the meeting (38 per cent). Qualitative data suggests other 
possible reasons for non-participation included women’s status in the household and because 
someone else in the household participated. SPREAD’s own data reports a total of 64,789 people 
having participated in the social audits, with an average of 300 participants per audit (of which 260 
were community members and the remaining being officials or others involved in NFSA service 
delivery). An impressive 14,152 testimonies and 29,569 grievances were collected in total from 
across the GPs.  
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4 Findings at outcome level 
4.1 Knowledge of NFSA services, entitlements, and grievance 
mechanisms 
 
One of the nine primary objectives of the social audit is to ‘inform and educate and mobilise 
community and rights holders about their rights and entitlements of the programme or scheme 
during the course of the social audit’ (SPREAD 2018d: 10). Social audits are also designed to 
generate awareness, share information about services and entitlements of the NFSA, and facilitate 
grievance redressal (SPREAD 2018d: 12). 
In this section, we first report data on knowledge and awareness of ICDS, Mamata, and TPDS 
services from the household services separately, before looking at broader opinions on knowledge 
and awareness that we explored in the community IDIs and FGDs. 
ICDS 
Table 4.1 shows results for ICDS-related outcomes that were measured at baseline and follow-up 
for caregivers. Caregivers are more likely to feel very well informed about THR (by about 11 
percentage points), Women in Early GPs are less likely to report having been informed on the 
preparation of THR (by eight percentage points). 
Table 4.1 DID Estimates of the impact of social audits on THR and GMP functioning – 
awareness/knowledge (primary caregivers sample) 
Outcomes 
Change 
in Early 
GPs 
Change 
in Late 
GPs 
Difference-
in-
Difference 
(DID) 
N 
Very well informed about THR 0.11*** 0.12*** -0.01 1088 
Very well informed on GMP 0.07** 0.02 0.05 1152 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors are clustered at the Gram Panchayat level. ‘Change in Early GPs’ corresponds to 
α+β in equation (1). ‘Change in Late GPs’ corresponds to α in equation (1). The DID parameter corresponds to β in equation (1). Source: 
Authors’ own. 
Pregnant women – Table 4.2 also reported large increases in how knowledgeable they are about 
THR (+25pp in Early GPs and +21pp in Late GPs). 
Table 4.2 DID Estimates of the impact of social audits on THR functioning – awareness/knowledge 
(pregnant women sample) 
Outcomes 
Change in 
Early GPs 
Change in 
Late GPs 
Difference-
in-
Difference 
(DID) 
N 
Very well informed about THR 0.25*** 0.21** 0.04 119 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors are clustered at the Gram Panchayat level. ‘Change in Early GPs’ corresponds to 
α+β in equation (1). ‘Change in Late GPs’ corresponds to α in equation (1). The DID parameter corresponds to β in equation (1). Source: 
Authors’ own. 
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Table 4.3 DID Estimates of the impact of social audits on AWC functioning – awareness (adolescent 
girls sample) 
Outcomes 
Change in 
Early GPs 
Change in 
Late GPs 
Difference-in-
Difference 
(DID) 
N 
AWC awareness  0.94*** 0.91*** 0.03 134 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors are clustered at the Gram Panchayat level. ‘Change in Early GPs’ corresponds to 
α+β in equation (1). ‘Change in Late GPs’ corresponds to α in equation (1). The DID parameter corresponds to β in equation (1). Source: 
Authors’ own. 
All the positive evolutions have been equally felt in Early and Late GPs, as evidenced by the DID 
estimates of the effect of the social audit being indistinguishable from zero in all cases. 
MAMATA 
Pregnant women are the targets of the MAMATA scheme, so we first report impacts on awareness 
for this group. The effect of social audits is unsurprisingly much larger than for caregivers. The 
proportion of pregnant women feeling very well informed on MAMATA is 34 percentage points 
higher at follow-up than at baseline in Early GPs. In Late GPs, the knowledge score has tended to 
decrease but the change is not statistically different from zero. As a result, the DID estimate of the 
impact of social audit on feelings of being very well informed is a very large 50 percentage points, 
and is statistically significant at 1 per cent. 
Table 4.4 DID Estimates of the impact of social audits on MAMATA functioning – 
awareness/knowledge (pregnant women sample) 
Outcomes 
Change in 
Early GPs 
Change in 
Late GPs 
Difference-
in-
Difference 
(DID) 
N 
Aware of MAMATA 0.3*** 0.07 0.22*** 124 
Very well informed on MAMATA 0.34*** -0.15 0.49*** 63 
MAMATA knowledge score 1.75*** 0.63** 1.13*** 124 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors are clustered at the Gram Panchayat level. ‘Change in Early GPs’ corresponds to 
α+β in equation (1). ‘Change in Late GPs’ corresponds to α in equation (1). The DID parameter corresponds to β in equation (1). Source: 
Authors’ own. 
Amongst caregivers, we can see that awareness of the scheme increased by nine percentage 
points in Early GPs (from 85 per cent) and six percentage points in Late GPs (from 91 per cent). 
Both these increases are strongly significant statistically. However, the difference between the 
change in Early GPs and the change in Late GPs is not itself statistically significant. This suggests 
that the change in awareness arose very quickly after the social audit. 
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Table 4.5 DID Estimates of the impact of social audits on MAMATA functioning – 
awareness/knowledge (primary caregivers sample) 
Outcomes 
 
 
Change in 
Early GPs 
Change in 
Late GPs 
Difference-in-
Difference 
(DID) 
N 
Aware of MAMATA 0.09*** 0.06*** 0.03 1152 
Very well informed on MAMATA 0.07* -0.01 0.08 877 
MAMATA knowledge score 1.02*** 0.57***  0.45*** 1152 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors are clustered at the Gram Panchayat level. ‘Change in Early GPs’ corresponds to 
α+β in equation (1). ‘Change in Late GPs’ corresponds to α in equation (1). The DID parameter corresponds to β in equation (1). Source: 
Authors’ own. 
Caregivers from the Early GPs were also more likely (by seven percentage points) to feel very well 
informed with MAMATA at follow-up than at baseline. The effect is only significant at the 10 per cent 
level, and the difference-in-difference estimate (0.08) is not statistically significant. 
Consistent with the idea that social audits improved information, the mean score of the MAMATA 
knowledge variable increased significantly for pregnant women (+1.75 for Early GPs and +0.6 in 
Late GPs) and the DID estimate of the impact of early social audit is large (+1.1), suggesting that 
the changes to knowledge on the MAMATA scheme were cumulative. These changes are very 
large as they correspond to an increase of 0.9 and 0.3 standard deviation of the baseline value of 
the variable, respectively. Results for caregivers are similar, though of lower magnitude (mean score 
increases of one point in the Early GPs and by 0.6 points in the Late GPs among caregivers – both 
effects are significant at the 1 per cent level; and there is a 0.45 difference-in-difference estimate 
between early and late groups). 
 
TPDS 
Knowledge about the TPDS improved substantially or very substantially across all groups (primary 
caregivers, pregnant women, and men) surveyed about the TPDS. For primary caregivers, this was 
the case for knowledge of TPDS entitlements, likelihood that ration shops provide the equivalent of 
entitlements, knowledge of PDS committees, and information on TPDS. The most substantial 
changes amongst this group were the likelihood that caregivers report feeling very well informed 
about TPDS, which increased by 12 percentage points in both early and late groups. For pregnant 
women, this is the case for feelings of being well informed, knowledge of the PDS committee and 
for information on TPDS. 
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Table 4.6 DID Estimates of the impact of social audits on TPDS functioning – knowledge/awareness 
(primary caregivers sample) 
Outcomes 
Change in 
Early GPs 
Change in 
Late GPs 
Difference-
in-
Difference 
(DID) 
N 
Knows PHH entitlement 0.04** 0.02** 0.02 765 
Knows AAY entitlement 0.2* 0.22 -0.02 24 
Knows there is a PDS committee in GP 0.13*** 0.14*** -0.02 871 
Very well informed about TPDS 0.12*** 0.12*** 0 871 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors are clustered at the Gram Panchayat level. ‘Change in Early GPs’ corresponds to 
α+β in equation (1). ‘Change in Late GPs’ corresponds to α in equation (1). The DID parameter corresponds to β in equation (1).  Source: 
Authors’ own. 
Table 4.7 DID Estimates of the impact of social audits on TPDS functioning – knowledge/awareness 
(pregnant women sample) 
Outcomes 
Change in 
Early GPs 
Change in 
Late GPs 
Difference-
in-
Difference 
(DID) 
N 
Knows there is a PDS committee in GP 0.02 0.15 -0.12 97 
Very well informed about TPDS 0.29** 0.11 0.18 97 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors are clustered at the Gram Panchayat level. ‘Change in Early GPs’ corresponds to 
α+β in equation (1). ‘Change in Late GPs’ corresponds to α in equation (1). The DID parameter corresponds to β in equation (1).  Source: 
Authors’ own. 
The biggest changes were amongst men, reflecting the fact that this was the service of most interest 
to men or that men were the more likely to hold ration cards and collect entitlements. 
Table 4.8 DID Estimates of the impact of social audits on TPDS functioning – awareness/knowledge 
(male respondents sample) 
Outcomes 
Change in 
Early GPs 
Change in 
Late GPs 
Difference-
in-
Difference 
(DID) 
N 
Knows PHH entitlement -0.02 -0.02 0 549 
Knows there is a PDS committee in GP 0.52*** 0.24*** 0.28*** 619 
Very well informed about TPDS 0.16*** 0.06 0.09 619 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors are clustered at the Gram Panchayat level. ‘Change in Early GPs’ corresponds to 
α+β in equation (1). ‘Change in Late GPs’ corresponds to α in equation (1). The DID parameter corresponds to β in equation (1).  Source: 
Authors’ own. 
The likelihood that men know that there is a PDS committee in the GP increased by 52 percentage 
points in Early GPs and 24 percentage points in Late GPs, and the likelihood that men know about 
the PDS committee increased by an extra 28pp in the Early GPs (p<0.01). These more substantial 
changes in early GPs suggest that these impacts were due to cumulative exposure to the social 
audit process and its effects. 
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The above provides information about the perceptions of the community’s awareness. Further to 
this, just over 60 per cent of caregivers who attended a meeting declared that their understanding of 
ICDS, MAMATA, and PDS improved after the meeting. 63 per cent of men who attended Gram 
Sabha meetings stated that their understanding of PDS had improved, 50 per cent stated that their 
understanding of ICDS had improved, 33 per cent had better knowledge of MAMATA, and 16 per 
cent had improved understanding of MDM. 
Broader community findings (IDIs and FGDs) 
The community IDIs and FGDs support the findings that appear across the NFSA services of 
increased knowledge and awareness of entitlements – many of the community members who 
participated in the social audit reported that their individual knowledge of NFSA services and 
entitlements had increased directly as a result of the social audit. A resulting increase in knowledge 
throughout the wider community was also observed. Increased knowledge in the community centred 
on understanding better what the Anganwadi Centre should be providing, entitlements to TPDS 
rations cards, and the expected quality of rations, with many people stating that their understanding 
of these services had improved. Some women (and one man) also reported an increase in 
knowledge of MAMATA entitlements. 
 
Earlier fewer members knew about this…now the ladies are more aware. Now they go to 
receive the rice grain. 
 
(Male SC FGD participant (average age of FGD 42), Balangir) 
 
I could know about this much egg is coming, this much chhatua is coming…and what 
Anganwadi is doing. 
 
(Female, OBC, 50, Kalahandi) 
Interviewer: Do you now know more about these schemes after this meeting? 
Response: Yes, I got to know some things that I didn't know earlier…in the MAMATA 
Yojana, we will get 5,000 rupees…also, some more things about the Anganwadi Scheme. 
 
(Male, OBC, 45, Kalahandi) 
 
This increase in knowledge was widely reported to have been gained through attendance at social 
audit events (particularly through the Gram Sabha), or direct contact with the social audit team 
during verification processes at their homes. 
 
Since the day what you conducted…. The Gram Sabha; from that day everyone was able to 
know. As we complained, everything happened well. 
 
(Male Village Leader FGD participant (average age of FGD: 55), Mixed Caste, Kalahandi) 
The sisters… they came to our house to explain to us these things. We were able to 
understand things. 
 
(Elderly Women Scheduled Caste FGD participant (average age of FGD: 53), Kalahandi) 
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Of those people who reported that their knowledge levels did not increase as a result of the social 
audit, some stated that this was because they already knew about these things prior to the social 
audit process. 
 
 We only know what we knew before...nothing more. 
 
(Female, OBC, 22, Balangir) 
 
In addition to overall knowledge and awareness of services reported so far, many respondents also 
reported an increase in knowledge of grievance redressal mechanisms. 
Interviewer: They have make you understand how to complain? How did you feel it? 
Response: I felt good there, what they made me understand. 
  
(Male, ST, 56, Koraput) 
 
Interviewer: Well, if you get any problem in future, you can complain. 
Response: Yes. 
 
Interviewer: Do you think that Sarpanch and other authorities also should take these 
services? 
 
Response: Yes, Sir. 
 
(Male, OBC, 38, Balangir) 
The majority of NFSA service providers and government officials also reported that their own 
knowledge of NFSA services and grievance redressal mechanisms was improved as a direct result 
of the social audit process. 
 
I have learnt two to three things regarding Anganwadi. In midday meals, which day they will 
give the egg, which day will give rice and dal (Gram). These things I got to learn from it. 
 
(Male, SC, ward member, Koraput) 
A lot of awareness has come from this. There has a lot of awareness relating the 
children...There is no more negligence in availing the money under the Mother’s Protection 
act, the money that a pregnant lady should get. 
 
(Male, Brahmin, Sarpanch, Balangir) 
It was beneficial because the awareness reached a large number of mass. So that they were 
able to meet us and discuss their grievances with us, people who could not get out services 
were also present. CDPO madam was also present to address all the problems of the 
mass....I learnt regarding the PDS system and the midday meal. I got to know how to file a 
complaint in case you have any grievances. 
 
(Female, OBC, AWW service provider, Balangir) 
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4.2 Access to, uptake of, and satisfaction with NFSA services and 
entitlements 
The social audit is designed to measure the community’s satisfaction with NFSA services (SPREAD 
2018d). There may be a mixed short-term effect on satisfaction levels regarding NFSA services; 
satisfaction may go down as knowledge levels increase, and so people become aware that they are 
not receiving the services they should, or satisfaction may increase as grievance redressal 
mechanisms lead to improved services and increased access. However, in the long term, it is hoped 
that satisfaction levels will increase, as levels of access gradually increase, and grievance redressal 
mechanisms allow for services to improve. 
SPREAD report that their teams have been able to ensure that changes have been made where 
dissatisfaction with services were identified. For example, as a result of the social audit process, the 
SPREAD teams have ensured that AWC hygiene kits are available in 479 out of 665 centres where 
they were missing, and AWC weighing machines have been made available in 181 out of 619 
centres where they were missing. They also ensured increased access to services (as detailed 
above) for many community members. It is hoped that these improvements will lead to improved 
services and therefore increased satisfaction.20 
In this section, as above, we report first on the results of the household surveys, before expanding 
the discussion to the results of the IDIs and FGDs with community members and others. 
ICDS21 
Results for ICDS are mixed – there is no evidence of social audits having a cumulative effect on the 
overall operation of the actual Anganwadi Centres. However, there were notable changes observed 
in terms of improvements in the specific services of growth monitoring and take-home rations. 
AWC operation was measured in terms of outcomes such as opening hours and contact with 
AWWs, as viewed from the caregivers’ perspective. AWWs are not reported to come more often or 
in a timelier manner to the centres in the Early GPs with respect to the Late GPs, and the likelihood 
that women were in contact with AWWs was also not statistically different in the Late and Early 
GPs. In fact, the likelihood of contact with AWWs did go down over the period by 3pp, but this likely 
reflects the change in the period of reference over which contact is recorded (from the last three 
months at baseline to the last month at follow-up, thereby limiting scope for interactions with 
AWWs), and the decrease was uniform across the two groups. There was no change in the 
satisfaction rate of women regarding AWCs in either the Early or Late GPs. Overall, very little 
change occurred between baseline and follow-up. Reported opening times of AWCs have gone 
down by eight minutes (0.14*60 minutes) but the decline is only statistically significant in Late GPs, 
so that such a development might be transitory. 
                                               
20
 SPREAD (2018c). Other successes reported by SPREAD during the first two years of the project include the following: 
• 306 children with severe acute malnutrition (SAM) have been referred to nutrition rehabilitation centres. The social audit team’s role in 
this was to identify, counsel, collaborate, and follow up with the SAM children, along with the Anganwadi Worker and ASHA. 
• 3,443 households have now received ration cards, and SPREAD have submitted applications for many more. 
• 1,621 women now receive cash benefits under the MAMATA scheme, thanks to the SPREAD team’s identification of gaps during the 
social audit process. 
• 5,737 applications for social security pensions have also been submitted, and 1,994 people have so far been successful in receiving a 
pension. 
21 Some of the key outcomes in this section have not been measured in the exact same way at baseline and follow-up because the 
reference period has changed (last three months at baseline, last month at follow-up). 
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Table 4.9 DID Estimates of the impact of social audits on AWC functioning – access/satisfaction 
(primary caregivers sample) 
Outcomes 
Change in 
Early GPs 
Change in 
Late GPs 
Difference-
in-
Difference 
(D) 
N 
Had contact with the AWW -0.02 -0.06*** 0.04 1126 
Received services from AWC or AWW 0.07*** 0.03** 0.04* 840 
AWC opened on time -0.01 0.01 -0.03 918 
Hours open per day -0.11 0.17** -0.28** 716 
AWW comes to the centre daily 0.01 0 0.01 861 
Very satisfied with AWC 0.02 0 0.02 1046 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors are clustered at the Gram Panchayat level. ‘Change in Early GPs’ corresponds to 
α+β in equation (1). ‘Change in Late GPs’ corresponds to α in equation (1). The DID parameter corresponds to β in equation (1).  Source: 
Authors’ own. 
Table 4.10 DID Estimates of the impact of social audits on AWC functioning – access/satisfaction 
(pregnant women sample) 
Outcomes 
Change in 
Early GPs 
Change in 
Late GPs 
Difference-
in-Difference 
(DID) 
N 
Had contact with the AWW 0.13* 0.09 0.04 120 
Received services from AWC or AWW 0.11** 0.1 0.01 85 
AWC opened on time -0.02 0 -0.02 93 
Hours open per day -0.06 0.33* -0.39 66 
AWW comes to the centre daily -0.03 0.04 -0.07 87 
Very satisfied with AWC 0.06 -0.14 0.2 106 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors are clustered at the Gram Panchayat level. ‘Change in Early GPs’ corresponds to 
α+β in equation (1). ‘Change in Late GPs’ corresponds to α in equation (1). The DID parameter corresponds to β in equation (1).  Source: 
Authors’ own. 
Table 4.11 DID Estimates of the impact of social audits on AWC functioning – access (adolescent girls 
sample) 
Outcomes 
Change in 
Early GPs 
Change in 
Late GPs 
Difference-in-
Difference 
(DID) 
N 
AWC opened on time 0.78*** 0.92*** -0.14* 85 
AWW comes to the centre daily 0.75*** 0.85*** -0.1 85 
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Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors are clustered at the Gram Panchayat level. ‘Change in Early GPs’ corresponds to 
α+β in equation (1). ‘Change in Late GPs’ corresponds to α in equation (1). The DID parameter corresponds to β in equation (1).  Source: 
Authors’ own. 
Table 4.12 Single-Difference Estimates of the impact of social audits on AWC functioning (adolescent 
girls sample) 
Outcomes (endline) Treatment 
Outcome 
(baseline) 
Constant N 
Received services from AWC -0.01 0.65*** 0.03 65 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors are clustered at the Gram Panchayat level. ‘Change in Early GPs’ corresponds to 
α+β in equation (1). ‘Change in Late GPs’ corresponds to α in equation (1). The DID parameter corresponds to β in equation (1).  Source: 
Authors’ own. 
When considering specific ICDS services (we focused on growth monitoring and take-home 
rations), we observe that the likelihood to receive a service from the AWC did increase by 4pp more 
in Early compared to Late GPs (p<0.1). Caregivers are also more likely to report being provided with 
special food after the child was measured (+ 23 percentage points) and are more likely to report that 
the child was referred to a nutrition rehabilitation centre after measurement (+3.5 percentage points 
over the Early and Late GPs). 
Table 4.13 DID Estimates of the impact of social audits on THR and GMP functioning – 
access/uptake/satisfaction (primary caregivers sample) 
Outcomes 
Change 
in Early 
GPs 
Change 
in Late 
GPs 
Difference-
in-
Difference 
(DID) 
N 
Informed about the preparation of THR at least once -0.08** 0 -0.08 860 
Very satisfied about THR -0.04 0 -0.04 1088 
Child's weight has been measured  -0.11*** -0.05 -0.06 1152 
Was provided with special food after child measurement 0.23*** 0.23*** -0.01 1701 
Child was referred to rehab centre after measurement 0.03*** 0.04*** -0.01 1701 
Very satisfied with GMP 0.02 0 0.03 1041 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors are clustered at the Gram Panchayat level. ‘Change in Early GPs’ corresponds to 
α+β in equation (1). ‘Change in Late GPs’ corresponds to α in equation (1). The DID parameter corresponds to β in equation (1).  Source: 
Authors’ own. 
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Table 4.14 DID Estimates of the impact of social audits on THR functioning – access/satisfaction 
(pregnant women sample) 
Outcomes 
Change in 
Early GPs 
Change in 
Late GPs 
Difference-
in-
Difference 
(DID) 
N 
Informed about the preparation of THR at 
least once 
0.08 0 0.08 47 
Very satisfied about THR 0.14 0.05 0.1 119 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors are clustered at the Gram Panchayat level. ‘Change in Early GPs’ corresponds to 
α+β in equation (1). ‘Change in Late GPs’ corresponds to α in equation (1). The DID parameter corresponds to β in equation (1).  Source: 
Authors’ own. 
Table 4.15 and Table 4.16 show results on ICDS-related outcomes from the viewpoint of AWWs. 
We do observe a modest but statistically significant increase in the use of infantometers in the Early 
GPs (by four percentage points). The difference-in-difference parameter is not itself statistically 
significant but this result suggests that social audits may have triggered a positive change in that 
regard. This is further supported by the fact that the difference-in-difference parameter is positive 
and statistically significant for the use of a wall meter. Indeed, use of wall meters has gone up in the 
Early GPs (by 16 percentage points) and gone down among the Late GPs (by ten percentage 
points). Apart from these, we do not observe any significant change over the study period except 
that AWWs have become less likely to report that there was no problem regarding ICDS in the last 
month in the Early group (6pp, p<0.1). This effect is not statistically significant among AWWs in the 
Late group and thus points to the cumulative effect of social audits. This could signal a deterioration 
of the service and/or a greater tendency for problems to be noticed and reported following social 
audits. 
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Table 4.15 DID Estimates of the impact of social audits on AWC functioning (Angawandi Workers 
sample) 
Outcomes 
Change in 
Early GPs 
Change in 
Late GPs 
Difference-in-
Difference 
(DID) 
N 
Cooking of supplementary food is 
done inside AWC 
0.047 0.197* -0.15 221 
Hand-washing 0.019 0.197 0.058 221 
AWC has no toilet facility 0.176** 0.197 -0.167 221 
AWC has no operational toilet facility -0.054 0.197 0.037 221 
Drinking water within 200m of AWC 0.051 0.197 -0.004 221 
A weighing scale is available and 
functional at the centre to weigh 
women 
-0.007 0.197 -0.005 221 
AWC has electricity eight hours a day -0.022 0.197 0.042 221 
Time spent by AWW on her duties in a 
week 
1.691 0.197 1.131 221 
Days worked as an AWW -0.268 0.197 -0.597 218 
The AWC remained closed for a week 
or more in the last month 
0 0.197 -0.059 221 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors are clustered at the Gram Panchayat level. ‘Change in Early GPs’ corresponds to 
α+β in equation (1). ‘Change in Late GPs’ corresponds to α in equation (1). The DID parameter corresponds to β in equation (1).  Source: 
Authors’ own. 
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Table 4.16 DID Estimates of the impact of social audits on GMP functioning (Anganwadi Workers 
sample) 
Outcomes 
Change in 
Early GPs 
Change in 
Late GPs 
Difference-in-
Difference 
(DID) 
N 
Days worked as an AWW -0.268 0.329 -0.597 218 
Distribution of THR to pregnant 
women 
-0.04 -0.029 -0.011 221 
Children are weighed every month at 
the centre 
0.042 -0.206** 0.249 221 
Growth status of children displayed 
at the AWC 
0.116 0.087 0.029 221 
Maintenance of child growth cards 
for children below six years  
0.019 0.096 -0.077 221 
These cards are produced before 
visiting medical and paramedical 
personnel 
0.057 0.159* -0.102 221 
How many home visits in which you 
weighed children did you make last 
calendar month? 
0.541 -0.857 1.398 221 
Are you provided with cash by the 
GKS for referral of SAM children?  
-0.034 -0.142 0.107 221 
Use of electronic bathroom scale 
(adult) 
0.017 -0.068 0.085 217 
Use of stadiometer 0.032 -0.029 0.062 221 
Use of infantometer 0.040* 0.004 0.036 221 
Use of wall meter  0.162 -0.103 0.266* 221 
Do you usually also measure the 
mid-upper arm circumference 
(MUAC) of children? 
-0.044 0.04 -0.083 221 
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How many underweight (UW) 
children did you refer to NRC in the 
last one month?  
-0.151 -0.083 -0.068 221 
AWW did not encounter any problem 
with ICDS in the last month 
-0.062* 0.053 -0.116 221 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors are clustered at the Gram Panchayat level. ‘Change in Early GPs’ corresponds to 
α+β in equation (1). ‘Change in Late GPs’ corresponds to α in equation (1). The DID parameter corresponds to β in equation (1).  Source: 
Authors’ own. 
MAMATA 
For the MAMATA scheme, we see a significant increase in the enrolment amongst that scheme’s 
target group of pregnant women – an increase of 22 percentage points (p<0.05) in Late GPs. A 15 
percentage point increase in Early GPs, however, was not statistically significant (likely to be a 
result of the small sample size). 
Table 4.17 DID Estimates of the impact of social audits on MAMATA functioning – access/satisfaction 
(pregnant women sample) 
Outcomes 
Change in 
Early GPs 
Change in 
Late GPs 
Difference-
in-
Difference 
(DID) 
N 
Registered with MAMATA 0.15 0.22** -0.07 67 
Very satisfied with MAMATA 0.31** -0.09 0.4** 63 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors are clustered at the Gram Panchayat level. ‘Change in Early GPs’ corresponds to 
α+β in equation (1). ‘Change in Late GPs’ corresponds to α in equation (1). The DID parameter corresponds to β in equation (1).  Source: 
Authors’ own. 
The proportion of pregnant women reporting being very satisfied with MAMATA jumped by 31 
percentage points in Early GPs and the DID estimate of the impact of early social audit is 40 
percentage points (p<0.01). This suggests that while we were only able to detect a statistically 
significant change in enrolment in the late GPs, overall changes in satisfaction levels were 
cumulative. 
Table 4.18 DID Estimates of the impact of social audits on MAMATA functioning – access/satisfaction 
(primary caregivers sample) 
Outcomes 
 
 
Change in 
Early GPs 
Change in 
Late GPs 
Difference-
in-
Difference 
(DID) 
N 
Registered with MAMATA 0 0.02 -0.02 855 
Very satisfied with MAMATA 0.1*** 0.04 0.06 877 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors are clustered at the Gram Panchayat level. ‘Change in Early GPs’ corresponds to 
α+β in equation (1). ‘Change in Late GPs’ corresponds to α in equation (1). The DID parameter corresponds to β in equation (1).  Source: 
Authors’ own. 
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TPDS 
Our data on the TPDS scheme reveal some substantial positive changes, particularly for men, 
where the changes are also more marked between Early and Late GPS (with better results for early 
GPs, suggesting a cumulative effect linked to exposure to the social audit process). 
For primary caregivers, we see significant improvements and likelihood of having an Aadhar number 
and the likelihood that their ration shop delivers food on a monthly basis. For pregnant women, this 
is the case for satisfaction levels with TPDS of the TDPS ration, monthly delivery of the TPDS, 
assignment of an Aadhar number, and confidence in ability to raise an issue. 
Some of these changes are very substantial. For instance, among caregivers, the likelihood that 
ration shops deliver food monthly increased by 32 percentage points in Early GPs and 46 
percentage points in Late GPs. 
For caregivers, most of the changes are of a similar magnitude between Early and Late GPs. In fact, 
there are only two outcomes for which the DID estimate of early social audit is significantly different 
from zero: whether the ration shop delivers food monthly (-14 percentage points) and confidence in 
capacity to raise issues with TPDS (+11 percentage points). There is thus little evidence in Table 
4.19 in favour of social audits exerting a cumulative positive impact on TDPS-related outcomes for 
this group. But the high number of outcomes displaying improvements in both Early and Late GPs is 
suggestive that social audits may exert a positive, immediate impact in favour of social audits 
exerting a cumulative positive impact on TDPS-related outcomes. 
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Table 4.19 DID Estimates of the impact of social audits on TPDS functioning – 
access/uptake/satisfaction (primary caregivers sample) 
Outcomes 
Change in 
Early GPs 
Change in 
Late GPs 
Difference-
in-
Difference 
(DID) 
N 
Received help with TPDS -0.13*** -0.08*** -0.05 1152 
Household has a valid ration card -0.02* 0 -0.03 1152 
Household has received info on ration card 
application 
0.2 0.14 0.06 55 
Ration shop always provides entitlement 0.03* 0.01 0.02 871 
Ration shop never provides entitlement 0 0 0 871 
Was delivered PHH entitlement -0.03* -0.02* 0 744 
Was delivered AAY entitlement 0.13 0.22 -0.09 24 
Had to pay extra money at ration shop -0.04** 0 -0.04 871 
Household usually consumes TPDS food 0.01 0 0.01 871 
Ration shop delivers food monthly 0.32*** 0.46*** -0.14** 871 
Has been assigned an Aadhar number 0.04** 0.03*** 0.01 871 
Delivery of TPDS was hampered by Aadhar 
issue 
0.03 0 0.03 871 
Rice is weighed with electronic scale -0.05 -0.06 0.02 861 
Very satisfied with TPDS quantity 0.03 0.1*** -0.07 871 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors are clustered at the Gram Panchayat level. ‘Change in Early GPs’ corresponds to 
α+β in equation (1). ‘Change in Late GPs’ corresponds to α in equation (1). The DID parameter corresponds to β in equation (1).  Source: 
Authors’ own. 
For pregnant women, satisfaction and confidence only significantly increased in Early GPs, 
suggesting that the impact of social audits may have been cumulative. But the DID estimate is not 
statistically significant, presumably due to small sample size. 
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Table 4.20 DID Estimates of the impact of social audits on TPDS functioning access/uptake/satisfaction 
– (pregnant women sample) 
Outcomes 
Change in 
Early GPs 
Change in 
Late GPs 
Difference-
in-
Difference 
(DID) 
N 
Received help with TPDS -0.16** -0.15** -0.01 124 
Household has a valid ration card -0.05 -0.04 -0.01 124 
Ration shop always provides entitlement 0.1** 0 0.1* 97 
Was delivered PHH entitlement 0 -0.04 0.04 83 
Had to pay extra money at ration shop -0.1* -0.02 -0.08 97 
Household usually consumes TPDS food -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 97 
Ration shop delivers food monthly 0.43*** 0.51*** -0.08 97 
Has been assigned an Aadhar number 0.19*** -0.05 0.25*** 97 
Delivery of TPDS was hampered by Aadhar 
issue 
0.12 0.05 0.06 97 
Rice is weighed with electronic scale -0.12 -0.09 -0.03 96 
Very satisfied with TPDS quantity 0.17** 0.02 0.15 97 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors are clustered at the Gram Panchayat level. ‘Change in Early GPs’ corresponds to 
α+β in equation (1). ‘Change in Late GPs’ corresponds to α in equation (1). The DID parameter corresponds to β in equation (1).  Source: 
Authors’ own. 
For men, many outcomes improved over the study period. In addition, there is strong evidence of a 
positive and cumulative effect of social audits. The proportion of men having to pay extra money at 
the ration shop decreased by 7pp more among men assigned to the Early group than among men 
assigned to the Late group. This difference is statistically significant at 5 per cent. Similarly, the 
likelihood that the TPDS ration is consumed by the household increased by 5pp more in the Early 
GPs (p<0.05). Furthermore, men in the Early group reported a significantly higher likelihood (5pp) of 
having been assigned an Aadhar number at follow-up than at baseline, although the DID estimate is 
not itself statistically significant. Similarly men in the Early group reported an increased satisfaction 
with their information on TPDS (+ 16pp, p<0.01) but the DID estimate is not statistically significant. 
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Table 4.21 DID Estimates of the impact of social audits on TPDS functioning – 
access/uptake/satisfaction (male respondents sample) 
Outcomes 
Change in 
Early GPs 
Change in 
Late GPs 
Difference-
in-
Difference 
(DID) 
N 
Household has a valid ration card -0.02 0.01 -0.03 778 
Household has received info on ration card 
application 
0 0.06 -0.06 35 
Ration shop always provides entitlement 0.01 0 0.02 619 
Ration shop never provides entitlement 0 0 0 619 
Was delivered PHH entitlement -0.01 0 -0.01 545 
Had to pay extra money at ration shop -0.06** 0.01 -0.07** 619 
Household usually consumes TPDS food 0.05*** 0 0.05** 619 
Ration shop delivers food monthly 0.34*** 0.4*** -0.06 619 
Has been assigned an Aadhar number 0.05** 0.01 0.05 619 
Delivery of TPDS was hampered by Aadhar 
issue 
0.02 -0.01 0.03 619 
Rice is weighed with electronic scale -0.08* -0.06 -0.01 615 
Very satisfied with TPDS quantity 0.07* -0.02 0.09 619 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors are clustered at the Gram Panchayat level. ‘Change in Early GPs’ corresponds to 
α+β in equation (1). ‘Change in Late GPs’ corresponds to α in equation (1). The DID parameter corresponds to β in equation (1).  Source: 
Authors’ own. 
Broader community findings (IDIs and FGDs) 
As expected, community members reported a mixed response to questions about satisfaction levels 
with NFSA services. 
Many people do report that they have started receiving services they had previously been unable to 
access, or that the services themselves have improved and now provide more. More community 
members reported being satisfied with NFSA services than not satisfied. 
Now it is good… People are getting all the benefits from the Panchayat. 
 
(Female, ST, 45, Balangir) 
 
There is a change in the MAMATA Card, and there is a change in midday meal also. 
 
(Male, ST, 33, Balangir female, 30, Labourer) 
 
Earlier, there were few people with ration cards in lower village area but now the card 
holders have increased, even increased by double. 
 
(Male, ST, 31, Balangir Farmer) 
 
96 
The changes have come in the Anganwadi Centres and the school. The food (MDM) 
provided here now is very good. My granddaughter is even getting good food what the kid 
was saying. Earlier the kid didn’t used to speak, maybe due to fear but I have seen that good 
food is being provided now. 
 
(Male SC FGD participant (average age of FGD: 42), Balangir) 
Several people reported that their satisfaction has increased as a direct result of the social audit 
process. 
Interviewer: Are you satisfied with the midday meal or the other services your children are 
getting in the school? 
Response: Yes, I am happy. 
Interviewer: Why are you thinking that you are happy? 
Response: Because earlier nothing is happening. Problem may happen but from my view, in 
that situation, I am doing my duty of looking into the school matters. The headmaster is also 
checking the quality of the food. Food is getting tastier. I even know how much does a child 
require food or the food they are getting in the midday-meal scheme. I see in that way. 
 
(Community member, Male, ST, 31, Balangir) 
 
Before the conduction of the Gram Sabha they were not getting the money by MAMATA 
Scheme on time, they were facing a lot of problems. But after the Gram Sabha on 20 
January, they are getting their money immediately without any late. 
(Male village leader mixed caste FGD (average age of FGD: 53), Balangir) 
However, some community members who participated in the FGDs and IDIDs have experienced 
disappointment resulting from the social audit process, as their expectations have been raised, but 
they have not seen a corresponding increase in access to services. 
Interviewer: Have there been any changes in the Anganwadi services or the MAMATA 
services or the ration services or the school food? Has there been any change after this 
meeting? 
Response: No it is same as before. What changes have come? Nothing. 
 
(Male, SC, 30, Kalahandi) 
 
The problem of pension card and ration card has not been resolved. Many old people who 
are blind are also not getting pension and ration… Sarpanch has talked about this problem 
with them but still nothing has been done. 
 
(Female ST FGD participant (average age of FGD: 27), Balangir) 
 
We are not getting rice grains anymore and the card we had for rice grains was returned 
when he said, so how do we notice anything, sir. And the midday meal that is given to 
children at school is steady without any improvement, rather it’s downgrading than to 
improve. 
 
(Male village leader FGD participant (average age of FGD: 47), Balangir) 
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Notably, however, the majority of those respondents who state that there had been no change since 
the social audit did not attend the Gram Sabha meeting, and a small majority did not participate in 
the social audit in any way. 
The vast majority of NFSA officials, and some of the government officials interviewed did report an 
increased uptake in services as a result of the social audit, which is in line with the SPREAD reports 
of increased access. 
Interviewer: Have you observed any increase in the intake of services provided by 
Aanganbadi, Mamta yojna, public distribution system, or midday meal? 
Response: Yes. 
Interviewer: Why can they [access these services after the social audit]? 
Response: Awareness has been created. They were able to know that how much they 
should get. They were able to know. There were people who were in doubt or didn’t know 
anything. 
 
(Male, OBC, teacher, Kalahandi) 
Barriers and enablers to accessing NFSA services 
 
In the community FGDs and IDIs, the people who are responsible for delivering (and therefore able 
to gate-keep) NFSA services in communities are cited as both enablers and barriers to accessing 
NFSA services. Community members who are receiving services view the deliverers of those 
services as enablers, whereas those community members who are not receiving these services 
view the service providers as the barrier. However, several community members were also able to 
identify that problems may also stem from other sources ‘higher up’ within local and national 
government. Similarly, village leaders are also cited as both enablers and barriers to accessing 
NFSA services. This suggests that the willingness and ability of individuals within each community is 
intrinsic to enabling access. If an individual lives in a village with a leader who is both willing and 
able to respond to NFSA grievances, then they are helped to access services. However, if an 
individual lives in a village where their leaders are either willing but not able, or not willing or able to 
enable access, then individuals will continue to be frustrated and unable to use these services. 
Therefore, providing village leaders and NFSA services providers with support and education about 
NFSA processes and entitlements (as SPREAD are doing) will be central to resolving problems. 
 
Characteristics such as poverty, caste, or tribal status, or other marginalisation issues are reported 
to influence access to NFSA services. Some community members report that all people within the 
village receive services equally, regardless of these issues, but a significant number disagree. For 
example, many community members report that ‘backward’ people are not able to access services. 
These people are not getting equal benefits because they are not able to go to the Sarpanch 
or to the party because of their low intelligence or illiteracy. 
 
(Male, ST, 31, Balangir) 
 
Interviewer: You told that the people who are backward and deprived, do they get the all the 
facilities of government like other people or they don’t get it? 
Response: No, they get only the rice…they don’t get [midday meals or Anganwadi services]. 
 
(Male, ST, 33, Balangir) 
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Further, families who move away from the village in order to work are also reported to struggle with 
accessing services. 
Interviewer: Do the unprivileged and deprived people in your village avail these services like 
other people or not? 
Response: They are not availing these services… 
Interviewer: They’re not availing… why are they not availing? 
Response: They have gone away… they get rice grain for a month… or two… and they don’t 
get the rations for two months at once… 
 
(Female, OBC, 25, Balangir) 
 
Interviewer: Why don’t they get such privileges? What is the problem? 
Response: The people who don't have enough job opportunities back at their home move to 
different places in search of a job. 
 
(Female, OBC, 26, Kalahandi) 
The most common issues named by many community members as a barrier to accessing NFSA 
services were administrative issues with TPDS ration cards, obstruction by village leaders, and 
AWWs not providing services or obstructing access. Other frequently discussed barriers include 
marginalisation of individuals or families, poverty, and administrative issues with the MAMATA 
scheme. 
Response: Anganwadi Didi. 
Interviewer: Except her, who else is creating problem? 
Response: No one else. But, there are supervisor and some higher ups come but they don’t 
listen even if we complain. 
 
(Female, ST, 23, Kalahandi) 
 
The Sarpanch and others… and the ward members…. they have obstructed us getting these 
facilities. 
 
(Female, SC, 19, Koraput) 
 
Response: They said that they will provide but still didn't. 
Interviewer: Who said that? 
Response: The Sarpanch and the ward members… I have submitted the Adhaar card and 
all the necessary requirements but they don’t seem to take heed of the problem. 
 
(Female, ST, 60, Koraput) 
 
We haven’t got MAMATA money ever from that… I did the paper works also. The children 
were growing and I was doing the paper works to get the money... But we didn’t get it. 
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(Male, ST, 37, Kalahandi) 
The majority of community members stated that nothing helped them access NFSA services. 
However, of those people who did state that they received help, many people stated that this came 
from Anganwadi workers and ASHAs, and village leaders. Other reasons cited by several 
community members were that the government helped them by providing the services and that 
community committees also enabled access to NFSA services. 
They didn’t cause any problem; rather, that helped us, especially the Anganwadi Workers, 
and ASHA workers and the teacher. They helped me. 
 
(Male, SC, 43, Balangir) 
 
4.3 Use of and confidence to use grievance redressal processes 
One crucial aspect of the stated desire of the social audit to improve access to and uptake of NFSA 
schemes is increased awareness of, as well as monitoring and improvement of, grievance redressal 
processes. Four of the nine objectives of the social audit (referred to in more detail in Section 1 of 
this report) refer in some way to grievance redressal procedures. From the side of the rights holder, 
these objectives were aimed at increasing their ability to make complaints, and from the side of 
service providers, this was to ensure complaints are upheld, and services are held accountable. 
In many districts, SPREAD reported that the grievance redressal systems for any government 
services had not been functioning for some time. This meant that by organising the social audits, 
they were providing some communities with access to grievance redressal for the first time. While 
this means that levels of access will certainly have increased as a direct result of the social audit 
programme, it also created issues. These included other issues such as roads, pensions, or access 
to water, hijacking the Gram Sabha and side-lining nutrition issues, and raised expectations of 
community members, where new understandings of entitlements and rights are not matched with 
provision from NFSA services (SPREAD 2018c). 
SPREAD reports and case studies provide some evidence of improvements within grievance 
redressal processes (not only people accessing them, but also changes being made). They also 
reported that the new block-level meetings provided officials with greater insights into and access to 
the grievance redressal process. This allows officials to ensure that grievances are suitably 
addressed (SPREAD 2018c). 
There is information on the impacts of the social audit process on grievance redressal from both the 
household surveys and the community IDIs and FGDs. Again, we first report results from the survey 
data before exploring further what we learnt from the community-based work. 
ICDS 
Somewhat surprisingly, women’s confidence in their ability to raise an issue regarding AWCs went 
down by 2pp in Late GPs and by 8pp in Early GPs, and the difference between Early and Late GPs 
is statistically significant (p<0.05). This negative result may be interpreted as a sign that the 
information regarding grievance redressal procedures conveyed in the SAs confused women, or 
was a sign that the SAs laid bare the grievances that women had and that, in turn, women started to 
actively question whether they did indeed have appropriate avenues to express their grievances. In 
the second interpretation, the loss in confidence would not be a negative result but instead is a first 
necessary step in a pathway towards empowerment. We see a similar result when caregivers 
reflected directly on THR and growth monitoring – here caregivers also felt less confident in their 
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ability to raise issues (by nine percentage points in Early GPs and 18 percentage points in Late 
GPs). 
Table 4.22 DID Estimates of the impact of social audits on AWC functioning – confidence (primary 
caregivers sample) 
Outcomes 
Change in 
Early GPs 
Change in 
Late GPs 
Difference-
in-
Difference 
(DID) 
N 
Very confident, can raise issue on AWC -0.08** -0.2*** 0.12** 1132 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors are clustered at the Gram Panchayat level. ‘Change in Early GPs’ corresponds to 
α+β in equation (1). ‘Change in Late GPs’ corresponds to α in equation (1). The DID parameter corresponds to β in equation (1). Source: 
Authors’ own. 
Table 4.23 DID Estimates of the impact of social audits on AWC functioning – confidence (pregnant 
women sample) 
Outcomes 
Change in 
Early GPs 
Change in 
Late GPs 
Difference-in-
Difference 
(DID) 
N 
Very confident can raise issue on 
AWC 
-0.07 -0.23*** 0.15 120 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors are clustered at the Gram Panchayat level. ‘Change in Early GPs’ corresponds to 
α+β in equation (1). ‘Change in Late GPs’ corresponds to α in equation (1). The DID parameter corresponds to β in equation (1).  Source: 
Authors’ own. 
Table 4.24 DID Estimates of the impact of social audits on THR and GMP functioning – confidence 
(primary caregivers sample) 
Outcomes 
Change 
in Early 
GPs 
Change 
in Late 
GPs 
Difference-
in-
Difference 
(DID) 
N 
Very confident, can raise issues on GMP -0.09** -0.18*** 0.09* 1152 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors are clustered at the Gram Panchayat level. ‘Change in Early GPs’ corresponds to 
α+β in equation (1). ‘Change in Late GPs’ corresponds to α in equation (1). The DID parameter corresponds to β in equation (1).  Source: 
Authors’ own. 
MAMATA 
For MAMATA, there is no evidence that social audits improved responsiveness of providers and/or 
improved grievance redressal mechanisms. In fact, similar to the findings with ICDS, caregivers 
became significantly less confident in their ability to raise any issue with MAMATA between the two 
waves of data collection (-6 percentage points in Early GPs and -15 percentage points in Late GPs). 
The fact that this negative evolution is less marked among Early GPs could indicate that it is a 
transient one. It could also reflect the hypothesis we outline above that after the social audit raised 
expectations, the caregivers started to question whether they indeed have sufficient avenues for 
addressing or expressing their grievances, thus causing the drop in confidence. 
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Table 4.25 DID Estimates of the impact of social audits on MAMATA functioning – confidence 
(primary caregivers sample) 
Outcomes 
 
 
Change in 
Early GPs 
Change in 
Late GPs 
Difference-
in-
Difference 
(DID) 
N 
Very confident can raise issue on MAMATA -0.06 -0.15*** 0.09 877 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors are clustered at the Gram Panchayat level. ‘Change in Early GPs’ corresponds to 
α+β in equation (1). ‘Change in Late GPs’ corresponds to α in equation (1). The DID parameter corresponds to β in equation (1).  Source: 
Authors’ own. 
Table 4.26 DID Estimates of the impact of social audits on MAMATA functioning – confidence 
(pregnant women sample) 
Outcomes 
Change in 
Early GPs 
Change in 
Late GPs 
Difference-
in-
Difference 
(D) 
N 
Very confident can raise issue on MAMATA -0.03 -0.12 0.08 63 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors are clustered at the Gram Panchayat level. ‘Change in Early GPs’ corresponds to 
α+β in equation (1). ‘Change in Late GPs’ corresponds to α in equation (1). The DID parameter corresponds to β in equation (1).  Source: 
Authors’ own. 
TPDS 
For TPDS, caregivers in the Late group report a 1pp deterioration of their confidence in their ability 
to raise an issue, though this was not the case in the Early group. Similarly for men, those in the 
Late group report an 11pp drop in confidence to raise an issue – with the 16pp DID highly significant 
(p<0.01). This could mean that the drop in confidence was only transient, with those experiencing 
the change over a longer period reporting no overall change (rather mitigating this somewhat 
surprising result). 
Table 4.27 DID Estimates of the impact of social audits on TPDS functioning -confidence (primary 
caregivers sample) 
Outcomes 
Change in 
Early GPs 
Change in 
Late GPs 
Difference-
in-
Difference 
(DID) 
N 
Very confident to raise an issue on TPDS -0.03 -0.13*** 0.11* 871 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors are clustered at the Gram Panchayat level. ‘Change in Early GPs’ corresponds to 
α+β in equation (1). ‘Change in Late GPs’ corresponds to α in equation (1). The DID parameter corresponds to β in equation (1).  Source: 
Authors’ own. 
Table 4.28 DID Estimates of the impact of social audits on TPDS functioning – confidence (pregnant 
women sample) 
Outcomes 
Change in 
Early GPs 
Change in 
Late GPs 
Difference-
in-
Difference 
(DID) 
N 
Very confident to raise an issue on TPDS 0.07 -0.09 0.16 97 
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Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors are clustered at the Gram Panchayat level. ‘Change in Early GPs’ corresponds to 
α+β in equation (1). ‘Change in Late GPs’ corresponds to α in equation (1). The DID parameter corresponds to β in equation (1).  Source: 
Authors’ own. 
Table 4.29 DID Estimates of the impact of social audits on TPDS functioning – confidence (male 
respondents sample) 
Outcomes 
Change in 
Early GPs 
Change in 
Late GPs 
Difference-
in-
Difference 
(DID) 
N 
Very confident to raise an issue on TPDS 0.05 -0.11*** 0.16*** 619 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors are clustered at the Gram Panchayat level. ‘Change in Early GPs’ corresponds to 
α+β in equation (1). ‘Change in Late GPs’ corresponds to α in equation (1). The DID parameter corresponds to β in equation (1).  Source: 
Authors’ own. 
Broader community findings (IDIs and FGDs) 
In contrast to the data reported from the household surveys, community members reported that the 
social audit process had taught them about NFSA grievance redressal processes, and that this 
meant they now felt able to make a complaint. 
Interviewer: Could you complain before? 
Response: No I couldn’t. 
Interviewer: Now why can you do that? 
Response: Due to the meeting, after listening their talks. By going to the meeting we are 
understanding something right? Earlier there were no meetings. The Anganwadi were 
kicking us, the Sarpanch was kicking us. Now there are meetings. 
 (Female, OBC, 50, Kalahandi) 
All NFSA service providers found that there was an increase in complaints about their services 
because of the social audit, meaning that more people were able to access and use the grievance 
redressal system. Despite the grievances raised during the social audit process being directed at 
NFSA service providers, the majority of those that were interviewed reported that they responded 
positively to the process, and had acted as a result of the social audit. However, they also reported 
frustration at not being able to meet the expectations of the community, many of which had been 
raised by the social audit process itself. 
Interviewer: Why do you feel it a negative thing when you're questioned? 
Response: Because we have no role in the ration card distribution and it requires the 
attention of the higher authorities, it comes from the collector's office. So that's why it's a 
negative experience because we don't interfere in the matter. 
 
(Male, Brahmin, 34, TPDS service provider, Balangir) 
 
I did have a bad experience. It was when the people who did not have a ration card tried to 
create a raucous and tumultuous atmosphere. We are trying to solve their problems but it 
cannot be done overnight. But, those people fail to understand that and are always creating 
chaos. 
 
(Male, OBC, TPDS service provider, Koraput) 
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Many government officials also reported that the Gram Sabha meetings in particular provided 
community members with renewed opportunities to engage with grievance redressal mechanisms. 
They reported that they responded positively to the complaints that were raised at the Gram Sabha 
meeting(s) they attended. 
Interviewer: Have you taken any step after social auditees complaint eradication 
programme? 
Response: Sir, once we got a complaint, a worker does not distribute eggs and mixed grain 
powder properly. I reached that place and shut out the problem. 
 
(Female, ST, 47, Ladies Supervisor ICDS, Balangir) 
 
They also reported that they considered that the process for grievance redressal had been 
strengthened as a result of the social audit. 
Interviewer: The process of solving the complaint, do you think there will be any 
improvement? 
Response: Yes. Sure. If you give any complaint then the responsible departments are made 
aware of how to solve the problem then sure it will improve. There will be an improvement. 
 
(Male, OBC, 55, ABEO, Balangir) 
4.4 Community empowerment and voice in local nutrition-related 
decision-making 
One of the key goals of social audits is to enhance participation in civic life and community-level 
governance. We computed a number of indices capturing various aspects of community 
participation based on respondents’ answers. Annex 1 gives a detailed description of each variable, 
which are also briefly described in Box 4.1. 
Table 4.30 shows how some of these outcomes changed among caregivers between baseline and 
follow-up. One can see that indices of ‘political participation’, ‘engaged citizen attitudes’, and 
‘responsive state attitudes’ substantially increased more in the Early than in the Late GPs. Table 
4.31 and Table 4.32 present results for pregnant women and men, respectively. These are similar to 
those for caregivers. The DID estimate of early social audits is positive and statistically significant 
for the indices of ‘community participation’, ‘political participation’, ‘engaged citizen attitudes’, and 
‘responsive state attitudes’ among pregnant women and men, and the GP effectiveness index also 
substantially rose for men. 
 
Box 4.1 Basic description of the community and political engagement indices 
 
The community participation index increases with the number of groups/committees a respondent is part of, 
the number of groups/committees a respondent feels empowered to speak at during meetings, and whether 
the respondent knows the Sarpanch and local officials. 
 
The community engagement index increases with attendance in group/committee meetings, contribution to 
group/committee actions, speaking out and/or taking part in monitoring actions by the GP, and with 
attendance in Gram Sabha and Palli Sabha. 
 
The political participation index increases when respondents report voting independently, and when they 
intend to vote in the next local and national elections. 
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The engaged citizen attitude index increases with the number of domains in which the respondents consider 
that citizens should take responsibility. 
 
The responsive state attitude index increases with the number of domains in which respondents consider 
that states should be accountable for. 
 
Source: Authors’ own. 
These results would suggest that social audits have triggered a cumulative positive change on 
these outcomes. However, Table 4.30 shows that the indices of ‘political participation’, ‘engaged 
citizen attitude’, and ‘responsive state attitude’ have significantly decreased among primary 
caregivers in the Late GPs. The same is true for pregnant women and male respondents for the 
latter two indices. This negative evolution partly explains the positive sign of the DID estimate of 
early social audit on these outcomes, and suggests that we need to nuance the interpretation of 
these findings. Indeed, is the decrease of the outcomes in the Late group which illustrates that 
social audits cause respondents to question their civic attitudes as well as their attitudes towards 
what they expect from the state. Such a process leads to a sharp decrease in their likelihood to 
display positive civic life attitudes. But this is a short-lived effect, which has completely dissipated 
after two and a half months, so that the evolution of these outcomes is either null or positive in the 
Early GPs. In summary, while there is evidence that social audits leads to a positive cumulative 
change in terms of political participation, the same is not true for the indices of engaged citizen and 
responsive states, for which the positive DID parameter stems from the negative transient impact of 
social audits in the Late GPs. 
We observe a decrease in trust towards AWWs among Early GPs (significant at the 10 per cent 
level) with the proportion of caregivers who completely trust AWWs being reduced by six 
percentage points. This is suggestive that the process of social audits may undermine the authority 
or standing of AWWs over time. However, the estimated impact of early social audit on trust towards 
AWWs is negative but not statistically significant, suggesting that such an effect is not precisely 
estimated. 
Table 4.30 DID Estimates of the impact of social audits on civic life (primary caregivers sample) 
Outcomes 
Change in 
Early GPs 
Change in 
Late GPs 
Difference-
in-
Difference 
(DID) 
N 
Community participation index 
(standardised) 
0.07 0.02 0.05 1057 
Community engagement index 
(standardised) 
0 0.01 -0.02 1149 
Political participation index 
(standardised) 
0.16** -0.15** 0.31*** 1151 
Engaged citizen index (standardised) 0.05 -0.17** 0.22** 1152 
Responsive state index (standardised) 0.05 -0.15** 0.2* 1152 
GP effectiveness index (standardised) -0.08 -0.05 -0.03 1152 
Highly trust teachers -0.06* -0.05 -0.01 1086 
Highly trust farmers’ association 0.09 0.09** -0.01 524 
Highly trust GP officials -0.03 -0.01 -0.02 1047 
Highly trust AWW -0.06* -0.04 -0.03 1135 
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Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors are clustered at the Gram Panchayat level. ‘Change in Early GPs’ corresponds to 
α+β in equation (1). ‘Change in Late GPs’ corresponds to α in equation (1). The DID parameter corresponds to β in equation (1).  Source: 
Authors’ own. 
Table 4.31 DID Estimates of the impact of social audits on civic life (pregnant women sample) 
Outcomes 
Change in 
Early GPs 
Change in 
Late GPs 
Difference-
in-
Difference 
(DID) 
N 
Community participation index 
(standardised) 
0.34** -0.2 0.54*** 103 
Community engagement index 
(standardised) 
0.06 -0.02 0.08 124 
Political participation index (standardised) -0.12 -0.12 0 124 
Good citizen index (standardised) 0.11 -0.36** 0.47* 124 
Good state index (standardised) 0.13 -0.54** 0.67** 124 
GP effectiveness index (standardised) -0.12 0.13 -0.25 124 
Highly trust teachers -0.12 -0.06 -0.05 116 
Highly trust farmers’ association 0.3* 0.3** -0.01 50 
Highly trust GP officials 0 -0.07 0.07 111 
Highly trust AWW 0.04 -0.2** 0.23* 121 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors are clustered at the Gram Panchayat level. ‘Change in Early GPs’ corresponds to 
α+β in equation (1). ‘Change in Late GPs’ corresponds to α in equation (1). The DID parameter corresponds to β in equation (1).  Source: 
Authors’ own. 
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Table 4.32 DID Estimates of the impact of social audits on civic life (male respondents sample) 
Outcomes 
Change in 
Early GPs 
Change in 
Late GPs 
Difference-
in-
Difference 
(DID) 
N 
Community participation index 
(standardised) 
0.25*** -0.13* 0.38*** 752 
Community engagement index 
(standardised) 
-0.06 0.05 -0.1 778 
Political participation index 
(standardised) 
0.16** -0.1 0.27** 778 
Good citizen index (standardised) 0.06 -0.16** 0.21* 778 
Good state index (standardised) 0.11 -0.13 0.24* 778 
GP effectiveness index (standardised) 0.12* -0.11 0.23** 778 
Highly trust teachers -0.08* -0.04 -0.04 759 
Highly trust farmers’ association 0.04 0.11 -0.07 395 
Highly trust GP officials -0.03 -0.05 0.02 749 
Highly trust AWW 0.01 0.02 -0.01 768 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors are clustered at the Gram Panchayat level. ‘Change in Early GPs’ corresponds to 
α+β in equation (1). ‘Change in Late GPs’ corresponds to α in equation (1). The DID parameter corresponds to β in equation (1).  Source: 
Authors’ own. 
Qualitative data expand upon these findings via several themes we have analysed. Empowerment 
and participation were difficult topics to discuss directly with participants so we looked for evidence 
of positive reflection on the social audit process as having consciously changed participants’ own 
view of their power over personal or community decision-making, or a sense that they had new 
powers or voice in redressal for inadequate services. We also looked for evidence of positive 
feelings about other avenues for participation in community processes (including PRI institutions 
and committees) following the social audit process. 
Several community IDI and FGD participants referred to better knowledge of the avenues to 
complain about existing or future problems. This included specific reference to the Sarpanch, Ward 
Members, particular named individuals including the AWW and even, in the following case, more 
senior officials such as the Block Development Officer (BDO): 
After all these happened, a little courage in us just increased. Then we were not able to talk 
with you, but now we do and then can ask to Sarapanch, in case he refuses, we are able to 
talk with BDO. Then again when we had money we would give it to our husband to deposit in 
account, but now we can do it ourselves, be it five or ten rupees, Indira Awas money, or our 
hard work earned money, by this we are able to save some. 
(Female SC FGD Participant (average age of FGD: 46), Balangir) 
 
Anganwadi did not give eggs and multi-grain cereal powder properly. It kept selling half of 
the multi-grain cereal powders and rice. After these meetings, this stopped happening. 
People are getting their share. We also learnt our rights and questioned the Anganwadi 
workers and voiced our grievances in the meeting. With the help of the officials this 
happened. 
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(Female ST FGD Participant (average age of FGD: 47), Koraput) 
 
A small number of the views expressed in the IDIs also give a sense of a growing confidence of 
participants about their rights and the possibility for redress, which support the survey findings, both 
on citizen engagement and on state responsiveness. One participant [bio] talks of having ‘gained 
courage’ – ‘I hope I can get what I am not given…I can go to the concerned person’ (Female, OBC, 
22, Kalahandi) – while another references the power of collective action in noting that in future they 
would be able to ‘gather and complain’ (Female, SC, 28, Koraput) in response to non-delivery of the 
NFSA services. 
Although the survey results are not clear with regard to membership of committees, there is some 
indication of increased willingness to join committees; or to see their benefits, within the community 
IDIs and FGDs. Some mentioned that they now wanted to be part of groups in future, in order to 
improve the general welfare of the village and there was also mention of benefiting children or 
education… Others mention specifically their keenness to contribute to the awareness and learning 
of others: ‘by taking part in the committee, I will share whatever good I know. I will try to create 
awareness among people’ (Female, SC, 30, Koraput), while one person mentions wanting to 
increase opportunities for their own learning by being part of a group (Female, SC, 45, Kalahandi). 
Despite these positive reports of growing awareness, participation, and empowerment, there were 
many people who did not report such changes in the community IDIs or FGDs and people who 
talked negatively about the process in terms of empowerment and/or the structural constraints to 
their empowerment. A couple mentioned the fact that they had to work and so didn’t have time for 
things like joining committees. In one case, a participant reflected wryly on their position: ‘would I be 
in this state if anything had changed’ (Male, OBC, 20, Balangir) whilst a few others reflected on the 
pointlessness of committee membership in the face of entrenched village power structures, as the 
following excerpts illustrate: 
These are all useful things and I can’t listen to the useless talks of people. We also say that 
AWW is eating away everything. We are telling that the teachers are misutilising their power. 
Why get involved in such chaos, that’s why we are not participating. 
(Male, SC, 54, Kalahandi) 
 
Rich men supress those things. Some things happen in meeting, but they do things in their 
own way behind the meeting. 
(Female ST FGD participant (average age of FGD: 24), Balangir) 
 
Sir we are tired objecting and raising our problems in the Panchayat but there is no result. 
Whatever they are doing meeting or what nothing else is being solved only problems. 
(Male SC FGD participant (average age of FGD: 35), Kalahandi) 
 
In one case, a participant raised the fact that their marginalisation could itself be a cause of conflict, 
which prevented them from participating – as ‘many people blame us’ (Male, OBC, 35, Balangir). 
4.5 IYCF/nutrition-related knowledge 
Table 4.33 and Table 4.34 show the estimated impact of social audits on nutrition knowledge. 
Surprisingly, we can see that the impact of early social audit is negative and statistically significant 
for overall nutrition knowledge and child-feeding knowledge. In contrast, other nutrition knowledge 
108 
increased in Late GPs but the effect was not sustained and is not seen in Early GPs. These findings 
reveal that social audits exerted a cumulative and negative impact of nutrition knowledge. 
When looking at the individual questions used to build the knowledge scores, we see that the 
proportion of correct answers dropped the most for questions on whether infants below six months 
should be given water when the weather is very hot (from 62 per cent of correct answers to 52 per 
cent), on the correct age to introduce solids in infants’ diets (from 58 per cent to 51 per cent), on the 
correct age to introduce liquids in infants’ diets (from 72 per cent to 67 per cent), and on the correct 
use of colostrum (from 27 per cent to 22 per cent). 
The decrease in the proportion of correct answers to the first question may well be linked with the 
beginning of the summer season in Odisha at the time of the endline data collection. Summer 
typically starts in March and is very hot in the sampled districts, with temperatures well above 40 
degrees. This could lead respondents to increased acceptance of the practice of giving water to 
infants. 
Such an explanation is not plausible for the other three questions which have seen a marked drop in 
the proportion of correct answers. For these questions, we believe that the explanation lies in 
inadequate nutrition messages being disseminated during and following the social audits. Our 
survey of ASHA workers indicates that while 98 per cent of them believed a pregnant woman should 
eat a quarter more than normal at baseline, this proportion fell to 63 per cent at endline, with a 
sharp rise in the proportion of ASHA workers believing pregnant women should eat an extra meal. 
Furthermore, there is some confusion regarding the correct age to introduce complementary food in 
addition to breast milk. At baseline, 79 per cent of ASHA workers indicated that complementary food 
should be introduced for children aged six months and more, and 21 per cent of ASHA workers 
indicated that complementary food should be introduced for children aged seven months and more. 
At endline, these proportions changed to 57 per cent and 43 per cent respectively. There was thus 
obviously a confusion amongst ASHA workers on whether the introduction of semi-solids should be 
done for children in their sixth month of life or after the sixth month has been completed. 
Furthermore, such confusion increased between the two waves.22 
Another reason for the decrease in nutrition knowledge may be the reduced contact time between 
AWWs/ASHA workers and beneficiaries during home visits. Home visits are the key moment for 
dissemination of knowledge on good nutrition practices; however, ASHA workers indicated a sharp 
drop in the time they spent on home visits between the two waves (from almost 6 hours per week at 
baseline to 3.6 hours per week at endline). The same is true for AWWs whose average time spent 
per week administering home visits went down from three to two hours over the two waves. 
However, there is no noticeable difference between Early and Late groups in terms of the time 
spent on time activities, so there is no evidence that social audits exert a cumulative adverse effect 
on nutrition knowledge through that mechanism. 
 
 
                                               
22
 This could be the result of the social audits, but it can also be because the ASHA workers being interviewed were not necessarily the 
same for both surveys. When we restrict the sample to the panel of workers who answered both rounds of the surveys, the change is 
even more dramatic: whereas 78 per cent of workers indicated that semi-solid foods should be introduced for children aged six months 
and more, and 28 per cent that the correct age was seven months, at endline the proportions were 38 per cent and 62 per cent 
respectively. 
109 
Table 4.33 DID Estimates of the impact of social audits on nutrition knowledge (primary caregivers 
sample) 
 Outcomes 
 
Change in 
Early GPs 
Change in 
Late GPs 
Difference-in-
Difference 
(DID) 
N 
Nutrition knowledge score -0.28* 0.13 -0.41* 1152 
Breastfeeding knowledge score -0.04 0.06 -0.1 1152 
Child-feeding knowledge score -0.35*** -0.1 -0.25** 1152 
Other nutrition knowledge score 0.11 0.17** -0.06 1152 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors are clustered at the Gram Panchayat level. ‘Change in Early GPs’ corresponds to 
α+β in equation (1). ‘Change in Late GPs’ corresponds to α in equation (1). The DID parameter corresponds to β in equation (1).  Source: 
Authors’ own. 
Table 4.34 DID Estimates of the impact of social audits on nutrition knowledge (pregnant women 
sample) 
Outcomes 
Change in 
Early GPs 
Change in 
Late GPs 
Difference-in-
Difference 
(DID) 
N 
Nutrition knowledge score -0.3 -0.25 -0.04 124 
Breastfeeding knowledge score -0.16 0.24 -0.4 124 
Child-feeding knowledge score -0.21 -0.43** 0.22 124 
Other nutrition knowledge score 0.07 -0.06 0.13 124 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors are clustered at the Gram Panchayat level. ‘Change in Early GPs’ corresponds to 
α+β in equation (1). ‘Change in Late GPs’ corresponds to α in equation (1). The DID parameter corresponds to β in equation (1).  Source: 
Authors’ own. 
Broader community findings (IDIs and FGDs) 
There is no evidence available from the evaluation’s qualitative IDIs and FGDs with community 
members, government officials, service providers, and the SPREAD team to suggest that the social 
audit process may have directly affected nutrition and IYCF knowledge of pregnant women and 
primary caregivers of children under five years or that of the wider community. The Programme 
Impact Pathway suggests a number of potential avenues for change, the main one being via AWW 
nutrition counselling to pregnant women and mothers as part of antenatal visits and postnatal/child 
check-ups. It is also a conditionality of women receiving some of their MAMATA payments that they 
attend IYCF counselling sessions. One possible explanation suggested by the qualitative data for 
the negative change observed by the quantitative data could be that the social audit process may 
have diverted AWW’s attention more towards improved delivery of ‘hard’ outputs (such as provision 
of THR) and away from their responsibility to provide one-to-one nutrition counselling to mothers of 
children, and pregnant and lactating women. This theory is supported by the significant number of 
community IDIs where receipt of these ‘hard’ inputs was mentioned, either where there had been a 
positive change or no change. A review of SPREAD’s internal programme documentation and 
monitoring indicators shows a similar pattern. There is only one ICDS component mentioned under 
the MIS entitlement list for verification by the social audit team which relates to this: ‘home visit by 
the AWW’, but the focus here is on maintenance of the home visit register rather than any measure 
of quality or topics covered as part of these home visits. 
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4.6 Village Health and Nutrition Days (VHNDs) 
The organisation of monthly VHNDs for pregnant and lactating women, mothers, and adolescent 
girls is a core ICDS service that is meant to be offered by AWWs at AWCs in order to support 
maternal and child health. Activities covered should include: antenatal care (ANC) check-ups; 
counselling on ANC, delivery and postnatal care, and nutrition; menstrual hygiene; breastfeeding; 
supplementary feeding; child immunisations; family planning and referral of severely malnourished 
children. 
Table 4.35, Table 4.36, and Table 4.37 show the impacts of social audits on whether or not a VHND 
was conducted. 
The first two tables show that the likelihood that one VHND was conducted in the last month was 
much higher at endline than it was at baseline. Furthermore, VHND awareness also rose by 40pp 
among adolescent girls. It is not possible to formally attribute this effect to social audits as the DID 
estimate is indistinguishable from 0, but it remains plausible than audits exerted an immediate effect 
(and thus, not detectable by the quantitative evaluation) this outcome given the scale of the change. 
Table 4.35 DID Estimates of the impact of social audits on VHND (primary caregivers sample) 
Outcomes 
Change in 
Early GPs 
Change in 
Late GPs 
Difference-in-
Difference 
(DID) 
N 
VHND was conducted once 0.52*** 0.52*** 0 1000 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors are clustered at the Gram Panchayat level. ‘Change in Early GPs’ corresponds to 
α+β in equation (1). ‘Change in Late GPs’ corresponds to α in equation (1). The DID parameter corresponds to β in equation (1).  Source: 
Authors’ own. 
Table 4.36 DID Estimates of the impact of social audits on VHND (pregnant women sample) 
Outcomes 
Change in 
Early GPs 
Change in 
Late GPs 
Difference-in-
Difference 
(DID) 
N 
VHND was conducted once 0.64*** 0.47*** 0.17 110 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors are clustered at the Gram Panchayat level. ‘Change in Early GPs’ corresponds to 
α+β in equation (1). ‘Change in Late GPs’ corresponds to α in equation (1). The DID parameter corresponds to β in equation (1).  Source: 
Authors’ own. 
Table 4.37 DID Estimates of the impact of social audits on VHND awareness (adolescent girls sample) 
Outcomes 
Change in 
Early GPs 
Change in 
Late GPs 
Difference-in-
Difference 
(DID) 
N 
VHND awareness 0.41*** 0.36*** 0.05 134 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors are clustered at the Gram Panchayat level. ‘Change in Early GPs’ corresponds to 
α+β in equation (1). ‘Change in Late GPs’ corresponds to α in equation (1). The DID parameter corresponds to β in equation (1).  Source: 
Authors’ own. 
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Broader community findings (IDIs and FGDs) 
 
None of the community members interviewed highlighted any specific changes to the incidence of 
VHNDs in their communities or any increased level of awareness as a result of the audit. However, 
a few participants from FGDs conducted with SSs and SPREAD Social Audit Committee 
Coordinators did mention that they felt that the audits had either improved the AWW’s organisation 
of the VHNDs or increased awareness about them. One FGD member suggested that this was a 
direct result of additional pressure put on the AWW by the audit process to fulfil all their job 
responsibilities, with the VHND being one of many activities they were required to do: 
During the Social Audit, they were sure that legal actions might be taken against them; they 
were insecure about their job, they thought that they might end up losing their jobs so in the 
duration of those eight days I saw they were regular in their jobs… Irrespective of whether 
earlier they were doing their job sincerely or not but in those eight days, regularly they 
opened the Anganwadi Centre, provided Hmm... The hot cooked meal, conducted pre-
school... Their VHND was proper and the Anganwadi Didi (AWW) were regular. 
(SPREAD Social Audit Committee Coordinator FDG participant, Kalahandi) 
As two SSs explained in one FGD conducted in Balangir, they felt that increased community 
awareness about the ICDS services provided meant that people were now more likely to use them, 
including attending VHNDs: 
Respondent 8: They can understand about the things they were entitled to, but couldn’t get. 
They can get their entitlement. They can understand it now. 
Respondent 6: They didn’t use to go to VHND but now they go to VHND. 
Respondent 8: The Anganwadi didn’t come to the Anganwadi Centre. Now they are also 
coming. They didn’t give food. Now they are giving food as well. They are teaching the 
children in Anganwadi. 
 
(SS FGD participants, Balangir) 
4.7 Food security and dietary diversity 
Impacting food security and nutrition outcomes were amongst the primary objectives of the CAN 
programme. Although it would be difficult for any programme to impact these types of outcomes in 
the period assessed leading to the decision not to take anthropometric measurements, we still 
measured changes in a limited number of relevant food and nutrition outcomes between baseline 
and endline. All four NFSA schemes are designed to contribute in various ways towards 
improvements in household food security and dietary diversity, with ICDS and MAMATA targeted at 
children and pregnant women in particular. 
Table 4.38 displays results of the estimations of the effect of social audits on food security and 
dietary diversity for primary caregivers. We observe that both the Women’s Dietary Diversity Score 
(WDDS) and the child dietary diversity score (for children between 6 and 24 months) have 
increased over the study period. Women have eaten almost one extra food type (0.88) and children 
0.5 extra food type at follow-up compared to the baseline. The increase in dietary diversity has been 
driven by consumption of fruits (which doubled), legumes, and rice. However, women and children 
assigned to the Early group have not increased their dietary diversity more than those assigned to 
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the Late group. We thus have no evidence that this increase in dietary diversity is caused by the 
social audits.23 
The Food Insecurity Experience Scale (FIES), which measures food insecurity at the household 
level, has not changed over the study period, for neither of the Early and Late groups. 
Insufficient dietary diversity is typically a result of an income gap (not enough resources to acquire 
diverse type of food) and/or of a knowledge gap (not enough knowledge as to what a good diet is). 
The increase in dietary diversity could thus be linked with either one or two of these gaps narrowing 
down between baseline and follow-up. Results for nutrition knowledge among caregivers discussed 
in the earlier subsection suggests that knowledge has not improved so that the positive change in 
diets is most likely linked with the income situation (and thus, independent of the social audits). 
Table 4.38 DID Estimates of the impact of social audits on food security and dietary diversity (primary 
caregivers sample) 
Outcomes 
Change in 
Early GPs 
Change in 
Late GPs 
Difference-
in-
Difference 
(DID) 
N 
Child dietary diversity score (7 food 
groups) 
0.53*** 0.51*** 0.02 1151 
Woman Dietary Diversity Score 0.77*** 0.99*** -0.22 1152 
Food Insecurity Experience Scale -0.19 0.01 -0.2 1152 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors are clustered at the Gram Panchayat level. ‘Change in Early GPs’ corresponds to 
α+β in equation (1). ‘Change in Late GPs’ corresponds to α in equation (1). The DID parameter corresponds to β in equation (1).  Source: 
Authors’ own. 
Broader community findings (IDIs and FGDs) 
The qualitative data from IDIs and FGDs with community members support the quantitative findings 
that women and children’s dietary diversity improved over the period when the social audit was 
carried out, although the frequency that this topic was explicitly mentioned was low. Whilst the 
quantitative data was unable to confirm any causal relationship with the social audits, qualitative 
findings showed that many community members perceived there to be a direct link. Positive 
changes reported in children’s diets were most commonly highlighted within the context of improved 
NFSA delivery of food entitlements. This included improved quality and quantity of take-home 
rations provided by the AWC (for example, more frequent distribution of rice, pulses, and eggs) as 
well as improved MDM provisions for children in school. A few mothers reported a marked increase 
in their child’s consumption of a wider range of foods following the audit process, including eggs and 
other grains (for example, rice in addition to corn). Whilst very few specific references were made to 
improvements in women’s diets, this might be explained by a greater community awareness of the 
importance placed on child nutrition and wellbeing relative to other household members, rather than 
an indication that women’s diets hadn’t also shown improvements as a result of increased access to 
foods (e.g. via TPDS and THR). 
Although access to a greater and more nutrient-rich diversity of foods may have improved, one male 
FGD member in Kalahandi District had observed a trade-off in terms of quantity of food provided: 
                                               
23
 In particular, there is no evidence of increased availability of eggs in children’s diets. 
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Government is helping us. Here we have heard that before government only supplying us 
‘daal’ (pulses), but now they are providing us rice, ‘dalma’ (different vegetable mixed daal), 
eggs, and vegetables but in less amount. 
(Male village leaders/elders FGD participant (mixed caste; average age of FGD participant: 
40), Kalahandi) 
Several community members commented on positive changes in the quality of food provided, for 
example as THR from the AWCs. A few individuals connected this directly with their child’s health 
status, for example: 
See how it happened... they didn't give my son proper food... they weren’t giving proper 
water... due to which he suffered from dysentery and diarrhoea... that’s why we complained. 
After that, they kept a check on the person serving the food... and if the food was being 
served on time or not. 
 
(IDI with female, ST, 27, Koraput) 
Interestingly, there was no evidence from the qualitative data that changes had occurred in 
decision-making on intra-household food allocation or food purchasing decisions that would impact 
on dietary diversity, which in theory might be associated with increased nutrition knowledge, gained 
for example from nutrition education sessions provided by AWW visits or VHSDs, or increased 
income from access to increased MAMATA payments. 
4.8 Summary 
This section considered the evidence we have gathered on the outcomes mapped in the theory of 
change (Figure 1) relating primarily to awareness and knowledge of services, entitlements, and 
grievance redressal avenues; access to and satisfaction with services; use of grievance redressal 
and broader measures of community participation and empowerment. We also considered broader 
impacts on food security and IYCF knowledge. 
In terms of knowledge of NFSA services, entitlements, and grievance mechanisms, we see some 
significant changes, varying by service. Knowledge about the ICDS service of THR improved 
amongst caregivers and pregnant women, the latter seeing some very high changes (+25/+21pp 
Early/Late). With no significant differences between Early and Late GPs, we cannot be sure that 
these changes are cumulative or indeed connected to the social audit process. However, in the 
absence of other supply- or demand-side activities happening with regard to ICDS during this 
period, it is hard to rule out their connection to the CAN programme. Awareness and knowledge of 
the MAMATA scheme and entitlements did significantly improve for the target group of pregnant 
women between baseline and follow-up. Such changes tend to be significantly more marked in 
Early GPs, indicating a cumulative positive impact of social audits. Knowledge about the TPDS 
improved substantially or very substantially amongst all groups sampled – caregivers, pregnant 
women, and men. These included variables measured such as overall knowledge of entitlements 
and knowledge about PDS committees. The changes for men were the most marked and were also 
more pronounced in Early than Late GPs. This suggests that these impacts were due to cumulative 
exposure to the social audit process and the community-level activities it set into motion. More 
detailed views of those who participated in the community IDIs and FGDs lend further credence to 
the view that such gains in knowledge were related to attendance at social audit events and 
processes. 
In terms of access to, uptake of, and satisfaction with NFSA services and entitlements, we see a 
more varied pattern but which includes improvement in some areas across all services. For ICDS, 
we saw an increase in the likelihood that a child was provided with special food following growth 
monitoring, and a small but statistically significant increase in referral to rehab centres after 
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monitoring. Neither of these changes differed significantly between Early and Late GPs, however. 
For MAMATA, we see significant increases (+22pp) in enrolment amongst pregnant women in the 
Late GPs, (increases in Early GPs were not statistically significant) – and a significant increase 
(+31pp) in pregnant women being satisfied by MAMATA. The latter change was significantly 
different between Early and Late groups suggesting that the change in satisfaction was based 
cumulatively on length of exposure to the social audit and the processes it set in motion. For TPDS 
we see improvements for all groups sampled, but particularly for men, including decreases (-7pp) in 
men reporting having to pay extra money at the ration shop in Early GPs, and higher likelihood of 
having been assigned an Aadhar number (+5pp). Both these changes are significantly different 
between early and late groups, suggesting a cumulative effect of the social audit process.  
Other changes where we cannot detect a significant difference between Early and Late GPs 
include, amongst primary caregivers, improvements, and likelihood to have an Aadhar number, 
likelihood that ration shops deliver food on a monthly basis, satisfaction with the TPDS, and the 
quantity of the food ration. Although these changes can’t be directly linked to the social audit 
process, the magnitude of the changes in some cases (e.g. 32pp increase in ration shops delivering 
food monthly in Early GPs and 46pp in Late GPs) and the absence of other major supply- or 
demand-side changes observed during this period are highly suggestive that these changes are 
related to the CAN programme. This view is supported by the information garnered from some of 
the individuals who participated in the community IDIs and FGDs, who reported increases in access 
and availability of all the services that were the target of the social audit. However, it is also the case 
that other participants in IDIs and FGDs complained that there have been no changes since the 
social audit, or discussed the fact that expected improvements in services they thought would result 
from their village’s participation in the CAN programme has not happened. Others still, stressed that 
they had difficulty accessing the services (or actively participating in services) due to their 
marginalisation in village life, as a result of poverty, caste, or tribal status. 
Findings on occurrence and awareness of village health and nutrition days showed significant 
improvements in both Early and Late GPs. The quantitative data made it difficult to attribute this to 
the social audits although it is plausible, particularly given the limited positive evidence from the 
qualitative data, that the audits exerted an immediate effect, given the scale of changes seen. 
Some of the most surprising results in this chapter relate to use of and confidence to use grievance 
redressal processes, particularly in light of the results on the positive effects of social audits on 
knowledge of these processes and on community participation. Confidence in ability to raise issues 
regarding ICDS, MAMATA, and TPDS went down, with the difference between early and late 
groups statistically significant. We have been unable to explain these changes as the data we 
gathered in community IDIs and FGDs suggest that – in some cases at least – people’s confidence 
about use of these processes had improved. The fact that the decrease in confidence is less 
marked in Early GPs than in Late GPs lends some support to the hypothesis that after having learnt 
more about service entitlements, people’s expectations increased beyond a level that they felt could 
be adequately met by simply complaining to the service providers. This hypothesis is also 
somewhat supported by the IDIs and FGDs we undertook with the service providers themselves, 
who reported that complaints had gone up but that they were frustrated that a lot of what was being 
complained about was not within their power to address (as these had more to do with systemic 
supply-side constraints). 
Our findings on community empowerment and voice in local nutrition-related decision-making 
strongly support the view that social audits led to very large positive changes in civic life-related 
attitudes of caregivers and pregnant women. Both groups of women became more positive about 
citizens being engaged in civic life and about states being responsive to citizen’s demands. Social 
audits also strongly enhanced the community participation of pregnant women and political 
participation of caregivers (both effects are seen in Early GPs only, which is evidence of a 
cumulative impact of social audits in this regard). Qualitative data provide a number of further 
illustrations of people’s growing sense of awareness of the forms of redressal and of being able to 
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voice their problems. Qualitative data also suggested that people became increasingly motivated to 
take part in community life via their membership of committees as a means to solve future 
problems. However, our qualitative research also emphasised how entrenched power structures are 
in villages, and how the realities of daily life may limit the participation of others. 
Again, surprisingly, the changes we see in IYCF/nutrition-related knowledge and practices are not 
positive. In fact, nutrition knowledge scores amongst primary caregivers declined in Early GPs – 
with the only positive result being amongst those in Late GPs and relating to ‘other nutrition 
knowledge’. Declines in knowledge are not present in Late GPs, suggesting that social audits exert 
a cumulative effect of knowledge. This could be due to the delivery of nutrition knowledge being 
different in Late and Early GPs (this is an area deserving of further exploration by SPREAD) and/or 
with service providers being diverted away from nutrition counselling towards other tasks as a result 
of the social audits. 
Our findings on food security and dietary diversity show very significant improvements in dietary 
diversity scores for women and children. However, as nutritional knowledge amongst samples had 
not improved during that time and in some cases had deteriorated (with nutrition knowledge actually 
decreasing in Early GPs), it is hard to link this change to the social audits (although neither can we 
formally rule out the possibility that social audits had an immediate impact). Some other plausible 
explanations are that income changed significantly during this period as a result of greater livelihood 
opportunities, or that these are seasonal variations in food availability. Some mothers interviewed 
as part of the community IDIs and FGDs, however, do link the social audit to changes in their 
children’s diets. Further work will be needed to understand changes in this area. 
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5 Conclusions and recommendations 
5.1 Institutional accountability for NFSA services delivery 
improvements  
Following a rigorous, independently executed evaluation, this report has considered the impact of 
the CAN programme along the theory of change identified in Figure 1. We have used a theory-
based mixed methods evaluation to consider whether the programme conformed to its expected 
design when in operation, whether it delivered outputs and processes as expected and uniformly 
across the evaluation communities (process evaluation); and whether assumptions linking those 
outputs to intended outcomes for a wide range of relevant variables have been met (impact 
evaluation). Where possible, we have tried to explain these impacts, or lack thereof, in relation to 
wider contextual knowledge relating to the study communities gained from background research; 
programmatic knowledge, the process evaluation, or our qualitative exploratory work at community 
level. 
Evaluation and design considerations described in Section 2 mean that there are limitations to the 
design of this evaluation that must be taken into account when interpreting the findings we have 
reported here. Because we were not able to select communities outside of the intervention 
communities against which we could compare intervention impacts, we opted for a phased design, 
which compared randomly allocated and thus similar communities who had been surveyed at 
baseline and then received the intervention either three to four months ahead of the endline, or just 
over a month ahead of the endline. Comparing average differences in differences in outcomes 
between the communities allowed us to see whether there had been any impact directly as a result 
of the intervention; as well as consider whether the impact was immediate and short-lived (results 
significantly higher in ‘Late GPs’) or cumulative (results significantly higher in ‘Early GPs’).  
This model had drawbacks, however, as firstly, such a short duration between baseline and endline 
means that the evaluation focused on the short-term impacts to communities participating in the 
social audit, even though we know that such processes of accountability and empowerment require 
a long time to filter through to improvements in service delivery (if at all) and secondly, because if 
desired results improved, in both Early and Late GPs, we were unable to tell whether such 
improvements were the result of the communities’ participation in the programme; or were simply 
the results of wider societal or service delivery changes during this period of time.  
Still, the design we followed was the best available option given operational limitations, and it 
provides rigorous quantitative estimates of impact. Furthermore, the services we were interested in 
are generally known to be improving in Odisha (Kohli et al. 2017), but they are not known to be 
improving at a dramatic rate. Moreover, there were not any other significant supply- or demand-side 
measures being implemented by government or other agencies in the evaluation area between the 
baseline and endline. Significant changes experienced in both Early and Late GPs with no 
significant difference between them could then plausibly be linked to their participation in the CAN 
programme, although we cannot formally establish any causal claim through the quantitative 
evaluation. 
With these limitations and caveats in mind, this concluding section brings together the results of 
Sections 3 and 4 of the report which report, respectively, on the design, outputs/implementation of 
the programme (Section 3) and our findings on the outcomes we were able to measure (Section 4). 
Our findings on the design and implementation are largely positive. SPREAD have clearly shown 
the ability to put in place a large and complex operation – including the recruitment and 
management of several hundred staff, and implement the social audit process in a way that was 
mostly welcomed by those in the communities we surveyed or interviewed: most service providers 
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and government officials. Operating at this scale and with the political acumen to do so in a way that 
was well integrated into local democratic institutions and government services (the PRIs, the Palli 
Sabhas, the Gram Sabhas, as well as securing the participation of local officials of the concerned 
services) was an immense hurdle that many organisations would have failed to clear without proper 
thought and experience. This is very positive, albeit a high bar for replicability elsewhere, including 
at larger or less resource-intensive scales. Even bearing in mind these positive findings, 
participation rates were not uniformly high. Whether participation rates (at around 23 per cent for the 
Palli Sabha amongst women and 10 per cent for the Gram Sabha) could have been higher depends 
a little on one’s expectations of poor communities’ capacity to spend at least several hours 
participating in such an exercise. This may be a design question as much as an implementation 
question. Findings from the evaluation reveal that being busy with work (both women and men), 
with household chores (women), and being away from the village (men), were reasons cited for non-
participation, as well as broader issues of the marginalisation of women. 
Taking into account the design limitations and caveats above, our findings on the outcomes we 
measured are also largely positive. We structured Section 4 along the various parts of the impact 
pathway and its assumptions that we could measure in terms of the outcomes that were targeted by 
the CAN programme. We looked firstly at increased knowledge and awareness about NFSA 
services; then at whether services or satisfaction with those services improved; and then at whether 
there was evidence of wider empowerment and participation improving via improved use of attempts 
to raise grievances; participation in village committees; and other aspects of civic life. We also 
considered changes in IYCF knowledge and practice, and dietary diversity amongst women and 
children; and food insecurity. 
We see positive changes in nearly all these areas, except for IYCF knowledge and practice, and 
confidence to raise issues with service providers, where we see some negative changes. In some 
cases, the observed changes were very substantial over the study period but these changes were 
of the same magnitude in the Early and Late GPs. In these cases, we cannot relate the observed 
changes to communities’ participation in the CAN programme for reasons explained above on the 
limitations of the evaluation design. However, this includes some examples of very large changes 
for which we cannot as yet offer alternative explanations. This is true for changes in caregivers’ and 
pregnant women’s knowledge of take-home rations; likelihood of children being offered special food 
after growth monitoring, referral to rehabilitation centres (a relatively small change), and a number of 
changes in terms of TPDS service provision for primary caregivers and pregnant women. 
Areas that we measured and which showed significant difference between Early and Late GPs 
(results were all higher in Early as compared to Late GPs, suggesting a cumulative impact as the 
result of exposure) included awareness and knowledge of, and satisfaction with the MAMATA 
scheme amongst pregnant women, knowledge of entitlements and PDS committees, decreases in 
having to pay extra money at a ration shop, and increases in Aadhar registration amongst men; 
enhanced participation in community participation amongst pregnant women, and political 
participation amongst primary caregivers. 
In two areas – increased dietary diversity of both children and women, and VHND awareness and 
occurrence – we see positive changes in both early and late groups. For dietary diversity, such 
change is probably primarily related to increased livelihood and income opportunities or changes in 
food availability over the study period. Yet, we cannot rule out that social audits contributed to this 
positive change (such a contribution could not be picked out by the quantitative evaluation design). 
Finally, there are two areas in which we see outcomes changing in the opposite way to which we 
would have hoped – the confidence of those surveyed to raise issues with service providers, and in 
women’s IYCF knowledge scores. Our qualitative data help set the first of these findings in 
perspective – there is some support for the hypothesis that confidence went down (more markedly 
in late than in early communities) because the social audit had an immediate effect on raising 
expectations beyond a level that could be met by service providers faced with broader supply-side 
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or systemic issues. This is a finding which is supported by service provider interviews. Our process 
data and review of the design sets the second finding in perspective – the social audit process did 
not prioritise IYCF knowledge, and many of the service improvements were concerned with delivery 
of hard outputs (THR, PDS, etc.) rather than improving the ‘softer’ skills and delivery tasks of 
frontline workers such as AWWs, who have responsibility for nutrition counselling. Wider evidence 
from India and elsewhere shows that without a concerted, sustained, high-intensity, and well-
supported effort to change IYCF knowledge, such changes in knowledge – and certainly practice – 
will not happen. As this was not a core part of the CAN programme, such changes are therefore not 
so difficult to understand. There is the possibility, however, that with attention diverted elsewhere, 
the cumulative greater decrease in knowledge in Early GPs (which we don’t see in Late GPs) is 
something to be avoided and this therefore feeds into one of our primary recommendations, below. 
In summary and in terms of the original objectives of the evaluation, we do see sufficient evidence 
that the social audit model has the potential to improve delivery and uptake of NFSA services. 
These service improvements and uptake were not uniformly positive for all target groups, but in 
some areas, the changes were significant and directly linked to communities’ participation in the 
social audit processes. The social audit did also lead to changes in knowledge, behaviour, and 
practice at a household level, in terms of participation in the social audit itself and increased desire 
to participate in aspects of civic life, such as committees related to NFSA delivery. Nutrition and 
IYCF knowledge, however, did not change. Given that this was not an objective of the evaluation, 
and would not have been possible given our design and methods, we cannot offer a definitive 
answer to the question of whether a social audit design can result in changes in maternal and child 
nutritional status within the context of the delivery of NFSA services in Odisha. However, some of 
the changes we see are of a magnitude rarely witnessed in terms of the Indian services covered by 
the NFSA, or local democracy strengthening, whether in terms of knowledge/awareness, 
participation/empowerment, and service delivery/satisfaction. There is good evidence that SPREAD 
is well placed to have been implementing this model effectively. As the programme is continuing 
into its next phase, we make some further recommendations for its ongoing implementation in the 
final section. 
5.2 Implications for CAN programme Phase 2 design 
 IYCF knowledge more central; AWW (and others’) roles in nutrition behaviour change 
communication (BCC) more central; 
 Further operational research and attention to differences in participation rates, particularly 
amongst women, and more marginalised groups – and to take into account other calls on 
time (work/household chores, migration); 
 Further work to understand why confidence to raise issues declines immediately after SA; 
 Further work to build on positive results in terms of knowledge, access, and satisfaction 
across the services – and willingness to participate in community life/committees. 
5.3 Longer-term implementation, scalability questions/research 
 Different intensities of length of exposure/rate of exposure (how many times/year); 
 Different organisational structures – less resource intensive?; 
 Increased level of policy engagement with state-level actors through strategic 
partnerships/networks to address service bottlenecks at district and state level.   
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Annex 1 Definitions of variables for quantitative 
data 
 
Variables Definition Type 
Very satisfied with 
AWC 
Index of satisfaction with the AWC:  
1= very satisfied  
0= somewhat satisfied, somewhat dissatisfied, very 
dissatisfied 
(1=yes, 0=no) 
Very confident, can 
raise issue on AWC 
Index of confidence with the AWC:  
1= very confident 
0= somewhat confident, somewhat not confident, not 
confident  
(1=yes, 0=no) 
Had contact with the 
AWW 
At least one member of the household had contact with the 
AWW in the last 3 months (endline survey: last month) 
(1=yes, 0=no) 
Received services 
from AWC or AWW 
AWC or AWW provided services or gave assistance to any 
member of the household in the last 3 months (endline 
survey: last month) 
(1=yes, 0=no) 
AWC opened on time The AWC generally opens on time (1=yes, 0=no) 
Hours open per day Average amount of hours that AWC is open daily continuous 
AWW comes to the 
centre daily 
The AWWs generally come to the centre daily (1=yes, 0=no) 
AWC awareness Respondent is aware of AWC existence (1=yes, 0=no) 
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Has been visited at 
home by a health 
worker 
Has been visited at home by a health worker in last 3 months 
(endline survey: within the last month) 
(1=yes, 0=no) 
Aware of MAMATA Respondent is aware of the MAMATA scheme (1=yes, 0=no) 
Registered with 
MAMATA 
Registered with the AWC as part of the MAMATA scheme (1=yes, 0=no) 
Very well informed on 
MAMATA 
Respondent feels very well informed about MAMATA: 
1= very well informed 
0= quite well informed, not so well informed, not well 
informed at all 
(1=yes, 0=no) 
Very satisfied with 
MAMATA 
Index of satisfaction with MAMATA:  
1= very satisfied  
0= somewhat satisfied, somewhat dissatisfied, very 
dissatisfied 
(1=yes, 0=no) 
Very confident can 
raise issue on 
MAMATA 
Index of confidence with MAMATA:  
1= very confident 
0= somewhat confident, somewhat not confident, not 
confident  
(1=yes, 0=no) 
MAMATA knowledge 
score 
Score constructed by the sum of correct answers on 
knowledge about the MAMATA scheme – respondents are 
given seven true/false statements about who is entitled to 
receive benefits of the scheme 
score 
(min=0, max=7) 
Household has a valid 
ration card 
Household has a valid ration card (1=yes, 0=no) 
Household has 
received info on ration 
card application 
Household has received information in writing about the 
status of the ration card application 
(1=yes, 0=no) 
Ration shop always 
provides entitlement 
Ration shop always provides with the amount of food that the 
respondent is entitled to 
(1=yes, 0=no) 
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Ration shop never 
provides entitlement 
Ration shop never provides with the amount of food that the 
respondent is entitled to 
(1=yes, 0=no) 
Knows PHH 
entitlement 
Respondent knows the correct amount of rice they are 
entitled to (only for PHH cardholders) 
(1=yes, 0=no) 
Knows AAY 
entitlement 
Respondent knows the correct amount of rice they are 
entitled to (only for AAY and AY cardholders) 
(1=yes, 0=no) 
Was delivered PHH 
entitlement 
Respondent received the correct amount of rice they are 
entitled to (only for PHH cardholders) 
(1=yes, 0=no) 
Was delivered AAY 
entitlement 
Respondent received the correct amount of rice they are 
entitled to (only for AAY and AY cardholders) 
(1=yes, 0=no) 
Had to pay extra 
money at ration shop 
Respondent paid extra money for the grains they were 
entitled to 
(1=yes, 0=no) 
Household usually 
consumes TPDS food 
Household usually consumes the grains they received  (1=yes, 0=no) 
Ration shop delivers 
food monthly 
Household receives food once a month (1=yes, 0=no) 
Knows there is a PDS 
committee in GP 
Respondent knows that there is a PDS advisory committee 
in their GP 
(1=yes, 0=no) 
Has been assigned an 
Aadhar number 
Respondent has been assigned and Aadhar number (12-
digit unique identity number) 
(1=yes, 0=no) 
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Delivery of TPDS was 
hampered by Aadhar 
issue 
Food grain delivery was withheld because of issues with 
Aadhar 
(1=yes, 0=no) 
Rice is weighed with 
electronic scale 
Rice was weighed with electronic scale (1=yes, 0=no) 
Very well informed 
about TPDS 
Respondent feels very well informed about TPDS: 
1= very well informed 
0= quite well informed, not so well informed, not well 
informed at all 
(1=yes, 0=no) 
Very satisfied with 
TPDS quantity 
Index of satisfaction with the quantity of TPDS:  
1= very satisfied  
0= somewhat satisfied, somewhat dissatisfied, very 
dissatisfied 
(1=yes, 0=no) 
Very confident to raise 
an issue on TPDS 
Index of confidence with TPDS:  
1= very confident 
0= somewhat confident, somewhat not confident, not 
confident  
(1=yes, 0=no) 
Received help with 
TPDS 
Respondent sought/advice regarding access to TPDS (1=yes, 0=no) 
Informed about the 
preparation of THR at 
least once 
Respondent was explained how to prepare THR contents at 
least once (either during pregnancy, after pregnancy while 
breastfeeding, while raising a child of 6–12 months old or a 
child of 12–24 months old)  
(1=yes, 0=no) 
Very well informed 
about THR 
Respondent feels very well informed about THR service: 
1= very well informed 
0= quite well informed, not so well informed, not well 
informed at all 
(1=yes, 0=no) 
Very satisfied about 
THR 
Index of satisfaction with the THR service:  
1= very satisfied  
0= somewhat satisfied, somewhat dissatisfied, very 
dissatisfied 
(1=yes, 0=no) 
Was provided with 
special food after child 
measurement 
Child was given special food after measurement (1=yes, 0=no) 
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Child was referred to 
rehab centre after 
measurement 
Child was referred to a hospital or a rehabilitation centre 
after being measured 
(1=yes, 0=no) 
Very well informed on 
GMP 
Respondent feels very well informed about GMP: 
1= very well informed 
0= quite well informed, not so well informed, not well 
informed at all 
(1=yes, 0=no) 
Very satisfied with 
GMP 
Index of satisfaction with GMP:  
1= very satisfied  
0= somewhat satisfied, somewhat dissatisfied, very 
dissatisfied 
(1=yes, 0=no) 
Very confident, can 
raise issues on GMP 
Index of confidence with GMP:  
1= very confident 
0= somewhat confident, somewhat not confident, not 
confident  
(1=yes, 0=no) 
Child's weight has 
been measured 
Child's weight has been measured by the AWW or ASHA 
either at home or the AWC in the last 3 months (endline 
survey: in the last month) 
(1=yes, 0=no) 
Community 
participation index 
(standardised) 
Index on community participation constructed with principal 
component analysis using the following variables:  
 
Number of groups/organisations the respondent belongs to, 
percentage of groups/organisations the respondent belongs 
to, number of groups/organisations the respondent feels 
empowered to speak, percentage of groups/organisations 
the respondent feels empowered to speak, knowledge of the 
name of the Sarpanch and knowledge of the names of 
elected officials. 
standardised 
index 
(mean=0, 
standard 
deviation=1) 
Community 
engagement index 
(standardised) 
Index on engagement with the community constructed with 
principal component analysis using the following variables:  
 
Attending at least one group meeting to discuss nutrition, 
contribution to group decisions on community monitoring of 
health and nutrition services, speaking out against problems 
associated with health and nutrition services and 
entitlements, taking part in monitoring implementation of 
health and nutrition services, attendance at Gram Sabha and 
attendance at Palli Sabha (all of these refer to the last 4 
months for the baseline survey and the last month for the 
endline survey). 
standardised 
index 
(mean=0, 
standard 
deviation=1) 
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Political participation 
index (standardised) 
Index on political participation constructed with principal 
component analysis using the following variables:  
 
independent decision on who to vote for in local elections, 
willingness to vote in the next local elections and willingness 
to vote in the next national elections. 
standardised 
index 
(mean=0, 
standard 
deviation=1) 
Good citizen index 
(standardised) 
Index on the importance of responsibilities of citizens 
regarding their GP according to the respondents' opinion.  
 
The index is constructed as a sum of yes (1) or no (0) 
answers on which of the following are the most important 
responsibilities: vote in elections, complain when things don’t 
go as they should, make suggestions to government officials, 
attend meetings, respect the law, pay taxes, and contribute 
otherwise to public projects. 
standardised 
index 
(mean=0, 
standard 
deviation=1) 
Good state index 
(standardised) 
Index on the importance of responsibilities of the state with 
respect to the citizens according to the respondents' opinion.  
 
The index is constructed as a sum of yes (1) or no (0) 
answers on which of the following are the most important 
responsibilities: accept elections outcomes, respond to 
citizen’s complaints, respond to citizen’s suggestions, 
explain the GP’s actions to the population, avoid corruption, 
consult people when taking decisions, and help services run 
well. 
standardised 
index 
(mean=0, 
standard 
deviation=1) 
GP effectiveness index 
(standardised) 
Index on the effectiveness of the GP according to the 
respondents' opinion.  
 
The index is constructed as a sum of agree (1) or disagree 
(0) answers on whether the GP responds to citizen’s 
complaints, consults the population, helps services run well, 
avoids corruption, and explains its actions to the people. 
standardised 
index 
(mean=0, 
standard 
deviation=1) 
Highly trust teachers 
Index of respondents' trust in teachers: 
1= trust a lot 
0= somewhat trust, somewhat distrust, distrust a lot 
(1=yes, 0=no) 
Highly trust farmers' 
association 
Index of respondents' trust in farmers' association: 
1= trust a lot 
0= somewhat trust, somewhat distrust, distrust a lot 
(1=yes, 0=no) 
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Highly trust GP officials 
Index of respondents' trust in GP members: 
1= trust a lot 
0= somewhat trust, somewhat distrust, distrust a lot 
(1=yes, 0=no) 
Highly trust AWW 
Index of respondents' trust in AWWs: 
1= trust a lot 
0= somewhat trust, somewhat distrust, distrust a lot 
(1=yes, 0=no) 
Child dietary diversity 
score (7 food groups) 
Score of dietary diversity among children constructed as a 
sum of the following foods consumed the day before the 
interview: grain, roots, or tubers, beans, legumes, or nuts, 
dairy products, meat, organ meat, fish, eggs, vitamin A-rich 
fruits or vegetables, and other fruits or vegetables. 
score 
(min=0, max=7) 
Child dietary diversity 
standardised index 
Standardised Index of dietary diversity among children 
constructed as a sum of the following foods consumed the 
day before the interview: grain, roots, or tubers, beans, 
legumes, or nuts, dairy products, meat, organ meat, fish, 
eggs, vitamin A-rich fruits or vegetables, and other fruits or 
vegetables. 
standardised 
index 
(mean=0, 
standard 
deviation=1) 
Woman Dietary 
Diversity Score 
Score of dietary diversity among women constructed as a 
sum of the following foods consumed the day before the 
interview: foods made from grains, white roots, and tubers, 
pulses (beans, peas, and lentils), nuts, and seeds, milk and 
milk products, organ meat, meat, and poultry, fish, and 
seafood, eggs, dark green leafy vegetables, vitamin A-rich 
vegetables, roots and tubers, vitamin A-rich fruits, other 
vegetables, other fruits, condiments and seasonings, insects, 
and other small protein foods, oils, and fats, savoury, and 
fried snacks, sweets, sugar-sweetened beverages, other 
beverages, and foods.  
score 
(min=0, max=15) 
Woman Dietary 
Diversity Score 
(standardised) 
Standardised index of dietary diversity among women 
constructed as a sum of the following foods consumed the 
day before the interview: foods made from grains, white 
roots, and tubers, pulses (beans, peas, and lentils), nuts, 
and seeds, milk and milk products, organ meat, meat, and 
poultry, fish, and seafood, eggs, dark green leafy vegetables, 
vitamin A-rich vegetables, roots and tubers, vitamin A-rich 
fruits, other vegetables, other fruits, condiments and 
seasonings, insects, and other small protein foods, oils, and 
fats, savoury, and fried snacks, sweets, sugar-sweetened 
beverages, other beverages, and foods.  
standardised 
index 
(mean=0, 
standard 
deviation=1) 
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Food Insecurity 
Experience Scale 
Score of food insecurity experience among the respondents. 
The score is constructed as the sum of occasions in the last 
12 months when, because of lack of money or other 
resources, the respondent: was worried they would not have 
enough food to eat, was unable to eat healthy and nutritious 
food, ate only a few kinds of foods, had to skip a meal, ate 
less than they thought they should, their household ran out 
of food, was hungry but did not eat, went without eating for a 
whole day (endline survey: in the last month). 
score 
(min=0, max=8) 
Food Insecurity 
Experience Scale 
(standardised) 
Standardised index of food insecurity experience among the 
respondents. The score is constructed as the sum of 
occasions in the last 12 months when, because of lack of 
money or other resources, the respondent: was worried they 
would not have enough food to eat, was unable to eat 
healthy and nutritious food, ate only a few kinds of foods, 
had to skip a meal, ate less than they thought they should, 
their household ran out of food, was hungry but did not eat, 
went without eating for a whole day (endline survey: in the 
last month). 
standardised 
index 
(mean=0, 
standard 
deviation=1) 
Nutrition knowledge 
score 
Score on knowledge about nutrition. The score is 
constructed as the total of correct answers on 14 general 
questions regarding nutrition. 
score 
(min=0, max=14) 
Breastfeeding 
knowledge score 
Score on knowledge about breastfeeding. The score is 
constructed as the total of correct answers on four specific 
questions regarding breastfeeding knowledge. 
score 
(min=0, max=4) 
Child-feeding 
knowledge score 
Score on knowledge about child-feeding. The score is 
constructed as the total of correct answers on three specific 
questions regarding child feeding knowledge. 
score 
(min=0, max=3) 
Other nutrition 
knowledge score 
Score on knowledge about other nutrition facts. The score is 
constructed as the total of correct answers on seven 
questions regarding general knowledge on nutrition. 
score 
(min=0, max=7) 
VHND was conducted 
once 
VHND was conducted once in the past 3 months (endline 
survey: in the last month) 
(1=yes, 0=no) 
VHND awareness Respondent is aware of VHND (1=yes, 0=no) 
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Annex 2 Mixed methods analysis approach 
 
Point 
along 
Programm
e Impact 
Pathway 
 
Design Inputs 
 
Outputs Outcomes Impacts 
Focus of 
evaluation 
assessment 
Appropriatene
ss of overall 
design and 
approach 
against 
original 
aims/objective
s as tool to 
reduce 
malnutrition in 
Odisha 
Staff and SS 
volunteer 
recruitment, 
characteristics, 
and training 
 
Other resources/ 
investments 
required to set up 
programme 
 
Targeting and 
selection 
individuals/sub-
groups 
 
Targeting of 
villages/GPs/bloc
ks etc. 
 
Critical SA 
components 
/mechanism
s 
 
Quality, 
coverage, 
and timings 
of 
programme 
activities 
undertaken 
 
Community 
knowledge 
of and 
participation 
in SA 
processes 
(pre, during, 
and post-
audit follow-
up) 
 
Manageme
nt, 
governance, 
monitoring, 
and 
transparenc
y of SA 
process 
 
 
 
Knowledge of 
NFSA 
entitlements, 
grievances, 
etc. 
 
Access to 
and uptake of 
NFSA 
entitlements 
for different 
sub-groups 
 
Community 
empowermen
t and 
demand for 
nutrition 
services and 
entitlements 
 
Community/ 
CBO 
participation 
in local 
governance 
activities/ 
decision-
making 
related to 
food and 
nutrition, esp. 
for women 
 
IYCF/nutritio
n-related 
knowledge 
and practices 
 
VHND 
occurrence 
and 
awareness 
 
HH food 
security/dieta
ry diversity 
 
Behavioural change of 
adolescent girls 
 
Institutional 
accountability for 
NFSA services 
 
Nutrition outcomes 
(e.g. stunting, 
wasting) particularly 
for women and young 
children (not 
measured directly via 
evaluation) 
 
GoO validates social 
audit as tool to 
improve nutrition 
Increased 
immunisation 
coverage of <3 yrs 
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Data sources SA manual 
SPREAD 
programme 
background 
documents 
Academic 
literature 
 
SA manual 
SS induction 
training report 
Other 
programme 
documents, 
monitoring plans 
etc. 
Qual IDIs/FGDs 
 Programme 
operational 
documents, 
monitoring/ 
MIS data, 
annual 
reviews, 
reports etc. 
SPREAD 
MIS data 
Qual IDIs/ 
FGDs 
Quant. 
survey 
modules 
 
Quant HH 
survey 
modules 
 
SPREAD 
MIS data 
 
IDIs/ FGDs 
with 
community 
members 
 
Not measured directly 
via evaluation given 
short time frame for 
impacts to be shown 
but some 
hypotheses/assumptio
ns can be drawn 
based on impact 
pathway 
Evaluation 
component 
Process 
evaluation 
Process 
evaluation 
Qualitative 
evaluation 
Quant survey  
Process 
evaluation 
Qualitative 
evaluation 
Quant. 
survey  
Quant. 
survey 
Qualitative 
evaluation 
 
 
Final report 
section  
Section 3.1 Section 3.2–3.4 Section 
3.4–3.6 
Section 4 n/a 
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